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Post-Deregulation Developments in Financial Services 
The Case of the Banking Industry in Argentina.
Summary
This thesis studies post-deregulation developments in financial services by examining the 
banking industry in Argentina during the 1990s. The main interests of this study lie in the 
analysis o f the effects o f consolidation in the banking industry on market power, cost 
economies and economic welfare, the relationship between ownership structure and economic 
efficiency and the consequences of consolidation and banks' geographic diversification on 
multimarket contact and market entry dynamics. Chapter 1 introduces the main issues discussed 
in the thesis and Chapter 2 describes the contextual industry framework and the post­
deregulation developments that form the basis for the empirical analysis undertaken in the 
remaining chapters.
Chapter 3 explores the effects o f consolidation on market power, cost economies and economic 
welfare using bank-level data for Argentine retail stock banks over the period 1993-2000 to 
estimate a cost-function based model incorporating deposits- and loans-market pricing 
behaviour. The results provide evidence of market power exploitation in the market for loans 
but not in the market for deposits and also the presence of significant cost economies. The 
findings further show an increase in consumers’ surplus and banks’ profits over the period 
possibly associated with the exploitation of scale economies and technical change, which may 
have counteracted the effect o f  market power.
Chapter 4 uses different approaches to measure cost and profit efficiency as well as scale 
economies and technical change for different ownership types in the banking industry over the 
1993-2000 period. The results indicate that within the domestic-owned banking sector, stock 
banks seem to be more cost efficient than mutual and public-owned banks, that all banks 
operate under increasing returns to scale but that only stock banks benefited from technical 
progress. The findings also reveal that domestic-owned stock banks appear to be as efficient as 
forcign-owned banks in terms o f both costs and profits. The results also indicate an increase in 
efficiency for all ownership types over the sample period, however, the most significant 
improvement appear to be that of mutual and public-owned banks.
Chapter 5 examines the impact o f multimarkct contact on entry into new markets in the banking 
industry over the 1994-2000 period using survival analysis techniques. The results suggest that 
banks with large asset bases and greater experience arc more likely to expand into new markets 
when the level o f demographic variables such as population density, demand or market growth 
arc favourable. The findings tentatively imply that multimarkct contact reduces the likelihood 
of entry into new markets and that other factors such as market dominance and market 
concentration also have a negative impact on entry. Finally, the results reveal that strategic 
similarity among multimarkct competitors possibly amplifies the negative effect of multimarkct 
contact on the hazard of entry. Chapter 6 summarises the findings of the thesis and discusses 
avenues for future research.
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
The banking industry has experienced extraordinary changes over the last decades. 
Banking markets have been deregulated and opened up to foreign competition in a 
number o f  countries around the world with the aim of achieving more efficiency. As 
banking markets were seen as partly characterised by collusive behaviour, liberalisation 
policies have been targeted at fostering innovation and efficiency, by making markets 
more competitive and reducing oligopoly rents. An additional objective was to put an 
end to the financial repression, where the level of interest rates to depositors were 
maintained artificially low by governments. As a result, post-deregulation 
developments such as mergers and consolidation, privatisation of public-owned banks 
and entry of foreign banks have led to deep changes in the structure of domestic 
banking markets.
Deregulation and liberalisation policies in the Argentine banking system were 
motivated by similar reasons. The new government that took office in 1989 found the 
economy submerged in hyperinflation, a persisting recession and a dramatic fiscal 
deficit. The new administration therefore embarked on a reform process aimed at the 
resizing of the State, the deregulation of the economy and the integration of the country 
into the international community. Financial deregulation and liberalisation were 
adopted with the aim of facilitating greater competition in the financial sector. These 
policies were also accompanied by several reforms oriented towards strengthening 
safety and soundness in the banking sector. As a result o f these reforms, the structure of
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the banking industry changed to a substantial degree. The number o f banks declined, 
banking concentration increased sharply, banks became larger and more geographically 
diversified and public-owned banks lost participation to private banks, with an 
increasing presence of foreign-owned entities.
This thesis studies post-deregulation developments in financial services by examining 
the retail banking industry in Argentina after its deregulation in the early 1990s. The 
retail banking industry is of special interest for competition analysis and antitrust policy 
as it serves households and small- and medium-sized firms. This is because retail 
banking is more likely than wholesale banking to be subject to market imperfections 
such as market power due to information asymmetries between sellers and buyers, 
switching costs, and the prevalence of local rather than international markets. Post­
deregulation developments in the retail banking industry include mergers, consolidation 
and geographic expansion, privatisation o f public-owned banks and entry of foreign 
financial institutions. These events raise many interesting research and policy issues.
Previous research has analysed the effects of consolidation on market power or cost 
economies in retail banking markets. None of these studies, however, have focused on 
the market power and cost economics consequences of consolidation on consumers’ 
welfare. Existing empirical evidence has also examined the relative efficiency of 
private and public-owned firms, mainly in non-financial industries. Due to data 
limitations, few works have analysed efficiency differences across several ownership 
types in the retail banking industry. Past research on the effects o f multimarket contact 
on banks’ competitive behaviour has mainly focused on outcomes o f  rivalry rather than 
on the rivalry process itself. This thesis contributes to the banking literature by
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providing new empirical evidence on the effects of consolidation on market power, cost 
economies and economic welfare, on the relative efficiency of different ownership 
types and on the influence of banks’ geographic expansion on multimarket contact and 
local market competition.
This thesis is of particular interest to both policy makers and academics. Based on a 
unique data set -  as will be discussed next -  the thesis extends existing research by 
casting new light on the following three main questions. First, what are the effects of 
changes in market power and cost economies, as a result of consolidation, on 
consumers’ surplus and banks’ profits. Second, what are the efficiency differences 
between: (i) public-owned and private banks, (ii) mutual and stock banks, and (iii) 
domestic- and foreign-owned banks. Third, what is the effect of multimarket contact on 
banks’ rates of entry into new geographic markets.
These issues are addressed using post-deregulation data over the 1993-2000 period. 
Such a period covers a decade of institutional order and economic stability. These 
conditions were however interrupted in December 2001 with the resignation o f  the 
Nation’s President, the devaluation of the currency, the freezing of bank deposits and 
an asymmetric ‘pesification’ of banks’ loans and deposits. While loans denominated in 
dollars were converted into pesos according to the exchange rate established by the 
Convertibility Law (one peso per U.S. dollar), deposits denominated in foreign 
currency were converted at a different rate (1.4 pesos per U.S. dollar), which ultimately 
led to imbalances in banks’ balance sheets. The findings of this thesis are not, however, 
affected by such events. The implications drawn from the empirical results could in fact 
assist policy makers in the development o f  future policies.
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1.2 Data
Many studies in the empirical banking literature use aggregate industry data to analyse 
market power or the effects of multimarket contact on competition due to data 
limitations. Additionally, while few studies analyse the Argentine banking industry, 
none of these works considers the period 1993-2000 due to data availability. 
Information at the bank level became available in 1997, when the Central Bank started 
publishing accounting and other type of data at the bank level. Before then detailed 
aggregate data for the industry were publicly available, but information on individual 
banks was far from detailed. The data for the period 1993-1997 was obtained as a result 
o f special requests to the Central Bank. For this reason, the data set used in this study is 
unique.
The distinguishing features o f the data set used in the thesis are twofold. Firstly, drawn 
on accounting and additional information from the retail banking industry, the data set 
records detailed cost and output data for different types of banks, which allows analysis 
of the cost structure of the industry as well as consideration of cost and profit efficiency 
differences between different ownership types. Secondly, the data set provides detailed 
information of banks’ branches localisation, which permits detailed analysis of banks’ 
decisions in terms of geographic expansion. This information is rarely available for a 
developing country. This fact also makes the data set used in this study unique.
1.3 Structure and Aims
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides the contextual 
industry framework that leads to the research questions addressed in the rest o f the 
thesis. The first part of the chapter describes the characteristics of the consolidation
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process in the Argentine banking industry, its effects on the structure of the sector and 
on the geographic range of banks’ operations. The second part of the chapter examines 
the privatisation of public-owned banks, the entry of foreign financial institutions and 
discusses the changes in the ownership structure of the industry as a result o f  these 
developments. This chapter is not intended, however, to be a full appraisal o f the 
effects o f financial deregulation and regulatory reforms.
The three chapters that follow present empirical results. Each chapter makes use of 
different data. Chapter 3 uses balance sheet data of stock banks only, Chapter 4 makes 
use of the same balance sheet data but for all retail banks in the industry and Chapter 5 
utilises branch location information, bank-level accounting data as well as market-level 
information for all retail banks. As mentioned above, the quantity and richness of the 
data collected and used in this study represents a significant advance over other works 
carried out for the industry. A detailed report of the data sources and the construction of 
the variables is included in each chapter.
Chapter 3 examines the market and cost structure of the banking industry in order to 
provide some useful insights on the effects of consolidation on market power, cost 
economies and economic welfare. To that aim it estimates a cost-function based model 
incorporating deposits- and loans-market pricing behaviour. This study differs from 
previous works in two ways. Firstly, it examines market power in both the markets for 
loans (output) and deposits (input) using bank-level data and allowing for a flexible 
cost structure. Secondly, it is the first study that analyses the effects of consolidation on 
market power, cost economics and consumers’ welfare. The results provide evidence of 
market power exploitation in the market for loans but not in the market for deposits.
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The findings also suggest the presence of significant cost economies. The results 
further show an increase in consumers’ surplus and banks’ profits over the period 
possibly associated with the exploitation of scale economies and technical change, 
which may have counteracted the effect of market power.
Chapter 4 explores efficiency differences between stock, mutual, public- and foreign- 
owned banks. To that aim it uses different approaches to measure cost and profit 
efficiency as well as scale economies and technical change for the different ownership 
types in the retail banking sector. This study makes two contributions to the empirical 
banking literature. Firstly, this is the first study to consider efficiency differences across 
four ownership types: stock, mutual, public- and foreign-owned banks. Secondly, it 
analyses the relationship between ownership and efficiency in a developing economy. 
The results indicate that within the domestic-owned banking sector, stock banks seem 
to be more cost efficient than mutual and public-owned banks, that all banks operate 
under increasing returns to scale but that only stock banks benefited from technical 
progress. The findings also reveal that domestic-owned stock banks appear to be as 
efficient as foreign-owned banks in terms of both costs and profits. The results also 
indicate an increase in efficiency for all ownership types over the post-deregulation 
period, however, the most significant improvement appear to be that of mutual and 
public-owned banks.
Chapter 5 examines the impact of multimarket contact on banks’ rates of entry into new 
geographic markets. To that aim it uses bank-market level data, includes controls for 
bank- and market-level characteristics and uses survival analysis techniques. The main 
contribution of this study to the multimarket contact literature lies in the analysis of the
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moderating effects o f several variables, which have not been considered, at least 
simultaneously, in previous works. The results suggest that banks with large asset bases 
and greater experience are more likely to expand into new markets when the level of 
demographic variables such as population density, demand intensity or market growth 
are favourable. The findings tentatively imply that multimarket contact reduces the 
likelihood of entry into new markets and that other factors such as market dominance 
and market concentration also have a negative impact on entry. Finally, the results 
seem to reveal that strategic similarity among multimarket competitors amplifies the 
negative effect of multimarket contact on the hazard of entry.
Chapter 6 concludes. This chapter draws the thesis together by reviewing the main 
findings of the preceding chapters. It also brings together the main policy implications 
provided by the empirical results. This chapter concludes offering further avenues for 
future research based on the analysis developed throughout the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Post-Deregulation Developments in the Argentine Banking
Industry
2.1 Introduction
At the beginning o f the last century, Argentina possessed a well-developed financial 
system with significant financial savings in an economy o f low inflation and persistent 
growth.1 The banking sector played an important role allocating savings to investment 
and financing the country’s development. Capital was very mobile and domestic 
interest rates as well as prices were close to international levels. However, the Great 
Depression and the radical change of the economic system towards an import 
substitution model in the early 1940s led to a long period of financial repression, 
increasing macroeconomic instability and chronically high inflation rates. Minimum 
reserve requirements were set at 100% and bank deposits were administered on behalf 
of the Central Bank until the late 1950s. Real interest rates were considered an 
instrument of economic policy and remained negative until the late 1970s. As a result, 
credit was rationed and privileged to sectors producing import substitutes, the 
government and housing.2
At the end of the 1980s the Argentine economy was characterised by high inflation as a 
result of increasing fiscal imbalances and foreign debt expansion. During 1989 
consumer prices increased by 4,924%, the real exchange rate reached the highest
1 The M3 to GDP ratio (a measure of financial depth) was at 50-60%, the average annual inflation rate 
was 1.8% while GDP growth averaged 3.9% annually (Vénganzonés and Winograd, 1997).
2 For a detailed analysis of Argentina’s monetary and financial evolution see Escudé (1991) and 
Vénganzonés and Winograd (1997).
8
historic level, GDP dropped by 6.2% and the unemployment rate rose to 7.6%. In this 
context, the government set out an ambitious economic programme oriented towards 
deregulation of the economy, liberalisation of financial markets, renegotiation of public 
debt, reorganisation of the public sector - mainly through the privatisation of public 
utilities - and opening of trade. At the beginning of 1991 the Convertibility Law fixed 
the peso at par with the U.S. dollar. Since then the performance of the Argentine 
economy changed to a substantial degree and the macroeconomic instability notably 
reduced: the annual inflation rate fell to one digit, GDP increased at an annual rate of 
5.5% throughout the first half o f the decade, although growth rates have been volatile 
since 1996, the fiscal deficit was virtually eliminated but unemployment increased, the 
trade balance surplus became a deficit and the foreign debt increased.
The effects of both economic recovery and financial deregulation had a significant 
impact on the functioning o f domestic financial and credit markets, basically 
characterised by an increase in the degree of monetisation and an improvement in the 
credit volume.3 A new Central Bank Charter further contributed to the recovery, 
modernisation and development of the banking sector. In particular, the new Charter 
limited rediscounting and public sector loans to emergencies and forbade the use of 
money supply to finance public deficit. In addition, the Central Bank improved the 
regulation of capital and reserve requirements and the inspection of financial entities 
through the Superintendence of Financial Institutions. More severe norms concerning 
capital adequacy, diversification of credit risks, provisions for non-performing loans 
and minimum auditing standards were adopted. Additionally, foreign entry restrictions 
were loosened and a process towards the privatisation of public-owned banks started.
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These reforms were basically aimed at ensuring the safety and soundness of the 
financial system and at the same time at making the banking sector efficient and 
competitive. As a result of these reforms, the banking industry experienced important 
changes, which accelerated after the Mexican crisis of 1994. Firstly, several mergers 
and acquisitions among domestic banks took place. This process led to a significant 
reduction in the number of banks operating in the system and a notable increase in the 
degree o f concentration. Secondly, as a result of the privatisation process and the 
elimination of entry restrictions, the ownership structure changed to a substantial 
degree towards an industry increasingly dominated by private and foreign-owned 
banks. Finally, the size and geographic diversification of banks increased notably.
This chapter examines post-deregulation developments in the Argentine banking 
industry to provide the background for the empirical analysis. The rest o f the chapter is 
organised as follows. Section 2.2 analyses the characteristics of the consolidation 
process in the retail banking industry and its consequences in terms of market 
concentration, activity level and geographic expansion o f retail banks. Section 2.3 
discusses the ownership changes that resulted from the privatisation process and the 
entry of foreign banks. Section 2.4 summarises and presents the conclusions. 3
3 The M3 to GDP ratio raised from 5.2% in 1990 to 18.4% in 1994 and 32.6% in 1999 (Asociación de 
Bancos Argentinos, 1999).
10
2.2 Consolidation and Geographic Expansion
The reforms implemented throughout the 1990s led to mergers and acquisitions among 
domestic banks (M&As), to failures of smaller financial institutions and also to the 
entry of large foreign banks, which prompted a constant process of consolidation that 
accelerated during the Mexican crisis of 1994. Table 2.1 shows the number of M&As, 
failures, conversions, privatisations and authorisation of new entities that took place 
over the 1993-2000 period. Figures in Table 2.1 show that these events led to a decline 
in the number of banks from 134 in 1993 to 65 in 2000. The 20 failures and 55 M&As, 
almost all o f  them among private banks, explain the reduction in the number of 
institutions. In addition, the privatisation o f  more than half of the 28 public provincial 
banks operating in 1993 accounts for the decline in the number of public banks.
Table 2.1
M&A, failures, conversions and privatisation
Argentine retail banking industry, 1993-2000.
Type of bank
December
1993 M&A* F C P A
December
2000
Public 29 -2 0 0 -16 0 11
- National 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
- Provincial b 28 -2 0 0 • 16 0 10
Private I0S -53 -20 0 16 6 54
- Domestic 95 -61 -20 0 16 4 34
Stock 56 -34 -15 6 16 4 33
Mutual 39 -27 -5 -6 0 0 1
- Foreignc 10 8 0 0 0 2 20
Total 134 -55 -20 0 0 6 65
Source: Own calculations based on Información de Entidades Financieras, Banco Central de la República 
Argentina.
Notes: * M&A: mergers and acquisitions; F: failures; C: conversions; P: privatisations; A: authorisation 
of new entities. b Includes municipal banks.c Includes local banks under foreign control ($0% or more of 
shares foreign-owned) and local offices of foreign banks.
II
The structure of the industry notably changed as a result of the consolidation process. 
Table 2.2 presents market structure and activity level indicators over the 1993-2000 
period. The information suggests that, despite the noteworthy reduction in the number 
of institutions, financial intermediation significantly increased between 1993 and 2000 
as deposits rose from $39.7 to $83.3 and loans increased from $40.7 to $73.5 billion, 
with an impressive jump in the number of accounts. But market concentration, as 
measured by either deposits or loans, also increased sharply. Despite remaining low in 
absolute terms, the Herfmdahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for loans increased from 503 to 
792 over the period.4 This tendency towards increasing concentration could be 
explained by the M&As, which not only reduced the number of firms but also increased 
the inequality in the size distribution of banks as the dispersion in market shares 
escalated from 1.8 to 3.2%. This is further confirmed by the market shares of banks 
classified by size: large banks increased their market share of loans from 85.8% in 1993 
to 92.2% in 2000, while medium and small-sized institutions lost 4.5% and 1.9% of the 
loans market, respectively.5
The consolidation process led not only to substantial changes in the size of banks and 
the distribution of market shares but also in the geographic range of banks’ operations. 
Table 2.3 shows the proportion of banks operating in different provinces and the 
network size and geographic diversification of the average bank. The data reveal that 
83% of banks had branches in one to four provinces in 1993, while the proportion of
4 The HHI of concentration is defined as the sum of the squared market shares of all banks in the market. 
The formula is HHI-LsZ-fv^+iyN, where Sj is the market share of bank j, N the number of banks in 
the market and v the coefficient of variation of banks' market shares. The HHI thus synthesises 
information on both the number of banks in the market and the distribution of market shares. The HHI 
has an upper value of 10,000, in the case of a monopolist firm with 100% of the market, and tends to 
zero in the case of a large number of firms with small market shares.
’ Banks arc classified into three groups (large, medium and small) according to their volume of loans in 
each year.
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banks operating in less than five provinces fell to 58% by 2000. In addition, the 
proportion of banks operating in more than 20 provinces increased from 3 to 10%. The 
figures in Table 2.3 also show that in 1993 the average bank had 30 branches - located 
in 4 provinces - while in 2000 the average bank operated a network of 72 branches - 
located in 7 provinces.
Table 2.2
Market structure and activity level
Argentine retail banking industry, 1993-2000.
Measure 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of banks 
Volume (billion $) *
Loans
Deposits
Number of accounts (million) 
Loans 
Deposits 
Concentration b 
HHI
Market Shares St.Dev. (%) 
Market share (% )b 
Large 
Medium 
Small
134 135 108 95
40.7 50.9 48.2 52.8
39.7 46.0 39.9 49.3
4.9 5.0 4.5 5.5
7.8 9.1 9.1 10.1
503.4 476.6 550.4 588.2
1.82 1.77 2.21 2.30
85.8 85.1 80.7 80.5
10.1 11.2 15.7 15.3
4.1 3.7 3.6 4.2
89 75 71 65
60.8 72.2 75.5 73.5
62.5 75.7 80.9 83.3
7.5 9.6 9.8 10.2
12.7 16.8 18.3 19.1
572.5 704.0 724.0 791.6
2.32 2.79 2.90 3.18
80.5 85.6 91.5 92.2
9.0 11.8 6.2 5.5
10.5 2.6 2.3 2.2
Source: Own calculations based on Financial Statements and Información de Entidades Financieras, 
Banco Central de la República Argentina.
Notes: * Constant pesos December 2000. b Loans.
The consolidation process also led to changes in interest rates, banks’ efficiency and 
profitability. Table 2.4 presents financial indicators for the retail banking industry over 
the 1993-200 period. The level o f interest rates shows that the intermediation spread
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declined from 14% to 12%, though it remained high.6 The level o f interest rates rose 
during the Mexican crisis of 1995, but at the end of the period the interest rate on 
deposits is one third while that on loans one fifth lower than their initial values. The 
efficiency ratios suggest a clear improvement over the entire period. On the one hand, 
they show a sustained decrease in operating expenses as a proportion of total assets 
(from 11.6 to 8.0). The reduction of the number of employees as well as of wages 
seems to be the main reason explaining this tendency. On the other hand, deposits per 
employee more than doubled during the period, which suggests an increase in the 
degree of ‘bancarisation’ and in labour productivity. Profitability, measured by returns 
on equity or returns on assets, shows a significant improvement over the second half of 
the period.
Table 2.3
Geographic diversification
Argentine retail banking industry, 1993-2000.
Proportion of banks with operations in (%): Average bank
Year Less than 5 6 to 10 11 to 20 More than 20 Number of Number of
Provinces provinces provinces Provinces branches provinces
1993 83.2 8.4 5.3 3.1 30 4
1994 80.9 10.7 5.3 3.1 30 4
1995 71.4 14.3 9.9 4.4 42 5
1996 70.1 12.6 12.6 4.6 45 5
1997 69.1 12.3 13.6 4.9 49 6
1998 62.5 16.7 12.5 8.3 61 7
1999 60.3 15.9 14.3 9.5 70 7
2000 58.1 16.1 16.1 9.7 72 7
Source: Own calculations based on information provided by the Banco Central de la República
Argentina.
6 The intermediation spread is simply measured as the difference between the interest rate on loans and 
that on deposits.
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Evolution of financial indicators
Table 2.4
Argentine retail banking industry, 1993-2000.
Indicator (%) * 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Interest rates
Deposits 9.7 9.1 15.7 7.3 7.0 7.2 7.1 6.9
Loans 23.7 21.9 24.5 17.0 15.4 15.9 18.0 18.9
Economic efficiency
Operating expenses / Assets 11.6 10.6 11.1 8.7 7.7 7.0 8.0 8.0
Labour expenses / Assets 6.5 5.9 6.2 4.8 4.0 3.5 3.9 3.8
Deposits/Employee (thousand $) 275.9 323.8 182.1 404.3 476.0 556.6 578.0 581.6
Profitability
Profit / Equity (ROE) 10.3 6.8 -11.9 -9.0 8.5 14.8 12.4 12.7
Profit / Asset (ROA) 1.5 0.5 -3.0 -1.3 0.8 1.9 2.2 2.0
Source: Own calculations based on Financial Statements. 
Notes: ‘ Annual indicators.
2.3 Ownership Structure
The Argentine banking industry is characterised by a diversity of bank ownership 
types. Argentine banks can be classified as public- and private-owned banks. The 
former can be national- or provincial-owned, whereas the latter can have a mutual or 
stock ownership structure. Mutual banks are formally owned by their depositors and 
possibly their borrowers while stock banks are owned by their shareholders.7 Stock 
banks can be further classified as domestic- or foreign-owned. The ownership structure 
of the industry changed during the 1990s as a result of the privatisation of public 
provincial banks, the consolidation of mutual banks and the entry of foreign financial 
institutions through the acquisition of domestic banks. Table 2.5 shows the evolution of 
the ownership structure in the Argentine banking industry over the 1993-2000 period.
7 These two types of banks also differ in that the stock bank can increase its capital by issuing new stock 
while the mutual increases capital via retained earnings.
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The privatisation of banks started in 1991, but the funds provided by the Fondo 
Fiduciario - set up during 1995 with funds from multilateral institutions - and the 
deposit insurance agency (SEDESA) contributed to accelerate the process (Calomiris 
and Powell, 2001). As a consequence, 12 banks were privatised during the period 1994- 
1996, followed by an additional 4 during the period 1997-2000 (see Table A1 in the 
Appendix). The privatised institutions were primarily acquired by other existing 
domestic banks or domestic groups of investors. Two o f  the ten largest banks in 
Argentina, the Banco de la Nacion Argentina and the Banco de la Provincia de Buenos 
Aires, still remain under the control of the national government and the provincial 
government of Buenos Aires, respectively.
Table 2.5
Ownership structure
Argentine retail banking industry, 1993-2000.
Year Total Public Private
Provincial* National Mutual Stock Foreign 6
1993 134 28 1 39 56 10
1994 135 28 1 38 58 10
1995 106 25 1 16 53 11
1996 95 18 1 8 55 13
1997 89 14 1 7 46 21
1998 75 10 1 4 40 20
1999 71 10 1 2 36 22
2000 65 10 1 1 33 20
Source: Own calculations based on Información de Entidades Financieras, Banco Central de la República 
Argentina.
Notes: * Includes municipal banks. b Includes local banks under foreign control (50% or more of shares 
foreign-owned) and local offices of foreign banks.
Table 2.5 shows that privatisation reduced the number of public provincial banks from 
28 in 1993 to 10 in 2000." In addition, the number of private institutions decreased
1 Two provincial banks were absorbed i.e. the Banco Social de Córdoba was absorbed by the Banco de 
la Provincia de Córdoba and the Banco Municipal de Paraná was absorbed by Banco de Entre Rios S.A.
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from 105 to 54. The number of private banks halved as a result of mergers, acquisitions 
and failures, especially after the Mexican crisis of 1994. Table 2.6 presents the market 
share of public- and private-owned banks over 1993-2000. The figures reveal that 
public banks lost almost 15% of the market for loans, nearly 10% of the market for 
deposits and about 20% of total assets. In contrast, the two largest public banks - Banco 
Nacion and Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aires - slightly increased their market 
share of loans (deposits) from 20.6% (23.7%) in 1993 to 24.6% (25.6%) in 2000. 
Finally, private banks gained more than 15% of the market for loans, nearly 8% of the 
market for deposits and almost 10% of total assets.9
Table 2.6
Market share of public- and private-owned banks
Argentine retail banking industry, 1993-2000.
Loans Deposits Assets
Year Public Largest Private Public Largest Private Public Largest Private
public*____________________public*____________________public*
1993 24.2 20.6 55.2 17.3 23.7 59.0 17.8 17.9 64.3
1994 19.8 20.2 60.0 14.9 21.0 64.1 15.3 17.0 67.7
1995 18.0 23.2 58.8 13.4 24.4 62.2 13.2 18.1 68.7
1996 14.1 22.2 63.7 10.5 25.0 64.5 9.4 15.2 75.4
1997 11.4 22.1 66.5 7.9 25.8 66.3 6.7 14.0 79.3
1998 10.6 22.7 66.7 8.3 26.9 64.8 7.1 14.1 78.8
1999 5.9 23.2 70.9 7.6 25.6 66.8 4.1 14.2 81.7
2000 4.6 24.6 70.8 7.5 25.6 66.9 3.9 12.9 83.2
Source: Own calculations based on Financial Statements.
Notes: * The two largest public banks arc Banco Nacion and Banco de la Provincia de Buenos Aries.
Another distinguishing feature of the Argentine banking industry during the 1990s was 
the consolidation of mutual banks. Between 1994 and 1995, the number of mutual 
banks decreased from 38 to 16, mainly as a consequence of mergers and acquisitions *
* During the Tequila crisis, the financial system lost deposits, however larger private and public banks 
gained deposits from other mutual and public provincial banks i.e. flight to ‘quality’ (Calomiris and
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(see Table A2 in the Appendix). These banks basically merged due to the loss of 
deposits experienced during the Mexican crisis. For example, five banks merged into a 
new mutual bank - Banco Argencoop - while another eight originated a new stock bank 
- Banco BISEL. During the second half of the decade the number of mutual banks 
further declined as a consequence of failures and also the conversion of several mutual 
banks to stock financial institutions. As a result, the share of mutual banks in total loans 
(deposits) fell from 5.5% (6.6%) to 1.2% (1.4%) between 1993 and 2000.
Probably the most notorious change in the Argentine banking industry during the last 
decade was the entry of foreign banks. The removal of restrictions on foreign direct 
investment and the repatriation of profits facilitated by the Convertibility Law allowed 
more foreign institutions to enter the domestic market. After the Mexican crisis, British, 
Canadian, French and Spanish (to name a few) financial institutions entered the 
domestic market primarily through acquisitions of domestic banks that were in a good 
financial condition and have an extended network of branches, rather than through the 
acquisition of privatised provincial banks. This process began slowly in 1995-1996, but 
accelerated significantly during 1997-1999. As a result, the number of foreign banks 
increased from 10 in 1993 to 20 in 2000 the majority of which are European followed 
by American (see Table A3 in the Appendix). Table 2.7 presents the evolution of 
market shares o f foreign- and domestic-owned banks in Argentina over 1993-2000. The 
data shows that foreign-owned banks significantly increased their market share of loans 
(deposits) from 14.5% (14.0%) in 1993 to 49.6% (48.4%) in 2000. In contrast, 
domestic banks lost almost 35% of the market for loans and deposits.
Powell, 2001).
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Market share of foreign- and domestic-owned banks
Table 2.7
Argentine retail banking industry, 1993-2000.
Year
Loans Deposits Assets
Foreign * Domestic Foreign * Domestic Foreign * Domestic
1993 14.5 85.5 14.0 86.0 14.2 85.8
1994 15.1 84.9 15.3 84.7 13.6 86.4
1995 17.6 82.4 18.8 81.2 18.9 81.1
1996 41.1 58.9 38.2 61.8 40.5 59.5
1997 44.4 55.6 41.4 58.6 46.1 53.9
1998 45.6 54.4 42.6 57.4 47.6 52.4
1999 47.9 52.1 46.8 53.2 50.4 49.6
2000 49.6 50.4 48.4 51.6 53.5 46.5
Source: Own calculations based on Financial Statements.
Notes: * Includes local banks under foreign control (50% or more of shares foreign-owned) and local 
offices of foreign banks.
Table 2.8 presents efficiency and profitability indicators by ownership type. Efficiency 
ratios at the beginning of the period show that mutual and public-owned banks appear 
to be the least efficient in terms of operating expenses to total assets, labour expenses to 
total assets and deposits per employee. These efficiency indicators also reveal an 
improvement for all ownership types over the decade. During the second half o f the 
period, the differences between stock, mutual and public-owned banks in terms of 
operating expenses to total assets, labour expenses to total assets and deposits per 
employee are smaller than over the first half of the period.
Profitability measures at the beginning of the period show that within the domestic 
banking sector stock banks appear to be more profitable, in terms of both returns on 
equity and returns on assets, than mutual and public-owned banks. But the differences 
in profitability between stock domestic- and foreign-owned banks seem to be small. 
When analysed over time, profitability shows an improvement for all ownership types, 
but especially for mutual institutions. In fact, at the end of the period mutual banks
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exhibit the highest rate of return on assets (and rate of return on equity) when compared 
with the other ownership types. This result may be explained by the significant decline 
in the number of mutual banks leading to the presence of just one mutual institution at 
the end of the decade.
Table 2.8
Financial indicators
Stock, mutual, public- and foreign-owned retail banks, 1993-2000.
1993-1996 1997-2000
Indicator (%) *
Public Mutual Stock Foreign Public Mutual Stock Foreign
Interest rates
Deposits 9.9 12.6 10.6 5.8 6.3 6.7 7.1 6.2
Loans 18.3 25.9 22.4 13.3 15.1 19.6 18.9 14.6
Economic efficiency
Operating exp / Assets 10.4 13.7 9.7 7.5 8.5 8.8 8.3 6.3
Labour exp / Assets 6.1 7.3 5.2 4.2 4.2 4.0 4.1 3.0
Deposits/Employee (thousand $) 269.4 213.5 280.6 515.6 468.9 482.8 449.8 775.9
Profitability
Profit / Equity (ROE) -20.5 -0.8 7.4 4.2 7.2 16.4 16.6 14.9
Profit / Asset (ROA) -5.4 0.0 0.9 0.5 1.0 2.7 2.5 2.1
Source: Own calculations based on Financial Statements. 
Notes: ‘ Annual indicators.
2.4 Conclusions
At the beginning of the 1990s, the banking industry in Argentina was deregulated and 
opened up to foreign competition with the aim of making the sector efficient and 
competitive. As a result of these reforms, the banking industry experienced important 
changes, which accelerated after the Mexican crisis of 1994. Firstly, several mergers 
and acquisitions among domestic banks took place. This process led to a significant 
reduction in the number of banks operating in the system and a notable increase in the
20
degree o f  concentration. Secondly, as a result of the privatisation process and the 
elimination of entry restrictions, the ownership structure changed to a substantial 
degree towards an industry increasingly dominated by private and foreign-owned 
banks. Finally, the size and geographic diversification o f banks increased notably.
These changes raise important policy concerns. First, the increasing levels of 
concentration could allow banks to take advantage of market power by setting prices 
less favourable to consumers and reducing output levels. But at the same time, the 
increasing size of banks could allow them to exploit cost economies. Second, the high 
level o f inefficiency that characterises public-owned banks suggests that privatisation 
policies should lead to efficiency improvements. Additionally, the increasing presence 
of foreign-owned banks could place domestic banks under peer pressure to improve 
efficiency. Third, the increasing geographic presence o f large banks and their higher 
degree o f  multimarket contact could facilitate tacit agreements, with the consequent 
negative effects on consumers.
These observations suggest that two opposing effects could be operating in the banking 
industry as a result o f post-deregulation developments. On the one hand, the larger 
scale o f banks’ operations resulting from consolidation, the increasing presence of 
private banks derived from privatisation and increased competition from foreign 
institutions could lead to efficiency gains, which could be transferred to consumers in 
the form of more favourable prices and higher output levels. On the other hand, the 
increasing degree o f concentration among larger banks and the higher degree o f  contact 
among these larger institutions could facilitate the exploitation of market power, with 
the consequent negative effects on consumers. If the first effect is more important,
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consumers will be better off as a result of deregulation. In contrast, if the second effect 
dominates, the consequences o f  the structural changes on consumers’ welfare will be 
negative. These issues are analysed in the following chapters.
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Appendix
Table Al
Privatisation of public banks
Argentine retail banking industry, 1993-2000.
Bank Privatisation started* Private ownership started1
Provincial
De la Provincia de La Rioja NA July 1994
Del Chaco S.E.M. November 1993 November 1994
De Entre Rios S.A. August 1993 January 1995
De la Provincia de Formosa December 1995 December 1995
De la Provincia de Misiones August 1993 January 1996
De la Provincia de Rio Negro July 1992 March 1996
Provincial de Salta July 1994 March 1996
De la Provincia de Tucumán January 1996 July 1996
De la Provincia de San Luis January 1995 August 1996
De la Provincia de Santiago del Estero January 1995 September 1996
De la Provincia de San Juan July 1995 November 1996
De Previsión Social (Mendoza) March 1995 November 1996
De la Provincia de Jujuy June 1995 January 1998
De la Provincia de Santa Fe July 1996 July 1998
De la Provincia de Santa Cruz October 1995 October 1998
Municipal
Municipal de Tucumán July 1996 July 1998
Source: Informe al Congreso de la Nación (various years), Banco Central de la República Argentina. 
Notes: * Date of law or decree authorising privatisation. b Date of creation of private institution.
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Table A2
M&A, failures and conversions
Argentine mutual banking sector, 1993-2000.
Year No of banks 
January
M&A Failures Conversions No of banks 
December
1994 39 -1 0 0 38
1995 38 -19 -1 -2 16
1996 16 -6 0 -2 8
1997 8 0 -1 0 7
1998 7 0 -3 0 4
1999 4 -1 0 -1 2
2000 2 0 0 -1 1
Total -27 -5 -6
Source: Own calculations based on Información de Entidades Financieras, Banco Central de la República
Argentina.
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Chapter 3
Consolidation, Market Power and Cost Economies
3.1 Introduction
Post-deregulation developments in the Argentine banking sector led to deep changes in 
the structure of the industry. The reforms implemented throughout the 1990s led to 
mergers and acquisitions among domestic banks, to failures of smaller financial 
institutions and also to the entry of large foreign banks, through the acquisition of 
domestic institutions, which prompted a constant process of consolidation. As a result 
of this process, the number of banks operating in the system almost halved and 
concentration of deposits and loans among the largest institutions increased sharply 
during the decade.
These significant changes raise important policy concerns. On the one hand, it can be 
argued that a high level of concentration could allow banks to take advantage of 
oligopoly and oligopsony power by raising the interest rate on loans and reducing the 
rate on deposits. On the other hand, the increasing size of banks could be indicative of 
the potential for scale and other types of economies, which could allow larger firms to 
increase their cost efficiency. These efficiency gains can be transferred to borrowers 
and depositors in the form of higher deposit and lower loan interest rates if  competition 
limits the exploitation of market power. Measuring the effects of banking industry 
consolidation on consumers’ welfare thus requires detailed consideration of the 
oligopoly and oligopsony nature of the market as well as the cost structure of the 
industry. Such a model facilitates the evaluation of whether any benefits from
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efficiency gains have been translated to customers or if exploitation of market power 
and cost economies has instead resulted in excess profits.
Previous studies present several limitations. First, most studies have focused on the 
measurement of market power without consideration of the cost structure or have 
estimated cost economies ignoring the market influences on the behaviour of banks and 
ultimately the impact of both on economic welfare. Second, studies have basically 
relied on aggregate data, which are limiting for at least two reasons. On the one hand, 
results based on the assumption that firms have identical cost functions may be 
misleading if firms are heterogeneous. On the other hand, difficulties emerge if the 
industry is represented in terms of an oligopoly and oligopsony rather than monopoly 
and monopsony framework, as this requires modelling individual decision-making 
units. Third, deposits have frequently been considered as inputs, but the potential for 
oligopsony power in this market has been ignored.
This chapter investigates the market and cost structure o f the Argentine banking 
industry using a panel data set for the period 1993-2000. The focus of the analysis is on 
the measurement of market power (in both the markets for loans and deposits), scale 
economics and technological change and their impact on economic welfare. Towards 
this aim it uses a cost function-based model to characterise the cost structure of retail 
banks along with profit maximisation conditions over loans and deposits. It analyses 
the changes in economic welfare associated with the consolidation of the banking 
sector using a partial equilibrium framework by adding up the variations in consumers’ 
surplus and banks’ profit. The results provide evidence of market power exploitation in 
the market for loans (but not deposits) and also the presence of significant cost
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economies. The findings further show an increase in consumers’ surplus and banks’ 
profits over the sample period possibly associated to the exploitation of cost economies 
and technical change which may have counteracted the effect of market power.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 reviews related studies 
regarding the measurement o f  market power and cost economies in general and in the 
banking industry in particular. Section 3.3 introduces the model and the measures of 
market power and cost economies and discusses the empirical implementation. Section
3.4 presents the data sources and definition of variables and provides a brief overview 
of the dataset while section 3.5 discusses the results. Finally, the last section 
summarises and presents the conclusions.
3.2 Literature Review
The traditional approach to the analysis of market power is based on the structure- 
conduct-performance hypothesis (SCP). The conceptual basis of this paradigm, due to 
Mason (1939) and Bain (1951), basically states that high levels of concentration 
(structure) facilitate the adoption of collusive behaviour and thus the setting of higher 
prices and reduced output levels (conduct) ultimately leading to higher profitability 
(performance). Several authors demonstrate that there are some market conditions 
under which the hypothesis is valid. Cowling and Waterson (1976) and Dansby and 
Willig (1979) show that if firms set a target output level rather than price per se and 
choose their output levels assuming that rivals will not vary their output levels in 
response, firms’ profitability will depend on the sum o f squared market shares of all 
firms in the market. Similarly, Saving (1970) demonstrates that a k-firm dominant
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cartel plus a competitive fringe of smaller firms, generate a fixed relationship between 
the combined market share of the k largest firms in the market and firms’ performance.
Several economic theories challenge the realism of these specialised conditions under 
which high levels of concentration lead to higher profitability and show that the 
structure-performance linkage is not valid under alternative assumptions. On the one 
hand, the theory of contestable markets suggests that competitive outcomes can be 
attained even in concentrated markets. Baumol et. al. (1982) shows that if an entrant 
into a market offers the same services at lower prices and can recover any cost o f entry 
while abandoning the industry, competitive prices could be attained regardless o f the 
number of firms in the market.10 On the other hand, the theory of trigger price strategies 
suggests one set of conditions that allow collusive behaviour to be sustained among 
arbitrarily many firms. Friedman (1971) shows that if firms realise that the temporary 
profits one firm could gain by underpricing its rivals could be more than offset by the 
expected losses from rivals’ retaliation in subsequent periods, even a large number of 
firms may tacitly collude.
Empirical studies based upon the SCP hypothesis usually explore different relationships 
between structural concentration measures and profit margins or price levels as proxies 
for performance. In general, these studies seem to provide support for the structure- 
performance linkage. However, these works are subject to several conceptual, 
methodological and data flaws.11 Gilbert (1984) and Weiss (1989) provide good 
summaries of profit- and price-concentration studies in banking while Dcmsetz (1973),
10 Competitive prices are those that cover the costs of production plus a rate of return on capital.
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Smirlock (1985) and Kimmel (1991) present some methodological criticisms. More 
recent studies such as Kurts and Rhoades (1991) and Berger (1991, 1995) try to fix 
these flaws but provide limited support for the structure-performance relationship in 
banking. It therefore becomes evident that a lack of strong theoretical foundations and 
mixed empirical results motivated the search for alternative methodologies to analyse 
market power.
Several alternative approaches have been proposed to analyse market power. These 
techniques directly explore the behaviour of output or prices instead of relying on an 
observation of market structure as the traditional approach proposes. These techniques 
can be classified according to whether reduced form  or structural equations are 
estimated. These methods basically differ in their data requirements and the type of 
assumptions maintained. Within the reduced-form methods, the test proposed by Panzar 
and Rosse (1987) has received particular attention in the banking literature.12 However, 
structural models have become widely used in recent studies o f  market power in the 
banking industry.
The Panzar-Rosse approach (PR) relies on the fact that an individual firm will price 
differently in response to a change in its costs, depending on whether it operates in a 
competitive or monopolistic market. This test uses information on shifts in revenue in 
response to shifts in factor prices to test for market power. The empirical 
implementation requires the estimation of a reduced-form revenue function from which
" These studies are unable to adequately capture heterogeneity across industries and firms. Additionally, 
there are econometric issues of endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables as well as serious data 
problems with these works.
3 Another reduced form approach that has been widely used to test for market power is Hall’s (1988) 
method. This technique is based on the Solow residual 0, which is an index of Hicks-neutral technical 
progress. However, this test has not been used in the banking literature.
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the PR statistic can be computed: sum of the elasticities of revenue with respect to each 
of the factor prices. This statistic equals unity under perfect competition, cannot be 
positive under monopoly and is positive but less than unity under monopolistic 
competition. A major advantage of this technique is that it requires specification of only 
one equation (Shaffer, 1994). However, this test is subject to some practical problems. 
On the one hand, for most demand and cost functions, the correct reduced-form 
revenue function is extremely complicated and the use of a misspecified equation can 
bias the results (Hyde and Perloff, 1995). On the other, the test is powerless for some 
specifications, such as the Cobb-Douglas.
Notwithstanding these drawbacks, several studies have applied this technique to banks. 
Nathan and Neave (1989) analyse a sample of Canadian banks over 1982-1984, finding 
evidence of monopolistic competition. Hannan and Liang (1993) apply the test to a 
sample o f  U.S. banks over 1983-1989 not rejecting the monopoly power hypothesis. 
Molyneux et al. (1994) analyses banking markets in five European countries during 
1986-1989, finding evidence of monopolistic competition in Germany, U.K., France 
and Spain and perfect collusion in Italy. Shaffer and DiSalvo (1994) estimate the PR 
statistic using data for an U.S. county with two banks. They find competitive outcomes 
over the subperiod 1976-1986 but perfect collusion over the full period 1970-1986. 
Carbo ct al. (2001) apply the test to Spanish savings banks over the post-deregulation 
period 1986-1998, finding evidence of monopolistic competition.
Among the alternative approaches, structural models have been widely used to analyse 
market power in the banking industry. The structural approach to the analysis of 
market power basically assumes that firms set prices or quantities in order to maximise
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profits and that such a decision is based on cost considerations and on the degree of 
competition in the market, which depends on demand conditions and also on the 
characteristics of interaction among firms (see Iwata, 1974; Appelbaum, 1979, 1982; 
Gollop and Roberts, 1979). If the inverse market demand is given by p=p(Y,z) where p 
is price, Y market output and z a vector of other shift variables, an effective marginal 
revenue function can thus be defined as MR=p-X/r| (where r| is the price semi-elasticity 
of demand and X is an index of market power).13 The equilibrium condition that the 
industry (or the firm) sets its marginal revenue equal to its marginal cost can then be 
presented as p=MC(Y,w)+X/r| (Bresnahan, 1982).14
This method involves using data to estimate market demand, production or cost 
functions along with pricing equations derived from profit maximising conditions, 
whose parameters allow inference of the degree of market power. If data for each firm 
in the market arc available, a complete model can be estimated and a firm-level 
parameter X can be obtained. This parameter provides information on the conduct of 
firm i, as A.j moves farther from zero the conduct of firm i moves farther from that of a 
perfect competitor. If only aggregate data for the industry are available, the equilibrium 
condition is inferred from aggregate (demand and/or cost) functions and the conduct 
parameter X indicates the industry average (X=0 indicates the market is competitive, 
X=1 denotes a monopolistic market while with n identical firms playing Cournot, X 
equals 1/n).
11 Under the assumption of homogenous products and quantity setting firms.
14 The parameter A is called the ‘conjectural variation', which indicates a firm’s anticipated response by 
its rival(s) to an output change. This parameter is a valid parametcrisation of any type of oligopoly 
equilibrium, however, it has no connection with conjectures (Bresnahan, 1989).
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This structural method has been applied to Uruguayan banks by Spider and Favaro 
(1984) and Gelfand and Spider (1987), to samples of U.S. banks by Shaffer (1989) and 
Shaffer and DiSalvo (1994), to Canadian banks by Shaffer (1993), to Finnish banks by 
Suominen (1994), to Norwegian banks by Berg and Kim (1994, 1998), to Italian banks 
by Angelini and Cetorelli (1999), to European banks by Neven and Roller (1999), to 
Israeli banks by Ribon and Yosha (1999), to a sample of Argentine banks by Burdisso 
et al. (2001) and to a sample of industrialised countries by Shaffer (2001). Table 3.1 
presents the data sources and main findings o f  these works. Many such studies find 
competitive conduct at the overall bank level while others provide evidence of some 
degree of market power among banks in the industry. Some of these studies, however, 
have been hampered by limitations of data and methodology.
Most of these studies rely on aggregate industry data (due to data constraints), which 
are limiting for at least two reasons. Firstly, most studies are based on the assumption 
that firms have identical cost functions, which may lead to misleading results, if firms 
are heterogeneous. Neven and Roller (1999) try to fix this flaw and estimate a model 
under the assumption that marginal cost functions differ across firms. Secondly, 
because the industry is represented in terms of monopoly rather than oligopoly 
framework since the latter requires modelling individual decision-making units 
(Morrison Paul, 2001a). Spiller and Favaro (1984) and Berg and Kim (1994, 1998) 
using firm level data incorporate the oligopolistic nature of the banking industry into 
the (conventional) structural model finding different types of oligopolistic interactions 
among firms. Following a similar approach Burdisso et al. (2001) find competitive 
conduct in the retail and corporate segments o f the Argentine banking industry.
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Table 3.1
Empirical studies of m arket power in the banking industry using structu ral models
Author Sample Findings
Spiller and Favaro 
(1984)
22 banks in Uruguay, 1977-1980 
(monthly)
Stackelberg dominant-firm market.
Gelfand and Spiller 
(1987)
22 banks in Uruguay, 1977-1980 
(monthly)
Market power in national and foreign 
currency denominated loans.
Shaffer (1989) U.S. (aggregate) commercial 
banks, 1941-1983
Coefficient of market power not different 
from zero. Collusion rejected but not perfect 
competition.
Shaffer (1993) Canadian (aggregate) chartered 
banks, 1965-1989.
Coefficient of market power not different 
from zero. Perfect competition not rejected.
Berg and Kim (1994) Norwegian banks, 1988. Coefficient of market power different from 
zero. Cournot rejected.
Shaffer and DiSalvo 
(1994)
Fulton County (aggregate) 
banks, 1970-1986.
Perfect competition, collusion and Cournot 
rejected. Degree of competition between 
competitive and Cournot levels.
Suominen (1994) Finnish (aggregate) banks, 1986- 
1989.
Coefficients of market power different from 
zero after deregulation (but not for the pre­
deregulation period)
Berg and Kim (1998) Norwegian banks, 1990-1992 Coefficient of market power different from 
zero in retail and corporate markets. 
Corporate market close to perfect 
competition.
Angelini and 
Cetorelli (1999)
Italian banks, 1983-1997. Coefficient of market power different from 
zero.
Neven and Roller 
(1999)
Banks in 7 European countries: 
Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, The Netherlands, 
Spain and U.K. (aggregate), 
1981-1989
Coefficients of market power different from 
zero in mortgage and corporate markets. 
Perfect collusion not rejected.
Ribon and Yosha 
(1999)
Israeli (aggregate) banks, 1989- 
1996 (monthly)
Coefficients of market power different from 
zero in loans and deposits markets. Loans 
market more competitive than deposits 
market.
Burdisso et al. (2001) 70 banks in Argentina, 1996- 
1999
Coefficients of market power not different 
from zero in retail and corporate markets.
Shaffer (2001) Banks in IS (North American, 
European and Asian) countries 
(aggregate), 1979-1991
Coefficient of market power different from 
zero in S countries (Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Japan and U.S.).
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While only a few studies in this methodology follow the production approach for the 
definition of outputs and inputs most of them adopt the intermediation approach. This 
view describes banking activities as the ‘transformation’ of money borrowed from 
depositors into money lent to borrowers and thus considers labour, physical as well as 
financial capital (deposits and funds borrowed from financial markets) as inputs while 
the volume of loans and investment outstanding represent outputs. In general, banks are 
assumed to be price takers in the inputs markets, but if  banks have market power in 
deposits the results may be biased. Ribon and Yosha (1999) appear to be the only ones 
to consider the possibility of oligopsony power in the deposits market and find that a 
certain degree of market power in this market seems to exist.
The studies discussed above analyse market power either by relying on measures of 
market concentration or by exploring firms’ behaviour in terms of prices or output 
settings without consideration of firms’ cost structure. However, many studies focus 
instead on firms’ cost structure by applying various methods to differing data sets for 
the purpose of estimating the degree of scale and scope economies and the contribution 
of technical change to reducing costs. Humphrey (1990) and Berger et. al. (1993) 
provide good summaries of such studies in the banking industry. This line of research 
focuses on the properties of the cost function, and most studies assume output to be 
exogenous to the individual bank and hence the process by which it is determined is not 
specified in the models estimated. Thus, performance is assumed not to be affected by 
market power. Berg and Kim (1994) analyse the effects of market power on scale 
economies and find that measures of scale economies are not independent of market 
structure characteristics.
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None of the studies mentioned above analyse the impact of market power and cost 
economies, in a concentrated banking industry, on economic welfare. In a different 
context, Bamea et. al. (2000) estimate a welfare function, which depends on the degree 
of competition, the stability and the operational efficiency of the banking system, to 
compare the size distribution of banks in the Israeli banking industry with the optimal 
one. Notwithstanding this study is subject to some limitations, the findings suggest that 
a move towards a distribution with equal size banks, a fewer number of large and small 
banks and more medium banks, will tend to increase total welfare.15
In view of the limitations of previous empirical studies and in order to analyse the 
impact of both market power and cost economies on economic welfare in a 
consolidating banking industry, the next section introduces a structural model based on 
Morrison Paul (2001a,b,c). The model consists of a cost function along with pricing 
equations derived from profit maximising conditions, and allows costs to differ across 
firms of differing size and to measure market power in the markets for loans and 
deposits, respectively, along with cost economies. The results from this model are then 
used to compute the variations in consumers’ surplus and banks’ profits to measure the 
changes in economic welfare.
3.3 Methodology
The basis of the model is the established principle that, in equilibrium, profit- 
maximising firms will choose quantities such that marginal cost equals their perceived 
marginal revenue, which coincides with the output price under perfect competition but 
with the industry’s marginal revenue under perfect collusion. In the input market, firms
15 This study uses the Marshallian surplus concept to evaluate deadweight loss which is not an exact
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will choose the quantity that corresponds to the equality between the marginal factor 
cost and its value marginal product which in a perfectly competitive market coincides 
with the input price while in a pure monopsony equals the firm’s marginal factor cost. 
In this way, characterisation of market power depends on the cost structure because it 
involves comparing the price of the output or input to its associated marginal valuation 
(the marginal cost for the output or the marginal value for the input). Moreover, 
detailed representation of costs with recognition of cost economies is fundamental to 
the interpretation of market power measures.
The most direct way to measure market power and cost economies is via a cost 
function-based model which incorporates pricing equations capturing the differences 
between output and input market prices and marginal costs or benefits (Morrison Paul, 
2001a). To represent the banking firm this study uses the following multi-output 
restricted cost function c (y,w,x,z), where y is a vector of m outputs, w is a vector of j 
variable input prices, x is a vector of input quantities and z a vector of control and shift 
variables. The adoption of the intermediation approach leads to the following definition 
of outputs and inputs: y includes loans (L) and securities (S), w includes the prices o f 
labour (1), physical capital (k), materials (m) and other purchased funds (f), x represents 
the level instead of the price o f deposits (d), z includes a trend variable to represent the 
effects of technical change and dummy variables to control for firm size.16 This cost 
function expressed in terms of the level of deposits facilitates the incorporation of
measure of welfare change (Hausman, 1981).
16 In cost function models deposits may be specified as outputs, inputs or as having both input and output 
attributes. The interm ediation approach  views deposits as (intermediate) inputs, generated by the bank 
by offering means of payment services to depositors, and used in conjunction with other inputs to 
originate loans and other earning assets. In contrast, the production  approach  considers deposits as 
outputs while the  value-added approach  treats deposits as having both output and input characteristics.
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market power in this input market that causes the demand equation to have a different 
structure than that implied by a Shephard’s lemma condition.17' 18
A detailed representation of technological aspects such as scale economies, technical 
change and input substitution requires consideration of the functional form o f the cost 
function. In particular, the functional form assumed for c(-) should be a second order 
form that allows for the cost-output relationship to be non-proportional and also to 
depend on all input prices (implying non-homotheticity if a full set o f  interaction terms 
between y and the w are included). Moreover, allowing for input substitution requires 
multiple inputs to be separately identified and a full pattern of cross effects or second- 
order terms across them allowed. This is facilitated by using a flexible functional form 
for c(-).
Characterising market power in output and input markets requires profit maximisation 
and potential deviations from competitive markets to be incorporated into the cost 
function model. In the mth output market, the profit maximising output supply decision 
can be represented by MCm=MRm where MCm=0Cj/5ymi represents marginal cost and 
MRm=p(Ym)+ymj(3pm/dYm)' (5Ym/5ym;) is marginal revenue computed from an inverse 
demand function p(Ym) representing the output demand structure (Appelbaum, 1982). 
After some manipulation, this optimality condition for firm i can be presented as:
(3.1) Pn.
5c,
n dym
17 In the presence of market power, the price of deposits becomes endogenous.
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where m=L,S, Xmi=(3Ym/dymi)(ym/Y m) is usually defined as the conjectural elasticity 
of total industry output with respect to the output of the ith firm and r|=-(3Ym/5pn,)/Ym 
is the market demand price semi-elasticity. Under perfect competition dY„Jdym\-0 and 
A.mi= 0 ,  while under pure monopoly Xmj=l since Ym=ymi 19 From (3.1) the degree of 
market power for the ith firm, can be defined as Tmi=(Pmi-3ci/cfymiyPmi->.m/r|p. which is 
composed o f two parts: the conjectural elasticity and the demand price elasticity (rip).20 
It follows that the separate identification of X.mj and r| requires the simultaneous 
estimation o f  (3.1) along with a demand function from which the parameters necessary 
for the identification of rj can be recovered.
A similar specification can be constructed for the x input market since the cost function 
is expressed in terms o f  the level instead of the price o f x. In this market, profit 
maximisation implies the equality between the marginal factor cost and its marginal 
revenue product (or marginal value product if the product market is competitive), 
MFCd= w(Xd) + xd,(aWd/dXdH5Xd/dxdi) = [p( Y)+y,(ep/dY)-(aY/dy.iHdyi/Sx,) = MRPd 
where MFCd is computed from an inverse supply function w(X<i). However, if the 
primal-based MRPd is replaced by its dual equivalent -5cj/dxdj, which is the shadow 
value of xd or the variable-input cost-saving from an additional unit o f xd (Morrison 
Paul, 1999a), the cost-side version of the optimal input pricing equation can be 
expressed as:
"  An alternative approach to measuring market power in the deposits market due to Schroeter (1988) 
requires restrictive assumptions on the cost structure (fixed proportions and separability of deposits from 
the other inputs) which may not be appropriate for the banking industry.
10 In the special case of Cournot behaviour, A. is simply the output share of the ith firm.
20 is the price elasticity o f demand, which equals q/pm (where T| is the price semi-elasticity of 
demand).
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(3.2)
s dx*
where wdl is the input market price, >.d, =(<3Xd/3xdiMxdi/Xd) is firm’s i conjectural 
elasticity in market Xd, e=(3Xd/dwd)/Xd is the industry input supply price semi­
elasticity and -5cj/<3xdi is the marginal shadow price of xd for firm i.21 From (3.2) the 
degree of market power for the ith firm, can be defined as idi—(wdi+5ci/5xdiVwdi=A^i/ew 
where ew is the price elasticity of input supply. For the same reasons as above, 
estimation of Xdj and ew requires adding an input supply function to the model.
The estimating equations for implementation of the model include the cost function, 
output demand, input supply and pricing equations. The flexible functional form 
specified for the cost function is the following translog function (omitting firm and time 
subscripts):
(3.3) In c (y,w,x,z) = ot0 + £ p ,  to w, + £ p J n y m + p„ tox„ + p, t + ' £ £ 5 *  to w, ■ to wk
j  m 2  j  k
+ ^ Z Z 5™lnym lny„ + ^8*  lnxd -lnxd + ^ 6 „ t- t
2  m n 2  2
+ Z E 8,, to w ,-to y . + £ 8 *  tow ,-tax , + £ 5 „  lnw, t
j  m j j
+ Z 8™- lny„ In^d + Z 8-« lny» t + 8d.Inx- t + Z a »D5
21 In order to analyse market power in both output and input markets Schroeter (1988) uses the following 
expression: PmO+OmF-Wdil+Ojl+MC. However, stating the optimisation problem in this manner requires 
the imposition of restrictive assumptions on the cost structure (as stated above) and also the assumption
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where c represents total cost, w denotes input prices, ym represents the volume of 
output m and Xd is the volume of deposits for firm i in period t and subscripts 
j,k=l,k,m,f denote inputs labour, physical capital, materials and other funds and 
m,n=L,S denote outputs loans and securities. A time trend t is added to serve as an 
indicator of technological progress and Ds are dummy variables included to allow for 
differences across banks’ size.
By partially differentiating the cost function with respect to each input price and using 
Shephard’s lemma, the following input share equations are obtained:
(3.4) s, =Pj + £ 8 )k In wk + X 5Jm l“ y .  + S„ bix,, +8*»
where Sj=ôlnc/51nwj = Xj-wj /c is the share o f  input j in total cost. These cost share 
equations are estimated along with the cost function to improve efficiency.
The hypothesis of profit maximisation implies that (3.3) satisfies the symmetry, linear 
homogeneity in input prices, monotonicity and concavity properties. A necessary and 
sufficient condition for the translog cost function to satisfy symmetry is that 5jk=ôkj for 
all j, k. If the cost function is linearly homogeneous in input prices, the share equations 
will be homogeneous of degree zero in input prices. Then, to ensure symmetry and 
linear homogeneity in input prices, the following parameter restrictions on equations
that 0m and 0d are equal, which leads to the same degree of market power in both input and output 
markets.
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(3.3) and (3.4) are imposed: Sj Pj Sj ôjk=0 5jk=5kj for all j,k, I j ôjm=0 Sj 5jd=0 Sj
8jt=0.2J
Monotonicity and concavity are not general properties of the translog, unlike symmetry 
they cannot be conveniently summarised by linear restrictions on parameters of 
equations (3.3) and (3.4), instead the consistency of the estimated equations with 
respect to these properties must be evaluated. To satisfy the monotonicity conditions 
that the cost function is non-decreasing in output and increasing in input prices, the 
marginal cost of output and input cost shares must be positive and for concavity the 
matrix A- S +ssT must be negative semidefinite where A is the symmetric matrix with 
elements {5jk}, s  is the share vector s = [ S j ] T and S is a diagonal matrix which has the 
share vector s on the main diagonal (Diewert and Wales, 1987). Since the cost function 
includes the level instead of the price of xd, additional regularity conditions require the 
restricted function (3.3) to be decreasing and convex in xd, which is satisfied if the 
shadow value of xd is positive and decreasing in xd.
The marginal cost function for loans and marginal shadow price function for deposits 
are obtained from the cost function by partially differentiating (3.3) with respect to yi. 
and xd respectively. As a result, the optimal pricing equations for loans and deposits 
stemming from (3.1) and (3.2) have the form:2 3
22 In the empirical implementation, linear homogeneity in input prices is imposed by normalising the 
dependent variable and all input price variables by one input price before taking logarithms.
2> Since banks account for a very small part of the market for securities, following Klein (1971), Hannan 
(1991) and others, banks arc assumed to be price-takers in this market. For that reason equation (3.5) 
refers to the loans market.
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where pl is the interest rate on loans and the interest rate on deposits for firm i, 
0L=Xi/r| measures the difference between p and the marginal cost of loans, 0d=Xd/e 
represents the gap between w<j and the marginal benefit from deposits, r| is the price 
semi-elasticity o f the demand for bank loans and e the price semi-elasticity of the 
supply of deposits. Dummy variables Ds are also added to these equations to allow 0L 
and 0d to vary across banks’ size.
In order to estimate r|p and ew the demand for loans and supply of deposits are specified 
as log-linear functions o f the form:
(3.7) In Yl = t)0 + t|p In Pl + r|M In M + r|z In Z
(3.8) In X<| = £0 + ew In wd + Em In M + ez In Z
where Yl is the aggregate demand for loans and Xd the aggregate supply of deposits 
expressed as functions of total income M, the price of a substitute Z, and the interest 
rate on loans pl and deposits wd, respectively. The parameter r|p is the price elasticity of 
demand for loans and ew the price elasticity of supply of deposits. Equations (3.7) and
(3.8) can be viewed as first-order approximations to arbitrary demand functions.
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The complete model consists of equations (3.3), (3.4), (3.5), (3.6), (3.7) and (3.8) and in 
principle may be estimated as a full system. In practice, however, it has proven to be 
difficult to estimate and is very demanding of data resources (Huang and Sexton, 
1996). Additionally, the main interest of this study lies in the estimation of the 
parameter 0 that captures the difference between price and marginal cost for loans or 
marginal valuation for deposits and that does not require price elasticity estimates. For 
these reasons, equations (3.3)-(3.6) are estimated as a system using annual bank level 
data. However, the analysis o f  the welfare effects of market power and cost economies 
requires estimation of a demand function of loans. Hence, the loans demand and the 
deposits supply functions (3.7) and (3.8) are estimated separately using quarterly time- 
series data.
3.3.1 Market Power and Cost Elasticities
From equations (3.5) and (3.6) two measures of market power can be obtained. First, 
the estimated parameter 0l captures the difference between price and marginal cost in 
the market for loans while 0<j measures the gap between the interest rate and marginal 
shadow value of deposits. Hence, positive values of these parameters indicate the 
presence of market power. Second, the degree of market power can also be measured 
by means of a Lcmer type index. In the loans market tl can be obtained dividing 0l by 
the average interest rate on loans, Pl, while in the market for deposits id can be 
computed dividing 0d by the average interest rate on deposits, Wd.24 In both cases, 
positive values indicate the presence of market power. 14*
14 These measures can also be calculated by using the estimated cost function, predicted costs and
observed output and input prices in order to estimate marginal costs (marginal shadow values).
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From the parameters of (3.3) several cost elasticities representing the cost structure can 
be computed. The elasticity of cost with respect to output, which represents the cost 
changes associated with scale y, may be expressed as ecy =Zrn(5c/ôym)-(ym/tc)= 
I m((31nc/<31ny)-(c/tc) where tc=c(-)+w(Xd)-Xd and in terms of the coefficients of (3.3) as:
(3-9) e«, = Z(Pm + 8™,lny- + S™ ■"y» + E 8j- ln wj + 5d„, I " + 6m, t j • ^ j
Since scale economies can be measured as SCE=l/ecy values of ecy lower (higher) than 
one indicate the presence of scale economies (diseconomies).
The elasticity of cost with respect to time often interpreted as technological change, 
which measures the rate of downward shift of the cost function over time, can be 
estimated by the restricted cost function as ec,=(5c/ôt)-(l/tc)=(01nc/ôt) (c/tc) and from
(3.3) can be written as follows:
(3.10) ecl = ip, + 8„t + X 8,, inWj + £ lnym + 6dt lnxd j • ^ j
where negative values indicate the contribution of technical change in reducing banking 
costs.
These elasticity measures are based on c(-), therefore depend on a given level of Xd. 
However, when output increases, Xd responses will have impacts on Wd (in the presence 
of market power in this market) which will appear as price-related cost economies or
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diseconomies. Two alternative approaches can be adopted to construct measures that 
incorporate such price-related adjustment: (i) including the ‘desired’ optimal condition 
for x from the input pricing equation into c(-) or (ii) using a ‘combined’ elasticity that 
directly appends the adjustment o f  x from a change in output. These approaches to the 
problem are similar empirically, but the latter is conceptually the most appealing 
(Morrison Paul, 1999b).
The second approach simply relies on the chain rule of differentiation. Since the desired 
level of Xd depends on the output produced, the c( ) function may be expressed as 
c(-,y,x(y)), where (•) represents all other arguments of the function. Then, the cost 
elasticity becomes: eCyd=Zm(5tc/5ym+5tc/5xd-5xd/5ym)'(ym/tc)=[3c/5yn,+(5c/5xd+w(Xd)+ 
Xd-SwiXdVdXdHSxd’/dymjHym/tc) where Xd’=Xd(ym) results from solving for xd from the 
pricing equation (3.6). However, Xd enters in both its level and logarithmic forms in 
(3.6) implying that no closed form analytic solution for xd* exists. Hence, the method 
developed by Brown and Christensen (1981) and used by Morrison (1992) and 
Considine (2001) in a somewhat different context is adopted, implicitly computing 
d \Jdym as -(d<$>ldym)l(d<&ld\A) where d> is an implicit function for optimal Xd*:
(3.11) <D = wd+0d + P d + Z 8^ lnyn,+ Z 54ilnwj +6*i ln*d+6d., i
m j  )
The cost-output and cost-time elasticities can be adjusted using (3.11) to incorporate 
the price-related adjustments. In the presence of market power in the deposits market, 
these ‘adjusted’ cost elasticities arc the most appropriate measures for cost analysis 
since they represent the full range of cost impacts arising from output increases or
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technological change, including associated input price changes due to market 
imperfections. In a similar manner, marginal costs and market power measures can also 
be estimated, incorporating the impact of output increases on input prices due to market 
power.
3.4 Data and Variables
The data used to estimate the system of equations (3.3)-(3.6) consist of annual 
information from the Report of Condition and Income Statement of each stock retail 
bank over the period 1993-2000. Data for the 1993-1997 period were provided by the 
Banco Central de la República Argentina, while data for the 1998-2000 period were 
obtained from Información de Entidades Financieras, Banco Central de la República 
Argentina. Public-owned and mutual banks were not included in the sample since these 
banks may have different objectives than profit maximisation. The data set is an 
unbalanced panel of 476 observations. The banks in the sample are classified into three 
size bands (large, medium and small) based on average bank asset values. If a bank’s 
average asset size is less than $150 million, the bank is classified as small-sized; when 
the asset size is greater than $150 million but less than $700 million, the bank is 
classified as medium-sized and when the asset size exceeds $700 million it is classified 
as a large bank.25 The size dummy variables are then defined as follows; Dige, Dmed and 
Dsma]i equal 1 for large, medium and small banks, respectively, and 0 otherwise.
The definition of outputs and inputs follows the intermediation approach. Hence, yi. is 
measured as the volume of loans, ys as total assets minus loans, property and 
equipment and other fixed assets and Xd as the volume of deposits. The interest rates on
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loans and deposits are given by the ratios of interest income from loans to total loans 
and interest paid on deposits to total deposits, respectively.26 Since loans are 
denominated in domestic (pesos) and foreign (dollars) currency, a quantity index is 
constructed by Divisia aggregation of loans in pesos and dollars as follows: lny, - lny,.i 
= (l/2) Zj(s,,+ Si,t. i ) - (  lnyi,t-lnyiit.|) where yj represents the ith type o f loan, p, the interest 
rate, Si=pj• y¡/S¡pj• yj its share in total revenues and t represents the time period.27 A 
Divisia quantity index of deposits (in pesos and dollars) is also constructed using the 
same methodology. The interest rates on loans pl and deposits Wd are then estimated by 
dividing the interests income from loans and interest paid on deposits by the 
corresponding quantity indexes.
The prices for the inputs labour, capital, materials and other funds are computed as 
follows. The wage rate (wi) is proxied by the ratio of personnel expenses (wages and 
insurance payments) to the number of employees. The price of capital for each bank 
(Wk) is constructed as sum of the depreciation rate and the opportunity cost of capital. 
The latter is approximated by the interest rate for loans less the expected rise in the 
value of the capital goods employed, which is proxied by the growth rate of the 
wholesale price index (Lang and Welzel, 1996). The price o f materials (wm) is 
constructed as administrative expenses minus personnel and capital costs divided by the 
value of total assets. The price of other funds (wf) is given by the ratio of interest 
expenses on other purchased funds to other borrowed funds (including interbank funds 3567
35 Different thresholds were used to classify banks, however, the results were not affected.
36 Because the price data are subject to error from this estimation procedure, observations in which the 
prices on loans and deposits are more than 2.5 standard deviations from the mean value for that year 
were dropped. As a result 4 institutions were excluded due to negative or implausibly large prices.
37 Banks provide different types of loans, which can be classified as retail or corporate loans. Retail loans 
include financing to households and small firms such as mortgages, personal loans and pledges. 
Corporate loans consist basically on financing to large corporations including overdrafts and promissory
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purchased, commercial papers and other purchased funds). Total cost in each bank (c) 
includes all operating expenses and interest payments on other funds. All nominal data 
were converted into 2000 prices using the wholesale price index.
Table 3.2 displays descriptive statistics for cost, input and output variables for the 
sample of banks and by subgroups based on total asset size over the 1993-2000 period. 
The average-sized stock bank held $1,042 million o f  assets while the average large, 
medium- and small-sized bank had $4,131, $60S and $119 million of assets, 
respectively. Small-sized banks held fewer loans and similar amount of securities, 
measured as a proportion of total assets, and charged higher interest rates on loans than 
did larger banks. In terms of inputs, large banks used fewer employees per $ of assets 
than did small- and medium sized-banks, but paid them higher wages and benefits. This 
result suggests that larger institutions used labour inputs rather efficiently and/or 
pursued a less labour-intensive strategy. In terms o f  funds, large banks had similar 
amounts of deposits than smaller institutions but finance a larger proportion of their 
assets with purchased funds. In addition, these banks paid the lowest interest rates on 
deposits and on other purchased funds of the market.
The data for estimation of equations (3.7) and (3.8) consist of quarterly industry-level 
data for the period 1993-2000. The aggregate volume of loans (Yl) and deposits (Xj) 
and the average interest rate on loans (pl) and deposits (Wd) estimated as the ratio of 
interest on loans/deposits over total loans/deposits were obtained from the Boletin
notes. Given that information on interest rates for both types of loans is only available from 1998, the 
analysis is restricted to total loans.
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Descriptive statistics
Table 3.2
Stock domestic- and foreign-owned banks, 1993-2000
Variable* Overall Large Medium Small
Output quantities (% of assets)
Loans Yl 55.5 59.5 55.6 54.0
(16.3) (11.1) (16.1) (17.7)
Securities ys 33.2 33.9 32.8 33.3
(16.4) (13.1) (15.8) (18.1)
Output prices (%)
Loans Pl 19.0 13.8 16.7 23.0
(10.3) (2.7) (7.7) (12.3)
Securities Ps 6.6 5.7 5.5 7.9
(9.9) (3.2) (3.6) (14.1)
Input quantities (% of assets)
Deposits Xd 48.8 49.3 48.8 48.5
(22.2) (8.7) (14.4) (29.8)
Labour (per million S of assets) Xi 1.6 0.8 1.4 1.9
(1.1) (04) (0.8) (1.3)
Capital xk 6.6 5.2 6.8 7.1
(3.9) (2.7) (3.7) (4.3)
Materials Xm 3.0 2.0 2.7 3.7
(1.6) (0.7) (1.2) (1.9)
Other funds xr 26.0 32.4 27.6 22.0
(14.2) (9.6) (14.3) (14.6)
Input prices (%)
Deposits wd 8.2 6.1 7.0 10.1
(7.7) (3.2) (2.7) (10.7)
Labour (thousand S per employee) w, 33.4 42.3 32.8 30.3
(12.2) (9.4) (9.2) (13.4)
Capital wk 23.2 18.2 20.9 27.0
(10.2) (4.1) (8.1) (11.9)
Materials wm 3.0 2.0 2.7 3.7
(16) (0.7) (1.2) (1.8)
Other funds wf 9.9 6.5 8.0 12.7
(13.3) (36) (5.9) (18.6)
Other characteristics
Costs (% of assets)* c 10.9 8.2 10.2 12.6
(4.7) (2.4) (3.9) (5.4)
Assets (million S) 1,042.4 4,131.5 605.5 118.8
(2246.0) (3795.8) (608.2) (106.1)
Number of banks' 62(51) 11(9) 20(18) 31 (24)
* Mean values and standard deviation in parenthesis. Constant pesos December 2000. Excludes the cost 
of deposits.c Number of banks in 1993 (2000).
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Estadístico, Banco Central de la Republic Argentina (2001). The activity level (M) is 
proxied by the GDP and the price of a substitute (Z) is estimated as sum of the LIBOR 
rate and the level of sovereign risk reflected in the price of the FRB bonds issued by the 
Argentine government.28 29This information was obtained from the Informe Económico, 
Ministerio de Economía y Obras y Servicios Públicos (2001).
3.5 Results
The system based on the cost function, input shares and pricing equations (3.3)-(3.6) 
was estimated on the basis of the bank-level data over the entire sample, over two 
subperiods 1993-1996 and 1997-2000, and also over three subsets of data comprising 
large, medium- and small-sized banks.” Additive error terms were appended to each 
equation, linear homogeneity in input prices and symmetry restrictions imposed across 
equations and one share equation was omitted to avoid singularity.30 The system was 
estimated by (iterative) Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS) to take into account the joint 
endogeneity of prices and quantities in the loans and deposits markets that may be 
characterised by non-competitiveness.31 Tables 3.3a and 3.3b present the parameter 
estimates for the system of equations (3.3)-(3.6) using the overall sample of banks and 
the subsamples of large, medium and small banks, respectively. The results show that 
most of the estimated parameters are statistically different from zero at significance
28 This variable may be considered as a proxy for the market interest rate. Shaffer (1989, 1993) and 
Suominen (1994) have used the market interest rate as a proxy for Z while analysing market power in the 
U.S., Canadian and Finnish banking markets respectively.
29 McAllister and McManus (1993) note that the fitting of a translog cost function over a population of 
banks that varies widely in terms of product mixes and size may result in specification bias and suggest 
the use of restricted samples of banks (similar in output mix and size). The sample of Argentine banks 
presents marked differences in terms of size and output composition. For these reasons the model is also 
estimated over subsamples of banks.
10 The labour share equation was omitted. However, the estimates arc invariant to the choice of share 
equation deleted since 3SLS provides maximum likelihood estimates.
31 The instruments used include all exogenous variables, the lagged values of input prices, deposits and 
loan levels, interest rates on loans and deposits and input cost shares.
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Param eter estimates fo r cost function, input cost share  and pricing equations
Table 3.3a
All bank-size classes over 1993-2000, 1993-1996 and 1997-2000
Param eter  *
1993-2000
C o ef z
1993-1996
C oef z
1997-2000
C o ef z
Cto b 2.264 " * 17.400 2.304 *** 6.710 1.750 * " 5.310
P l 0.740 *** 19.540 0.810  — 10.110 0.691 *** 8.970
P s 0.358 *** 10.860 0.268  *** 3.680 0.338 *** 4.880
Pd -0.207  *** - 7.990 - 0.281 - 5.180 -0.035 - 0.840
Pi 0.477 18.713 0.508  *“ 11.618 0.412 “ 9.089
Pk 0.115 " * 5.720 0.121 *** 3.620 0.091 “ 2.180
Pm 0.392 *** 23.470 0.385 *** 13.490 0.488 *** 14.340
P f 0.016 0.880 - 0.014 - 0.360 0.009 0.280
Pt - 0.040 - 1.590 0.062 0.380 - 0.024 - 0.270
8 l l 0.190 *** 25.540 0.219 15.770 0.173 17.530
Sss 0.187 *** 14.410 0.160  *** 8.200 0.254 • “ 13.030
8dd 0.013 1.440 0.011 0.840 0.024 ** 2.070
5 „ 0.073 *** 7.593 0.083 *** 6.842 0.065 *** 4.962
§kk 0.048 * * * 6.690 0.049  * * * 5.030 0.043 ” * 4.260
0.192 * * * 50.510 0.185 * * * 34.080 0.204 * * * 46.070
8 f f 0.068 * * * 11.340 0.062  * * * 6.420 0.069 * * * 8.560
8n - 0.003 - 0.720 - 0.024 - 0.480 0.007 0.550
8 il - 0.012 - 1.504 0.022  “ 2.011 -0.037 “ - 3.584
8 kL 0.017 • ” 3.090 0.012 * 1.760 0.016 " 1.980
- 0.027 * * * - 5.120 -0.036 - 5.170 - 0.023 - 3.240
8 n . 0.021 * * * 3.960 0.002 0.300 0.043 * “ 6.110
- 0.017 * * - 2.499 - 0.027 * * * - 3.108 0.007 0.753
8ns - 0.011 * * - 2.340 - 0.010 - 1.640 - 0.028 * * * - 3.570
8mS 0.000 0.100 0.003 0.550 0.003 0.470
0.028 * * * 5.620 0.034 * * * 4.380 0.017 “ 2.490
8 id 0.010 1.327 - 0.012 - 1.152 0.011 1.177
8kd - 0.026 " * -4.650 -0.023  * * * - 3.330 - 0.010 - 1.240
0.041 * * * 8.240 0.046 *“ 7.010 0.034 • “ 5.470
8 ,d - 0.025 *” -4.670 - 0.012 - 1.380 - 0.035 *** - 6.360
8 lk 0.016 “ * 2.711 0.002 0.223 0.035 “ 4.204
- 0.079 *** - 19.777 - 0.079 *** - 16.405 - 0.089 *“ - 17.955
8 ,r - 0.011 • - 1.731 - 0.006 - 0.723 - 0.012 ■ 1.461
8km - 0.060 ” * - 14.590 - 0.050 *** - 8.820 - 0.068 *** - 12.950
8 k f - 0.005 - 1.010 0.000 0.030 -0.011 • •  1.660
S mf - 0.053 *** - 17.860 - 0.056 * * • - 12.970 - 0.047 *** •  12.840
Su 0.010 — 3.150 -0.027 - 1.610 0.010 1.110
- 0.012 *** - 2.920 0.014 0.890 - 0.011 - 1.240
8d, 0.006 * 1.840 0.015 1.070 - 0.005 - 0.950
8 „ - 0.008 * • ' - 3.244 - 0.016 * - 1.901 - 0.004 - 0.807
8k, 0.003 1.300 0.000 - 0.010 0.009 " 1.990
8m, 0.004 ** 1.980 0.000 0.080 - 0.008 ” - 1.980
Sn 0.002 0.940 0.016 “ 1.960 0.003 0.910
8dL -0.034 " * - 5.260 - 0.042 * •* - 4.610 -0.013 - 1.640
8 ls - 0.209 " * - 25.660 -0.210  “ • - 19.070 - 0.207 ” * - 15.000
8sd 0.051 “ 7.960 0.069 *“ 7.630 - 0.003 -0.400
0 L b 0.049 * * • 4.070 0.031 * 1.760 0.052 ” • 3.350
O d” - 0.051 “ * - 6.420 -0.049 * * * - 3.330 - 0.047 *** - 7.990
N o .obs . 476 248 228
***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. ‘ l-labour, k-capital, 
m-materials, f-funds, L-loans, S-securities, d-deposits, t-time trend. h Dummy variables for 
differences across large, medium and small banks are insignificant.
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Parameter estimates for cost function, input cost share and pricing equations
T able 3.3b
Subsamples of large, medium- and small-sized banks, 1993-2000
Parametera
Large
Coef z
Medium
Coef z
Small
Coef z
On 2.884 *** 14.830 3.082 *** 9.390 2.279 *** 10.260
Pl 0.383 *” 5.520 0.687 *** 9.420 0.773 *** 12.050
Ps 0.691 *** 13.940 0.166 1.630 0.309 *** 4.510
Pd -0.306 ” • -3.660 -0.321 *" -5.590 -0.201 *** -5.320
Pi 0.657 *** 13.869 0.544 *** 9.958 0.432 *" 10.141
Pk -0.003 -0.100 0.174 *** 4.140 0.113 *** 3.270
Pm 0.325 "* 13.200 0.285 " 10.680 0.400 *** 12.300
Pr 0.021 0.590 -0.002 -0.050 0.055 ** 2.030
P. -0.072 *** -3.050 0.023 0.540 -0.030 -0.650
S l l 0.217 *** 13.260 0.151 *” 8.590 0.168 *** 12.230
0.194 *** 10.240 0.130*" 4.660 0.161 *** 6.690
8dd 0.115 ” 2.110 0.003 0.130 0.035 ** 2.450
S ii 0.099 *** 5.189 0.059 *" 4.182 0.078 *** 5.265
0.064 *** 5.620 0.029 ** 2.010 0.059 *** 5.680
0.188 *** 67.920 0.156 *** 40.170 0.199 *** 30.450
5ir 0.116 *** 9.390 0.085 *** 6.620 0.066 *** 9.210
8„ 0.006 1.570 -0.007 -1.300 -0.006 -0.860
ÔIL -0.092 *" -5.595 0.031 ** 2.034 -0.011 -0.968
8kL 0.000 -0.020 -0.041 "* -3.600 0.016 ** 1.970
-0.031 *** -4.450 -0.020 *** -3.230 -0.017 * -1.940
S«. 0.124 “ * 9.320 0.030 ** 2.320 0.012 1.640
8|S -0.003 -0.215 -0.033 " -2.484 -0.004 -0.400
-0.019 -2.340 -0.029 *** -2.730 -0.016 ** -2.140
-0.021 "* -3.650 0.008 1.210 0.005 0.700
0.042 “ • 4.370 0.054 "* 4.370 0.015 ** 2.160
8u 0.058 " 2.431 -0.044 "* -2.768 0.014 1.350
Skd 0.019 1.090 0.053 “ 4.120 -0.030 *** -4.120
0.069 “ 7.780 0.031 *" 5.220 0.038 *** 4.910
8 „ -0.146 *** -7.380 -0.040 *" -3.200 -0.022 "* -3.310
8|k 0.005 0.410 0.025 " 2.570 0.012 1.319
S|m -0.083 *" -19.458 -0.080 *** -21.340 0.076 *** 10.602
Sir -0.022 * -1.667 -0.004 -0.395 -0.014 * -1.765
8km -0.040 "• -11.590 -0.025 *" -4.730 -0.072 *** -11.010
8kr -0.029 "* -3.330 -0.029 *" -3.000 0.001 0.110
8mf -0.066 "* • 18.080 -0.051 *" -13.990 -0.052 *** • 11.860
8u 0.032 *” 4.190 -0.011 -1.500 0.000 -0.070
8a -0.002 -0.280 0.015 * 1.840 0.000 0.000
8* -0.028 “ * -4.790 -0.004 -0.800 0.011 * 1.950
Sh -0.013 ” -3.002 0.003 0.737 -0.009 ** -2.402
8k, -0.003 -1.230 0.001 0.220 0.004 1.220
0.006 ” 2.460 0.001 0.330 0.000 0.060
8n 0.010 " * 2.940 -0.005 -1.180 0.005 * 1.900
8dL -0.036 -1.250 -0.015 -1.040 -0.044 **• -4.350
-0.187 ” * -11.790 -0.137*" -6.520 -0.185 *** -11.830
-0.030 -1.450 0.044 *** 3.200 0.045 *** 4.970
0L 0.037 " * 5.710 0.036 * " 4.170 0.046 *** 3.540
0d -0.033 *” -6.050 -0.042 * " -7.270 -0.064 * " -6.030
No.obs. 87 177 212
•**, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. * 1-labour, k-capital,
m-materials, f-funds, L-loans, S-securities, d-deposits, t-time trend.
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levels of 10% or less.32 The null hypothesis that the parameters are the same across 
subperiods was rejected by means of a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test. Additionally, a LR 
test rejected the null hypothesis that the sets of coefficients for the different size groups 
are the same.33
In order to explore the cost function properties, several regularity conditions were 
tested in addition to the linear homogeneity in input prices and symmetry, which were 
imposed a priori during estimation. Monotonicity in output and input prices was 
satisfied since marginal costs and the fitted input cost shares were positive at most data 
points in the sample. Concavity in input prices was also satisfied for the range of 
observations because the matrices computed using the fitted input cost share equations 
and the relevant parameter estimates were negative semidefinite.34 The requirements 
with respect to deposits were also satisfied since the shadow price of deposits was 
positive at all data points35 and the second partial derivative o f  costs with respect to 
deposits was positive, thus conforming with the convexity condition. Finally, the 
estimated costs were positive for all values of output satisfying the non-negativity 
condition, and continuity followed from the flexible functional form employed.
52 The model was also estimated with regional dummy variables. However, the hypothesis of differences 
across regions was rejected. The estimates presented in Tables 3.3a and 3.3b were obtained without these 
dummy variables.
35 The LR test was performed by incorporating one (two) dummy variables for the subperiod 1993-1996 
(medium- and small-sized banks) into the pooled estimation and allowing every parameter to vary across 
the periods 1993-1996 and 1997-2000 (large, medium- and small-sized banks). This unrestricted model 
was then compared to the restricted model, which imposed common coefficients for all subperiods 
(subgroups). The LR statistic was 137.24 (288.82) and the critical value was 37.34 (112.33) at thel% 
confidence level.
34 For the subsamplc of large banks, the concavity condition was not satisfied. For the sample of small 
banks the Hessian matrix presented one wrong sign.
33 This result also suggests that deposits should be modelled as inputs in the Argentine banking industry.
As Hughes et. al. (2000) pointed out, if deposits are outputs more variable inputs and, hence, variable
expenditure will be required to produce y and the increased x* which implies that dc/dxa>0. If deposits 
are inputs, an increase in Xj allows a reduction in the variable expenditure needed to produce y, which 
implies that dc/dxd<0. In this case, the shadow value of deposits is positive, that is dc/dxd<0 implying 
that deposits function as inputs in production.
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Additional restrictions were then imposed on the parameters of the translog cost 
function in order to investigate the production structure of the industry. Five hypotheses 
were tested: (i) homotheticity (the cost function can be written as a separable function 
in output, factor prices/ levels and time, 8 j m= 0 ,  6 ^ = 0  and 5 m t= 0 ) ,  (ii) homogeneity with 
respect to output (the elasticity of cost with respect to output is constant, 8 jm = 0 ,  8 m d = 0 ,  
8 m I= 0  and 8 m n= 0 ) ,  (iii) unitary elasticity of substitution between inputs ( 8 ^ = 0 ) ,  (iv) 
generalised Cobb-Douglas (unitary elasticity of substitution together with homogeneity, 
S j m = 0  8 „ , d = 0 ,  8 m , = 0  8 m n= 0  and 8 j k = 0 )  and (v) no technical change ( 8 j t= 0 ,  8 m l= 0  8 d t= 0 ,  
8t=0 and 8ti=0). Table 3.4 displays the Likelihood Ratio statistics for these structural 
tests. The results indicate that each restricted functional form of the production 
technology is strongly rejected at the 5% significance level. However, the null 
hypothesis of no technical change over the first half of the sample period cannot be 
rejected. These results suggest that the use of the translog flexible functional form to 
estimate the cost structure appears to be appropriate.
Table 3.4
Structural tests of the cost function
Likelihood Ratio test statistic:
Restrictions _______ Overall______________ Subsamples
93-00 93-96 97-00 Large Medium Small
(i) Homotheticity 244.9 120.3 126.1 117.7 73.4 68.8 9 16.9
V=0, 5,^=0, 8m=0 
(ii) Homogeneity in output 862.6 444.2 524.5 316.7 168.3 323.2 13 22.4
6^=0, 8^=0, 8„=0, 8^=0 
(iii) Unitary elasticity of substitution 674.8 277.8 543.6 278.2 263.4 307.1 6 12.6
8^-0
(iv) Generalised Cobb-Douglas 1,245 644.3 840.0 472.4 411.3 543.7 19 30.1
8jm“0,8md-0,8in,=0,8m„-‘0,8Jk“0 
(v) No technical change 56.3 9.4 24.0 47.5 15.8 18.9 8 15.5
’ Critical values at 3% level
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Although most o f  the parameters are not readily interpretable individually, some 
relevant implications about market power are evident from the pricing equation 
estimates presented in the last rows of Tables 3.3a and 3.3b. These results suggest 
significant departures from marginal cost (benefit) pricing. In the loans market, the 
parameter 0l (positive and highly significant) indicates that banks seem to price above 
marginal cost, implying a possible exploitation of oligopoly power in this market. In 
the market for deposits, the coefficient 0a, which is also statistically significant but 
negative, suggests that banks seem to pay more than the full value of their marginal 
benefit for increases in deposits, implying no market power exertion in this market. 
More direct assessment of market power requires evaluating the x estimates. Table 3.5 
presents market power and cost economies indicators for the average bank. These 
measures were calculated by using the estimated cost functions in Tables 3.3a and 3.3b, 
predicted costs and observed output and input prices. The results presented in Panel A 
are derived from the parameter estimates for the overall sample and those from Panel B 
using parameter values for the subsamples of large, medium- and small-sized banks.
Table 3.5
Market power and cost elasticities measures
Loans Deposits Cost-output elasticity Cost-time elasticity
Xl Xd Ccv __ §ct_
A. Estimates derived using parameter values for overall sample of banks over periods 1993-2000,
1993-1996 and 1997-2000
1993-2000 0.258 -0.615 0.826 (0.055) -0.017 (0.015)
1993- 1996 0.142 -0.516 0.850 (0.057) 0.014 (0.028)
1997-2000 0.302 -0.691 0.803 (0.030) -0.019 (0.029)
B. Estimates derived using parameter values for subsamples of large, medium- and small-sized
banks
Large banks 0.271 -0.545 0.861 (0.046) -0.032 (0.010)
Medium banks 0.212 -0.598 0.799 (0.056) -0.014 (0.013)
Small banks 0.199 -0.636 0.774 (0.042) -0.006 (0.017)
Standard deviation in parenthesis.
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In the loans market, the estimated value of tl for the average bank indicates that banks 
are pricing 25.8% above marginal cost, moreover, the average margin increased from
14.2 to 30.2% over the sample period. The margins also display some interesting 
patterns across subgroups of banks. The estimated values of xL for large, medium- and 
small-sized banks are 27.1, 21.2 and 19.9% respectively, which suggests that large 
banks seem to exercise a higher degree of market power pricing than smaller financial 
institutions. Several characteristics of large banks such as financial strength, 
multimarket links, diversified operations and economies of scale could allow them to 
set prices above marginal costs.
For the deposits market, the average x<i measure indicates that the average bank is 
paying 61.5% above the marginal shadow value o f  deposits. The results also show that 
this margin increased over the sample period from 51.6 to 69.1%. When analysed 
across subgroups of banks, the estimated value o f xa indicates that small banks’ interest 
rate on deposits is 63.6% above the marginal shadow value of deposits while larger 
banks pay just 54.5% above it. These results seem to suggest that small-sized banks, 
which may have limited access to other sources o f  funds, have to pay a higher margin 
in order to attract deposits while large financial institutions, probably having access to 
international lines of credit, for example, pay a lower margin for increases in deposits. 
In line with these findings, Carbo et al. (2001) using a different methodology find that 
saving banks in Spain also pay a margin above the marginal value of deposits. In 
contrast, Ribon and Yosha (1999) conclude that banks in the Israeli banking sector 
exercise market power in both the markets for loans and deposits.
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The interpretation of these indicators of market power is reinforced with the 
consideration o f  the associated evidence of cost economy measures presented in Table 
3.5. The cost-output elasticity for each bank was obtained using (3.9) and then averaged 
out to obtain the average cost elasticity of the appropriate period or subsample. The 
estimated value for the overall sample £cy = 0.826 suggests the presence of significant 
economies of scale which have increased over the sample period since Ecy declined 
from 0.850 to 0.803 over the 1993-2000 period. Probably this is due to the fact that 
while on the one side banks are exploiting the economies o f scale through the 
consolidation process, on the other, regulatory changes and advances in technology are 
increasing the optimal scale leading to an increase in scale economies over time. Since 
banks do not appear to exercise market power in the market for deposits, this is the 
most appropriate measure for cost analysis.
The results also show that scale economies diminish as firm size increases, however, 
the estimated ecy reveals the presence of significant increasing returns to scale for all 
size bands suggesting that the average cost curve is not U-shaped. However, there may 
be a particular level of output, outside the observed range in the sample, above which 
banks would operate under constant or decreasing returns to scale. In fact, for the U.S. 
banking industry Berger and Mestcr (1997) find increasing returns to scale for all size 
classes up through $25 billion (assets), with decreasing returns thereafter. In addition, 
Cavallo and Rossi (2001) for a sample of six European countries find constant returns 
to scale for large banks with average assets of $92 billion. In Argentina, the largest 
banks have less than $15 billion in assets, which may suggest that there still exist 
economies that can be exploited by an increase in the size of banks.
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Table 3.5 also presents the estimates of time elasticities aimed at capturing the 
contribution o f  technical change in reducing average banking costs. This cost-time 
elasticity was computed for each bank using (3.10) and then averaged out to obtain the 
average elasticity of the appropriate period or subsample. The estimated value for the 
overall period ec, = -0.017 indicates that, costs were reduced by approximately 1.7% 
per year as a consequence of technical change. When analysed over time, the results 
suggest that cost savings occurred in the industry during the second half of the period, a 
result that may be connected to the incorporation of new technology, such as ATM or 
information systems technologies during the 1990s. When analysed over subgroups, the 
results appear to indicate that the effect of technical change on average costs has been 
significant for large and medium-sized banks, while it has been almost negligible for 
the group of smaller banks. These results may be due to cost increasing effects that 
have cancelled out technical innovations effects since technological change, defined as 
a trend, may capture not only production innovations but also the impact of other 
factors such as changes in organisational structure and processes on bank costs.
The demand for loans and supply of deposits were estimated by Two Stage least 
Squares (2SLS), because of the endogeneity of pi. and w<j, using industry-level data.36 
The estimated functions are:
(3.12) In Yl = 3.012 -  1.538 In pL + 0.524 In M + 0.591 In Z
(0.30) (-2.48) (1.71) (3.43)
(3.13) In Xd = -34.967 + 1.471 In wd + 3.996 In M
(-3.49) (2.00) (4.40) 16
16 The instruments used include all exogenous variables and the lagged values ofYt, Xj, pu and wd.
DW= 1.52 
DW= 1.71
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where t statistics are indicated in parenthesis. All the coefficients have the expected 
signs and are statistically different from zero at significance levels o f 10% or less 
(except the constant term in the demand equation). Based on the Durbin-Watson 
statistic the hypothesis of non-correlated disturbance terms cannot be rejected. The 
price elasticity of demand for loans equals r)p= 1.54, while the deposits supply price 
elasticity equals ew= 1.47 suggesting that borrowers and depositors are sensitive to 
variations in interest rates. Vesala (1995) finds similar estimates for the interest rate- 
elasticity of demand for loans in the Finnish banking sector. In contrast, Ribon and 
Yosha (1999) find lower estimates for both the elasticities of demand for loans and 
supply of deposits in the Israeli banking industry. However, they also find a small 
difference in the elasticities as in this case.
3.5.1 Welfare Analysis
The change in social welfare associated to the consolidation of the banking sector is 
evaluated in a partial equilibrium framework by adding up the changes in aggregate 
consumer and producer surplus. The aggregate consumer surplus is measured by the 
compensating variation defined as CV(p)=e(pl,v0)-e(p°,v0), where e(p,v) is the 
expenditure function, v(p,m) represents the indirect utility function, p is the price vector 
and m represents monetary income. When prices decline p'<p°, CV is the negative of 
the area to the left of the Hicksian demand curve for base utility level v° between p 1 and 
p°, and when p'<p°, CV is positive and simply equal to that area, that is, 
CV(p)=Jp^ x H(p,v")dp where xH is the Hicksian demand (Jehle and Reny, 2001).37 17
17 Exact measures of consumer surplus arc computable at least theoretically from the knowledge of the 
ordinary demand curve (Hausman, 1981). From Roy’s identity, the indirect utility function, the 
expenditure function and the Hicksian demand function can be recovered. However, this method can be 
extremely difficult to implement since it involves solving a differential equation that depends on the
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Breslaw and Smith (1995) show that when prices change from p° to p1, expanding the 
expenditure function in a Taylor series about (p°, v°) and disregarding other terms than 
the quadratic yields:
(3.14) CV(p) = xH(p° , v°M p ' - p u) + 0.5 ^  ,v  } (p 1 - p " )2
op
since at the initial equilibrium xH(p0,v°)=xM(p,m), the derivative of the Hicksian 
demand can be obtained from the Slutsky equation as dxH(p0,v0)/dp=[3xM(p0,m°)/<9p] 
+xH [dxM(p°,m°)/dm] where xM is the Marshallian demand function. To compute the 
compensating variation they developed a numerical algorithm that involves splitting up 
the price change into smaller intervals, evaluating the CV for each small change using
(3.14) and finally adding together the CV computed at each step. This numerical 
algorithm can be easily implemented and is valid for any demand function.
The aggregate producer surplus or aggregate profit n (p )  equals the area between the 
market price and the industry marginal cost, and can be measured as follows:
(3.15) n(p) = £‘l'” [p '-c'(x)]dx
where c’(x) represents marginal cost. This producer surplus can be estimated as the 
difference between total revenue and total cost for the equilibrium level of output. 
Finally, the change in total surplus dW(p) can be measured as sum of CV(p) and dfl(p).
ordinary demand function, and this is analytically possible only in simple cases. An alternative 
methodology to approximate welfare measures is to use numerical methods. Vartia (1983) proposed a
61
The compensating variation over the sample period is computed applying Breslaw and 
Smith’s algorithm with 300 steps using the parameters of the demand function 
estimated above while the change in profits is estimated as the difference between total 
revenue and total cost for the average bank in the sample. Table 3.6 presents the 
estimated compensating variation, change in profits and change in economic welfare 
over the sample period. The results show an increase in the consumers’ surplus of $2.2 
billion and in banks’ profits of $5.1 billion implying an overall increase in economic 
welfare of $7.2 billion between 1993-1996 and 1997-2000.* 38 These findings suggest 
that the expansion in the level o f activity led to cost reductions as a result of cost 
economies, which might have counteracted the effect of increased market power.
Table 3.6
Welfare effects of market power and cost economies
Period
Lemer
Index
(%)
Interest 
rate loans
(%)
Average
cost
(S)
CV* d lT d W
1993- 1996 14.2 21.8 21.0
1997-2000 30.2 17.2 12.2 2,188.1 5,057.3 7,245.4
1997 -  2000 (output at 23.1 22.5 17.5 -247.7 2,648.5 2,400.8
1993 level)
* Positive (negative) numbers represent welfare gains (losses) in million $.
numerical algorithm to compute the compensated income from any ordinary demand function. Breslaw 
and Smith (1995) improved on Vartia’s method and proposed a quicker algorithm.
38 Since the average number of loan and deposit accounts over 1993-2000 equal 7.1 and 12.9 million, 
respectively, the compensating variation per account equals $ 109.4. This figure can be compared with 
the average interest per account gained or lost by borrowers and depositors over the sample period as a 
result of changes in interest rates. The amount of the average loan is obtained by dividing total loans by 
the number of loan accounts in each year and then averaging over 1993-2000. The average interest rate 
on loans in subperiods 1993-1996 and 1997-2000 is then multiplied by the amount of the average loan to 
obtain the average interest paid by borrowers. Since the interest rate on loans fell over the sample period, 
borrowers benefited by paying on average $253 less per loan account between the subperiods considered. 
The average interest earned by depositors in subperiods 1993-1996 and 1997-2000 is obtained in a 
similar manner. The calculations suggest that depositors lost on average $126 per account as a result of a 
reduction in the interest rate paid on deposits. Adding the gain from loan accounts ($253) and subtracting
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The effects of scale economies and market power on consumer’s surplus and bank’s 
profits are further analysed under an alternative scenario. The importance of growth in 
output in combination with increasing returns to scale is analysed by keeping output 
constant at the 1993-1996 levels when calculating interest rates and average costs for 
1997-2000. Table 3.6 shows that the interest rate on loans and average costs for the 
1997-2000 subperiod under this alternative scenario are higher than those obtained 
without keeping output levels constant. The compensating variation and change in 
profits over the sample period are then calculated using these values. Table 3.6 shows 
that the consumers’ surplus is -$0.2 billion, the variation in banks’ profits is $2.6 billion 
and total surplus equals $2.4 billion. The difference in economic welfare between the 
two scenarios ($7.2 against $2.4 billion) suggests that the change in total surplus over 
the sample period seem to have been driven by cost economies, which appear to have 
more than counteracted the effect of increased market power.
3.6 Conclusions
This study estimates a cost-function based model incorporating output- and input- 
market pricing decisions to evaluate the market and cost structure of the Argentine 
banking industry during the 1990s. The model is based on a flexible translog cost 
function that allows a detail representation of technological aspects such as scale 
economies and technical change, and also pricing equations for loan- and deposit- 
markets that allows measurement of market power in these markets. The model is 
estimated using bank-level data for Argentine stock retail banks over the period 1993- 
2000. This period is characterised by a notable increase in activity level as measured by
the loss from deposit accounts (SI26) provides a net gain of SI27 per account between 1993-1996 and 
1997-2000. This number roughly approximates the SI09.4 compensating variation per account.
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the volume o f loans and deposits, but also by a significant increase in the degree of 
market concentration.
The results provide evidence of market power pricing in the loans markets, which 
increased during the 1990s possibly due to the consolidation process. In addition, the 
findings seem to suggest that larger banks exert a higher degree of market power 
pricing than small- and medium-sized financial institutions, which may be explained by 
the characteristics of large organisations such as financial strength, multimarket links, 
diversified operations and economics o f scale, which could allow them to set prices 
above marginal costs. In contrast, the results indicate no market power pricing in the 
market for deposits, which may be explained by the fact that bank lending is 
information intensive, and requires relationship building between banks and customers, 
whereas bank deposits are a standard service. Moreover, these findings suggest that 
banks appear to pay interest rates on deposits in excess of their marginal shadow value 
of deposits. Additionally, small-sized banks seem to pay a higher margin over their 
marginal shadow value of deposits, a result possibly associated to their limited access 
to other sources of funds.
These indications of market power pricing seem to be related to cost economies. In fact, 
the measures of cost elasticity suggest that even relatively large banks operate with 
significant increasing returns to scale. This evidence indicates that there still exist 
economies that can be exploited by an increase in the size o f  banks and it points out 
that the consolidation process may proceed further. In addition, the results suggest that 
technological advances introduced during the 1990s contributed to lower the cost of 
bank production for large and medium-sized banks. However, the findings do not show
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any significant effect of technological change on average costs for small-sized financial 
institutions.
The implications of the cost and market structure patterns on economic welfare, 
evaluated in a partial equilibrium framework, suggest that both consumers and banks 
benefited over the sample period. In fact, the results indicate that consumers’ surplus 
and banks’ profits increased over the 1990s, possibly due to the expansion of banking 
activity in combination with the increasing returns to scale and the technological 
advances, which may have counteracted the effect of market power in the market for 
loans. These findings imply that policies forcing downsizing in industries characterised 
by high concentration levels may be misdirected if consolidation and resulting 
concentration are motivated by cost economies. Obviously, such action could limit the 
potential to lower costs in the industry, and thus ultimately reduce the product price for 
consumers.
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Chapter 4
Ownership and Efficiency
4.1 Introduction
Post-deregulation developments in the Argentine banking industry led to changes in its 
ownership structure. During the 1990s several provincial banks were privatised, the 
number of mutual banks significantly decreased as a result of mergers and conversions 
to stock banks, and foreign financial institutions entered the domestic market primarily 
through acquisitions of domestic banks. A consequence of these developments was a 
switch from a sector dominated by domestic-owned banks, with similar participation of 
public and private financial institutions, to a liberalised system where foreign banks 
play a major role. At the end of the decade, public banks controlled just one third of the 
assets in the banking sector, having lost almost 20 percent to private banks, while 
foreign-owned banks controlled more than half o f the assets, against less than one fifth 
by the early 1990s.
These developments were the result o f banking sector reforms implemented under the 
assumption that a more competitive framework, with a major participation of private 
domestic- and forcign-owned banks, is more suitable to increase the efficiency of the 
banking system. On the one hand, the entry of foreign banks could improve the 
competitive environment and also have positive spillover effects on domestic banks 
derived from a (potential) better technology and expertise in offering specialised 
banking products. This could place domestic banks under peer pressure to improve 
operational efficiency. On the other hand, the privatisation of banks could also
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contribute to enhance the efficiency of the banking system by improving staff 
productivity or rationalising the branch network. These efficiency improvements could 
bring about benefits to consumers through reductions in prices and expansions in the 
amount and quality of services.
The literature has offered a diversity of theoretical arguments and mixed empirical 
evidence on the relationship between ownership and efficiency, though empirical 
studies have mainly concentrated on non-financial firms. Only few works have 
analysed ownership-efficiency in the banking industry, and the results have been 
diverse. This study contributes to this literature in different ways. Firstly, this study 
analyses efficiency characteristics of stock, mutual and public-owned banks. As such, it 
differs from previous works that mainly concentrate on efficiency differences between 
mutual and stock financial institutions and from the few studies that analyse private and 
public banks. Secondly, it also differs from past works in that it explores the relative 
efficiency of foreign- and domestic-owned banks in a developing country.39 
Consequently, this is the first work to consider efficiency differences among four 
ownership types. Thirdly, it is also distinct from past studies because it examines 
efficiency differences in a developing country while most of the empirical evidence 
explores the banking industry in developed economics, especially in the U.S..
This chapter uses data from the Argentine banking industry to estimate economic 
efficiency, scale economies and technical change using parametric techniques. It 
estimates cost and profit frontiers using the stochastic frontier approach - with different 3
3I* It has been documented that the increasing presence of foreign banks in developing economies 
increases efficiency and reduces profitability of domestic-owned banks though the opposite occurs in 
developed countries (Clacsscns ct al, 1999).
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assumptions about the distribution of inefficiencies - and the distribution free approach 
on a panel data set over the 1993-2000 period. The evidence indicates that within the 
domestic-owned banking sector, stock banks seem to be more cost efficient than mutual 
and public-owned banks, that all banks operate under increasing returns to scale but 
that only stock banks benefited from technical progress. The findings also imply that 
domestic-owned stock banks appear to be as efficient as foreign-owned banks. The 
results also indicate an increase in efficiency for all ownership types over the period, 
however, the largest improvement in performance appear to be that of mutual and 
public-owned banks.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 consists of two subsections. 
The first reviews theoretical studies on the relationship between ownership and 
efficiency while the second examines empirical studies related to efficiency differences 
in the banking industry. Section 4.3 presents the analytical foundations of efficiency 
measurement. Section 4.4 outlines the methodology employed, while Section 4.5 
describes the data sources and the definition of variables and provides a brief overview 
of the data set. Section 4.6 discusses the results. The last section summarises and 
presents the conclusions.
4.2 Literature Review
4.2.1 Theoretical Studies
The economic literature provides several arguments to explain efficiency differences 
between public and private ownership. The dominant model considering the effect of 
ownership on performance uses the agency and public choice theories to stress the 
importance of management being constrained by market discipline. According to these
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theories private firms should outperform public firms. The agency theory argues that 
managers (the agent) in both types of firms are assumed to pursue their own interests 
rather than that of the firm or its owners (the principal). In private firms, however, this 
divergence is reduced through the following mechanisms: the existence of a market for 
ownership rights, which enables the owners to sell if they are not satisfied with 
managerial performance -  this is the focus of the property rights theory, the threat of 
takeover and the labour market for managers, which may discourage managers from 
pursuing their personal agenda (Alchian, 1965; Manne, 1965; De Alessi, 1980; Fama, 
1980). In the case of public firms all of these mechanisms are virtually absent.40
The public choice theory points to specific inefficiency factors that arise from 
government ownership irrespective of market conditions. According to this theory, 
government officials tend to pursue their own interests (or the interests o f pressure 
groups), rather than the public interest. Government officials are inclined to impose 
goals on public firms that could lead them to gain votes, but achievement of such goals 
could be in conflict with efficiency. Moreover, government’s attempts to accommodate 
diverse interest groups leads to multiple and frequently changing objectives in these 
firms, which intensify agency problems since managerial decisions’ outcomes become 
more difficult to monitor (Estrin and Perotin, 1991 ).41
Several theoretical contributions raise doubts over the predictions of the property rights 
and public choice arguments. Grossman and Hart (1980) argue that the takeover threat
40 The managerial labour market may not be absent. Two separate markets can be observed for private- 
and public-owned firms' managers, respectively. However, the latter is generally dominated by political 
decisions, making it useless as a threat to managerial discretion. Cragg and Dyck (1997a,hl998) provide 
empirical evidence about this fact.
41 Other approaches, based on the agency and public choice theories, focus on the differences between 
private and public firms in terms of organisational characteristics (Parker, 1995).
69
in private firms may be empty due to the existence of free rider problems while Mueller 
(1989) and Wintrobe (1987) suggest that the voting market might operate as a 
substitute for the market for corporate control in disciplining public firms. Caves and 
Christensen (1980), Borcherding et al. (1982) and Millward (1988) argue that 
competition might have a greater impact on performance than ownership. More 
recently, Martin (1993) shows that in some cases more competition might increase 
managerial slack.42 In addition, Willner (1999) suggests that the nature o f the 
managers’ motivation may sometimes have a greater impact on efficiency than the 
ownership or objectives of an organisation.
The arguments presented above refer to efficiency differences between public and 
private firms. In the case of private firms, the literature offers alternative arguments to 
explain differences in efficiency between mutual and stock firms. The dominant model 
also uses agency theory to explain these differences.43 This theory does not provide, 
however, sufficient arguments in favour of an ownership type. Mayers and Smith 
(1981) argue that firms with alternative organisational forms are sorted into market 
segments where they have comparative advantages in dealing with various types of 
principal-agent conflicts. According to this view, stock firms are expected to be more 
efficient than mutual firms in controlling agency problems between owners and 
manager because stock ownership provides more effective mechanisms for controlling 
management, either through the market for corporate control or the managerial labour
42 He shows that if demand is linear, an increase in the number of firms in an oligopoly will actually 
increase managerial slack.
43 In a mutual organisation the customers arc the owners with very limited control over management. In 
stock institutions on the other hand, there is a separation between owners and customers, and managers 
are periodically monitored by owners (stockholder)
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market (Niçois, 1967; O ’Hara, 1981).44 However, mutual firms are expected to be more 
effective in controlling owner-customer conflicts because the ownership and customer 
functions are merged in the mutual firm (Mayers and Smith, 1988).
The literature also provides several arguments to explain the relative efficiency of 
domestic- and foreign-owned firms. Several authors argue that multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) operating abroad face higher costs relative to domestic firms. These costs may 
arise from several sources. Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997) group these costs as spatial, 
unfamiliarity and home and host country environment costs. Spatial costs refer to 
transportation costs and coordination over distance; unfamiliarity costs consider lack of 
knowledge of host environments or lack of information networks and political 
influence; host country environment costs refer to the differential government treatment 
of domestic versus foreign firms or nationalistic buyers’ reluctance to buy from foreign 
firms; and home country environment costs relate to regulatory restrictions imposed by 
a firm’s home government.
These arguments do not provide though support in favour of an ownership type. 
Counter arguments suggest that in order to overcome these additional costs and 
compete successfully against local firms, MNEs need to provide their overseas subunits 
with some firm-specific advantages, often in the form of organisational or managerial 
capabilities (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Caves, 1982; Hcnnart, 1982). These arguments 
suggest that multinationals’ subunits try to overcome the higher costs of operating 
abroad by importing organisational or managerial capabilities from their parent firms,
44 Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that customers of mutuals have other form of controlling management 
i.e. by withdrawing their funds from the control of management, which is a form of partial takeover or 
liquidation.
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particularly if the subunits are competing in an undifferentiated product market in 
which other sources of imported competitive advantage, such as a brand name, a 
superior technology or factor-cost advantages, have little role to play (Zaheer, 1995).
The preceding analysis suggests that there is no simple relationship between ownership 
and efficiency. The theoretical arguments do not provide conclusive predictions: it is 
not obvious that stock firms are more efficient than mutual or public-owned 
organisations or that domestic firms outperform foreign-owned institutions. On the one 
hand, the property rights theory suggests that private firms should be more efficient 
than public firms, as private ownership provides more effective mechanisms for 
controlling management. This argument is also valid for stock as compared to mutual 
firms. On the other hand, other theoretical contributions suggest that there is no simple 
relationship between ownership and efficiency. These works challenge the effective 
functioning of the market for corporate control for private firms or the absence of this 
market for public firms and point to the effectiveness of mutual firms in controlling 
customer-owner problems. These conflicting arguments suggest empirical analyses 
could contribute to shed some light on the direction of this ownership-efficiency 
relationship.
4.2.2 Empirical Studies
Empirical evidence on efficiency differences between private- and public-owned firms 
largely concentrates on non-financial firms.45 The studies that examine the relative
45 The results of these studies are mixed. On the one hand, Millward (1982), Millward and Parker (1983) 
and Martin and Parker (1997) conclude that there is no evidence to suggest that public firms are less 
efficient than private firms. On the other hand, Borcherding et al (1982) conclude that the evidence 
seems to indicate that private firms arc more efficient than their public counterparts, but that these
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efficiency of public-owned and private financial institutions arc more recent. Table 4.1 
summarises these empirical studies. Tulkcns (1993) uses non-paramctric techniques to 
analyse the relative performance of branches of two large banks in Belgium (one 
private and one public). He finds the public bank’s branches to be relatively more 
efficient than those o f the private bank. Zaim (1995) uses Data Envelopment Analysis 
to investigate the efficiency differences among banks in Turkey. He finds that public 
banks arc more efficient than their private counterparts. Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) also 
use Data Envelopment Analysis to examine the relative performance of banks in India. 
They find public-owned banks appear to be more efficient than private-owned banks. 
Burdisso et al. (1998) use parametric techniques and report that private banks in 
Argentina seem to be more cost efficient than public financial institutions. Altunbas et 
al. (2001) using data for Germany find that public banks have slight cost and profit 
advantages over stock financial institutions.
The results of studies analysing the relative performance of mutual and stock financial 
institutions are not conclusive. Verbrugge and Goldstein (1981) explore the cost 
structure of saving and loan associations (S&Ls) in the U.S. concluding that mutual 
organisations exhibit higher costs than stock institutions while Blair and Placone (1988) 
find no differences between stock and mutual S&Ls. More recent studies use cost 
frontier methodologies and also reach mixed conclusions. Mcstcr (1993) finds mutual 
S&Ls in the U.S. to be more cost efficient than stock institutions while Cebenoyan et
differences arc related to differences in competition. In contrast, Vining & Boardman (1992) argue that 
private firms outperform public firms even after controlling for competition.
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T able  4.1
Empirical studies of efficiency differences across ownership types
Author Method* Sample1, Findingsc
Private vs. public ownership
Tulkens (1993) FDH Branches of 2 banks in 
Belgium (one private and 
one public)
Public bank's branches have higher 
efficiency than those of the private bank 
(0.97 and 0.93).
Zaim (1995) DEA Sample of banks in Turkey 
(public, private and foreign)
Public banks have higher efficiency than 
private and foreign banks (0.93, 0.77 
and 0.92). Foreign banks have higher 
efficiency than private banks.
Bhattacharyya et 
al. (1997)
DEA Sample of banks in India 
(28 public, 23 private and 
23 foreign), 1986-1991
Public banks have higher efficiency than 
private and foreign banks (0.86,0.75 
and 0.79). Foreign banks have slightly 
higher efficiency than private banks.
Burdisso et al. 
(1998)
DFA 71 banks in Argentina 
(public and private), 1991- 
1996
Public banks have lower cost efficiency 
than private banks (0.28 and 0.62).
Altunbas et al. 
(2001)
SFA and 
DFA
Sample of banks in 
Germany (public, stock and 
mutual), 1989-1996
Public and mutual banks are more cost 
and profit efficient than stock banks 
(0.82, 0.83 and 0.74).
Stock vs. mutual ownership
Mester (1993) SFA 1,015 S&Ls in the U.S., 
1991
Mutual S&Ls have higher cost 
efficiency than stock S&Ls (0.92 and 
0.87).
Ccbenoyan et al. 
(1993)
SFA S&Ls in the fourth district 
U.S., 1988
Mutual S&Ls are as efficient as stock 
S&Ls (0.87 and 0.86).
Lozano-Vivas
(2002)
SFA Sample of commercial 
(stock) and savings (mutual) 
banks in Spain, 1986-1995
Mutual banks have lower cost efficiency 
than stock banks (0.87 and 0.96)
Domestic vs. foreign ownership
DeYoung and 
Nolle (1996)
SFA 62 foreign and 240 domestic 
banks in the U.S., 1985- 
1990
Domestic banks have higher profit 
efficiency than foreign banks (0.73 and 
0.56).
Hasan and Hunter 
(1996)
SFA and 
TFA
Sample of Japanese and 
domestic banks in the U.S.
Domestic banks have higher cost 
efficiency than foreign banks (0.82 and 
0.79).
Mahajan et al. 
(1996)
TFA Sample of multinational and 
domestic banks in the U.S., 
1987-1990
Domestic banks have higher cost 
efficiency than foreign banks (0.88 and 
0.77).
Elyasiani and 
Mehdian (1997)
DEA Sample of foreign and 
domestic banks in the U.S., 
1988
Domestic banks are as efficient as 
foreign banks.
Berger et al. (2001) DFA 2,123 U.S. banks, 1993- 
1998. 215 banks in France, 
206 banks in Germany, 76 
banks in Spain, 124 banks 
in the U.K., 1992-1997
Domestic banks have lower cost and 
profit efficiency than foreign banks. In 
the U.S. domestic banks have higher 
cost and profit efficiency than foreign 
banks.
*SFA: Stochastic Frontier Approach; DFA: Distribution Free Approach; TFA: Thick Frontier Approach; DEA: Data 
Envelopment Analysis; FDH: Free Disposal Hull. b S&Ls: Savings and loans.c Average efficiency in parenthesis.
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al. (1993) find no difference.46 Altunbas et at. (2001) find that mutual banks in 
Germany have cost and profit advantages over stock financial institutions. Finally, 
Hasan and Lozano-Vivas (2002) report Spanish savings banks (mutual institutions) to 
be more inefficient than commercial banks.
Studies analysing efficiency differences associated with foreign and domestic 
ownership provide mixed conclusions. DeYoung and Nolle (1996), Mahajan et al. 
(1996) and Hasan and Hunter (1996) find that foreign-owned banks in the U.S. are 
significantly less efficient than domestic banks, while Elyasiani and Mehdian (1997) 
find that, on average, foreign-owned banks are as efficient as U.S.-owned banks. 
Studies for other countries also provide mixed evidence. Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) 
find forcign-owncd banks in India to be more efficient than private-owned domestic 
banks (but government-owned banks to be more efficient than both of them). Zaim 
(1995) finds similar results for banks in Turkey. Berger et al. (2001) report that foreign- 
owned banks in France, Germany, Spain and the U.K. are more cost and profit efficient 
than domestic-owned banks. In contrast, in the U.S. foreign banks are less cost and 
profit efficient than U.S.-owned banks. In line with this, they also find that in France, 
Germany, Spain and the U.K., foreign banks from the U.S. generally exceed the cost­
and profit-efficiencies of domestic banks.
To sum up, theoretical contributions and empirical evidence both suggest that there is 
no simple relationship between ownership and efficiency. However, most studies focus 
on the experiences of developed economies characterised by well functioning capital
w Gardner and Grace (1993) and Berger ct al. (1996a) analyse the U.S. life insurance industry and the 
U.S. property-liability insurance industry respectively finding no significant differences between stocks
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markets. The particular characteristics of developing countries may make the analysis 
of the ownership-efficiency relationship even more complex. Developing economies 
are characterised by information poverty (which affects the effectiveness of shareholder 
monitoring), high transaction costs, stringent takeover regulations and also by the fact 
that the success or failure of a takeover may depend on the ability of firms or 
individuals to gather government support (Sarkar et al., 1998). Additionally, the few 
empirical studies that have analysed the ownership-efficiency relationship within a 
developing country have not offered conclusive evidence. This calls for further analysis 
of the banking industry in developing economies.
4.3 Efficiency Measurement
4.3.1 Efficiency Concept
Productive efficiency can be defined as the degree of success firms achieve in 
allocating inputs at their disposal to produce outputs in an effort to meet some objective 
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). Technical efficiency focuses on levels o f inputs 
relative to levels of outputs. To be technically efficient, a firm must either minimise its 
inputs given outputs or maximise its outputs given inputs. Economic efficiency is a 
broader concept than technical efficiency, in that it also involves choosing the optimal 
levels and mixes of inputs and/or outputs based on reactions to market prices. To be 
economically efficient, a firm has to choose its inputs and/or outputs (levels and mixes) 
so as to optimise an economic objective, usually cost minimisation or profit 
maximisation. Economic efficiency requires both technical efficiency and allocative
and mutuals in terms of cost efficiency, but stock firms providing property liability insurance present 
higher profit efficiency than mutuals.
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efficiency: the optimal inputs and/or outputs are chosen based on both the production 
technology and the relative prices in the market.
Technical efficiency is generally defined as the ability to produce maximum outputs 
from given inputs (input-oriented) or the ability to minimise input use in the production 
of given outputs (output-oriented) and is measured in terms of distance to a production 
frontier. Figure 4.1 illustrates the simple case in which variable input x is utilised to 
produce a single output y. The production frontier is f(x)=max{y:y e P(x)} = max{y:x 
e L(y)}, where P(x) and L(y) are the output and inputs sets respectively, which 
describes the maximum output that can be produced with any given input vector. The 
input-output combination of each firm is located on or beneath the production frontier.
A firm using X) to produce yi is technically inefficient, since it operates beneath the 
production frontier f(x). The input-oriented technical efficiency measure, measured on 
the x axis, is given by the function TEi(y,x)=min{0:y<f(0x)}, where TE|(yi,X|) 
measures the maximum decrease in xi that enables continued production of yi, and 
TEi(yi,X|)=0i<l, since yi=f(0|Xi). The output-oriented measure, measured on the y 
axis, is given by TEo(y,x)=[max {<t>:<t>y£f(0x)}]'1, then TE0(yi,X|) measures the 
reciprocal of the maximum increase in yi that is achievable with X |, and 
TEo(yi,X|)“ ($i)’l< l, since <t>iyi=f(xi). A thorough discussion of these concepts is 
provided in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000).
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Input-oriented and output-oriented technical efficiency
Figure 4.1
Economic efficiency can be measured in terms of distance to a cost, revenue or profit 
frontier. Cost efficiency is measured from a cost frontier derived under the assumption 
that firms face input prices w and seek to minimise the costs incurred in producing 
output y:
(4.1) c (y,w) = minx {wTx: x e  L(y)} *= minx {wTx: y £ fix)}
which represents the minimum expenditure required to produce y, given input prices. In 
the case of multiple outputs, the cost frontier becomes: c(y,w)=minx{wTx: x e 
L(y)}=minx{wTx: Di(y,x)>l} where D|(y,x) is an input distance function.47 A measure 
of cost efficiency is then a function of:
(4.2) CE (y,x,w) = c(y,w)/wTx
47 When multiple inputs are used to produce multiple outputs, distance functions provide a 
characterisation of the structure of production technology.
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which is the ratio of minimum cost to observed cost. In Figure 4.2 (a) the cost 
efficiency of a firm using inputs X| at price W| to produce yi is measured by the ratio of 
minimum cost c(yi,Wi)=W|Xc to actual cost W|X|, where xe is the optimal input use to 
produce yi given wi. Thus the measure of cost efficiency ranges between zero and one, 
and equals one if  the firm uses a cost-minimising input vector.48
Figure 4.2
Economic efficiency: cost and profit efficiency
c y
(a) (b)
Profit efficiency is measured in terms of distance to a profit frontier derived under the 
assumption of perfect competition in output and input markets. Firms face output prices 
p and input prices w and seek to maximise profits by solving: max n = pTy-wTx, s.t. (y, 
x) e GR where GR = {(y,x):x can produce y} describes the set of feasible input-output 
vectors. The standard profit frontier is given by: n(p,w)=maxyt, {pTy-wTx: (y,x) e GR} 41
41 Revenue efficiency requires the assumption that firms face output prices p and seek to maximise 
revenue pTy they can generate from the input vector x they employ. A measure of revenue efficiency is 
given by the function: RE(x,y,p)-pTy/r(x,p).
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which shows the maximum profit obtainable from using x to produce y, given input and 
output prices. A measure of profit efficiency is given by the function: 
nE(y,x,p,w)=(pTy-wTx)/jt(p,w), provided 7i(p,w)>0, which is the ratio of actual profit to 
maximum profit. In Figure 4.2 (b) a firm facing prices (pi,wt) achieves rcE(y,x,p,w)=l 
at output-input combination E, and jrE(y,x,p,w)<l for all other feasible output-input 
combinations.
If product markets are not perfectly competitive, profit efficiency can be measured in 
terms of distance to an alternative profit function consistent with firms having some 
control over output prices (Humphrey and Pulley, 1997). Instead of taking output prices 
as given, firms are assumed to maximise profits for given output quantities y and input 
prices w, by choosing output prices p along with input quantities x. The alternative 
profit frontier is given by:
(4.3) n(y,w)=maxp.x {pTy-wTx: (y,x) e GR}
and a measure of profit efficiency is given by the function:
(4.4) 7iE.(y,x,p,w)=(pTy-wTx)/n(y,w)
provided maximum profit n(y,w) is positive. This measure equals 1 if the firm uses 
profit-maximising input quantities and output price vectors.
Most studies in the literature of efficiency of financial institutions focus on the 
estimation of economic efficiency. Bauer ct al. (1998) argue that economic efficiency is
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a better measure to be used by regulators, to evaluate the costs and benefits to society 
of different policies, than is technical efficiency since the latter does not consider the 
value of inputs wasted or outputs not produced. Most of these studies have analysed 
cost efficiency, but more recently some works have also estimated profit efficiency 
using standard and/or alternative profit frontiers (DeYoung and Nolle, 1996; Berger 
and Mester, 1997; Humphrey and Pulley, 1997; Lozano-Vivas 1997; Berger et al. 2001; 
Kumbhakar ct al. 2001; Berger and Mester, 2003).
Berger and Mester (1997) argue that the analysis of profit efficiency of financial 
institutions is to be preferred for at least two reasons. Firstly, while the use of a cost 
function allows for measurement of inefficiencies on the input side, the profit function 
incorporates both the revenue effects of producing at incorrect levels or mixes of 
outputs and the cost effects of using the incorrect levels or mixes of inputs.49 Secondly, 
profit efficiency is based on the more accepted economic objective of profit 
maximisation, which requires that managerial attention be directed to raising revenues 
as well as to reducing costs. Several authors also argue that the alternative profit 
function is to be preferred to the standard profit function mainly due to the fact that the 
standard assumption o f perfect competition in the financial services industry is difficult 
to sustain in some cases (Berger and Mester, 1997; Berger ct al., 2001). However, the 
use of a cost frontier may be more appropriate to evaluate the efficiency of banks that 
have different objectives than profit maximisation.
** Moreover, the input (output) inefficiencies measured using the cost (revenue) function assume that the 
output (input) inefficiencies arc zero. If cither assumption is not satisfied, the inefficiencies obtained 
from a profit function will be more accurate than those obtained from a cost (revenue) function alone 
(Lozano-Vivas, 1997).
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The use of cost or profit frontiers to evaluate economic efficiency is then related to 
owners’ and managers’ objectives in different organisations. In stock banks, for 
example, the owners are possibly requesting maximum profits and market forces may 
discipline managers to maximise profits. However, it is not clear whether managers of 
mutual and public banks have similar objectives. The owners’ objectives in mutual 
banks may be related to the minimisation of the spread between the rates offered to 
depositors and those charged to borrowers while in public ownership may be the 
maximisation of social welfare. Since the objectives of each ownership type are not 
clear, the evaluation of each bank’s capability to achieve its superior goals should be 
left aside. The solution to this problem could be to focus on subobjectives that are 
unambiguous for the different ownership types. Cost minimisation might be a good 
candidate in this respect to analyse the efficiency differences of stock, mutual and 
public-owned banks. In contrast, stock domestic- and foreign-owned banks should have 
similar objectives i.e. profit maximisation, then, profit frontiers could also be used to 
evaluate these banks’ efficiency.
4.3.2 Frontier Efficiency Approaches
The empirical measurement of technical efficiency requires the specification of a 
production function such as yi=fl(Xj,P)TE|, where y  is the output of firm i, Xj is a vector 
of inputs, fl(x,p) is the production frontier, p is a vector of technology parameters to be 
estimated and TE is technical efficiency, which equals y/fl(Xi,P).Using logarithms the 
production frontier can be written as:
(4.5) lny=lnf(Xi,P)-Uj
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where u,= -In TE, reflects technical inefficiency that forces production to be below the 
frontier i.e. if U j= 0  firm i is fully efficient. Similarly, a cost function can be written as 
follows: In c, = In f(y,,Wi,P)+uCj where uCj represents cost inefficiency that makes costs 
to be above the frontier. In addition, the (alternative) profit function is given by: In iij = 
In f(yi,wi,p)-u’Ii where u* represents profit inefficiency that forces profits to be beneath 
the frontier.
Two different approaches can be used to estimate efficiency: parametric and non- 
parametric. The parametric approaches to efficiency measurement specify a functional 
form for the frontier and allow for random error as follows: In yj = a  + Xj’P + e, where 
Ei = Vj - Uj, Vj represents random error and Ui reflects technical inefficiency. The main 
disadvantage of parametric techniques is given by the imposition of a particular 
functional form that presupposes the form of the frontier. If the functional form is 
misspccified, measured efficiency may be confounded with the specification errors. 
Several parametric methods can be used to estimate efficiency: Stochastic Frontier 
Approach (SFA), Distribution Free Approach (DFA) and Thick Frontier Approach 
(TFA). These approaches differ in the distributional assumptions imposed to 
disentangle random error from inefficiency.
In the SFA inefficiencies Ui arc assumed to follow an asymmetric distribution (for 
example, half-normal or truncated-normal) while random errors v, follow a symmetric 
distribution (Aigner et al., 1977; Mecuscn and van den Broeck, 1977). The frontier is 
estimated using maximum likelihood methods and the estimated inefficiency for any 
firm is taken as the conditional mean or mode of the distribution of the inefficiency 
term, given the observation of the composed error term. When panel data is available,
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efficiency can be also estimated using two alternative methods: fixed-effects and 
random-effects estimators. These methods allow estimation of efficiency without any 
assumption about the distribution of the error term (Schmidt and Sickles, 1984). Studies 
by Ferrier and Lovell (1990), Cebenoyan et al. (1993), Bauer et al. (1993, 1998), Esho 
and Sharpe (1996) and Maudos et al. (2002), for example, have used this approach to 
analyse efficiency of financial institutions.
As panel data techniques, DFA imposes no distributional assumptions on the error term 
representing inefficiency. This approach for efficiency measurement assumes that the 
inefficiency of each firm is stable over time, whereas random error tends to average out 
to zero through time (Berger, 1993). This approach requires estimation of separate 
production (cost) functions for each time period and the residuals for each firm 
averaged out over time. The estimate o f efficiency for each firm is then determined as 
the difference between its average residual and the average residual of the firm on the 
frontier, which is the firm with the highest (lowest) residual when a production (cost) 
frontier is estimated. Some truncation is then performed to account for the failure of the 
random error to average out to zero fully. The main disadvantage of this approach is the 
requirement that efficiency is time-invariant, however, a main virtue is that it allows the 
structure of production technology to vary flexibly through time. Berger (1993), Berger 
and Mester (1997), Bauer et al. (1998) and Berger et al. (2001) have undertaken work 
in this area.
As with the previous approach, TFA imposes no distributional assumptions on the 
inefficiency error term. However, TFA assumes that inefficiencies differ between the 
highest and lowest quartiles and that random error exists within these quartiles. This
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approach requires estimation of separate production (cost) functions for firms in the 
highest and lowest quartiles, stratified by size class. Variation in residuals within the 
highest and lowest performance quartiles of observations is then assumed to represent 
random error, while deviations in the average level of predicted output (costs) between 
the highest and lowest quartiles is assumed to reflect inefficiencies (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1991). The main shortcoming o f this approach is that it does not generate 
efficiency estimates for each firm in the sample. Studies by Berger and Humphrey 
(1991), Bauer et al. (1993) and Berger and Mester (2003) have applied this approach to 
banking firms.
The non-parametric approaches to efficiency estimation impose less structure on the 
frontier than the parametric methods but do not allow for random error, which may 
cause measured efficiency to be confounded with random deviations from the 
efficiency frontier if random error exists. Two non-parametric approaches can be used 
to estimate efficiency: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Free Disposable Hull 
analysis (FDH). DEA assumes that all deviations from the estimated frontier represent 
inefficiency. DEA is a linear programming technique where the set of best-practice or 
frontier observations are those for which no other firm or linear combination of firms 
has as much or more of every output (given inputs) or as little or less of every input 
(given outputs). The DEA frontier is formed as the piecewise linear combinations that 
connect the set of these best-practice observations, yielding a convex production 
possibilities set. As such, DEA docs not require the explicit specification of the form of 
the underlying production relationship. FDH is a special case of DEA. These 
approaches have been applied to financial institutions by Elysiani and Mehdian (1990),
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Miller and Noulas (1996), Drake and Weyman-Jones (1996), Worthington (1996) and 
Isik and Hasan (2002).
There is no consensus in the literature regarding a preferred frontier method for 
evaluating efficiency of financial institutions. For this reason, some studies have 
compared different techniques, usually applying two efficiency methods to the same 
data set.50 The most recent studies that compare several parametric and non-parametric 
techniques as applied to financial institutions (Bauer et al., 1998 and Cummins and Zi, 
1998) conclude that parametric approaches tend to yield about the same distribution of 
efficiency and rank banks in about the same order. But parametric and non-parametric 
methods are not consistent with each other in those dimensions. They also indicate that 
the parametric techniques appear to be more consistent with measures of bank 
performance such as returns on assets or various cost ratios that are often used by 
regulators. In this context, Cummins and Zi (1998) further suggest the use of more than 
one methodology when analysing efficiency to avoid specification errors affecting the 
findings.
4.4 Methodology
Two approaches can be used to analyse efficiency differences across ownership types. 
It would be possible: (i) to estimate an industry frontier, including all ownership types, 
from which efficiencies can be calculated or alternatively, (ii) to estimate frontiers for 
each ownership type. The former would allow comparisons between ownership types 
relative to the industry best-practice cost or profit frontier, whereas the latter would
50 Several studies have compared SFA and DEA (e.g. Ferrier and Lovell, 1990; Giokas, 1991; Ferrieret 
al., 1993; Eiscnbeis cl al., 1997; Rcstis, 1997). In conlrast, only few studies have compared twoor three
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only permit comparison between banks of the same ownership type. This study uses the 
first approach, for two reasons. Firstly, one objective of this work is to estimate 
efficiency differences across ownership types and this would not be possible by 
estimating separate frontiers. Secondly, there is no evidence to suggest that in 
Argentina banks of different ownership type have access to different technologies. A 
cost frontier is then estimated using pooled data on all banks, regardless of their 
ownership type, while a profit frontier is estimated from data of stock domestic- and 
foreign-owned banks.
To measure cost efficiency, the cost function for bank i, which takes exogenous output 
quantities y and input prices w, is specified as:
(4.6) In c = f  (y,w,z) + In uc + In vc
where c is total cost, f  (y,w,z) is a cost function with outputs, variable input prices and 
other control and shift variables as arguments, In uc denotes an inefficiency factor that 
may increase costs above the best-practice level, and In vc denotes the random error that 
incorporates measurement error and any other statistical noise that may temporarily 
give firms high or low costs. The term ln u ' + ln v c is a composite error term. The 
efficiency measurement techniques used in this study separate the two components 
making different assumptions.
To measure profit efficiency, the alternative profit function that takes output quantities 
y and exogenous input prices w, is written as follows:
parametric methods (e.g. Berger and Mcstcr, 1997), or two or three non-parametric techniques
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(4 .7 )  In n = / ( y ,w ,z )  - In  u " +  In  v '
where 7t*=7t+0 such that n is total profit o f bank i and 0 is a constant added to every 
bank’s profit so that the natural logarithm is taken of a positive number; In u" represents 
inefficiency that reduces profits and In v" represents random error.
The functional form adopted for the cost and profit function is the translog. This is the 
functional form most frequently used in the literature. However, McAllister and 
McManus (1993) and Mitchell and Onvural (1996) show that the fitting of a translog 
over a wide range of firm sizes, could lead to specification bias. They suggest that the 
use of a more flexible functional form could alleviate this problem. One such function 
is the Fourier flexible form, which augments the translog by including Fourier 
trigonometric terms. Several studies show that the Fourier fits the data for U.S. 
financial institutions better than does the translog (see McAllister and McManus, 1993; 
Mitchell and Onvural, 1996; Berger and DeYoung, 1997). However, with regard to 
efficiency estimates, there appears to be little economic gain from the additional 
trigonometric terms. Berger and Mester (1997) and Vander Vennet (2002) report that 
the translog and the Fourier flexible form yield similar average level and dispersion of 
measured efficiency and rank individual banks in almost the same order. In this study, 
the translog and the Fourier flexible specifications provide similar efficiency scores and 
ranking of firms, hence, results reported are those for the translog function.51
(DeBorger et al., 1995).
Efficiency scores obtained with the Fourier flexible form are presented in the Appendix.
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The translog cost function can be written as follows (omitting firm and time
subscript):52
(4.8) In c (y,w,z) = a„ +£P,  lnw, + £ P m lny. + P,t + ; I I 6,i l n w j lnwk
J *" 2  j  k
+ | Z E 8™ lnyn, l n y „ ^ 8 „ . - t  + I l 5 ^  lnw, lny„
m n *  j m
+ Z 81. Inw, t + S 8rn. '"y» * + *»“ ' + *»vC
j  m
where c represents total cost (operating and interest costs), Wj denotes input prices, ym 
represents the volume of output of firm i in period t and subscripts j,k=d,l,k,m,f denote 
inputs deposits, labour, physical capital, materials and other funds and m,n=L,S denote 
outputs loans and securities.53 A time trend t is added to serve as an indicator of 
technological progress, u is the inefficiency term and v the random error term.54
The alternative profit function has the same translog specification as the cost function. 
The use of the same functional form for the cost and profit functions assures that any 
observed differences in measured cost and profit efficiency are due to the efficiency 
concept (i.e. cost efficiency or profit efficiency) and not to the choice of functional 
form. The use of the same functional form therefore avoids confounding inefficiency
53 Input cost (output revenue) share equations embodying Shephard's Lemma (Hotelling's Lemma) 
restrictions are excluded because this would impose the assumption of no allocative inefficiencies.
53 Berger and Mester (1997) include financial capital as a fixed input in the cost function to control for 
risk. Efficiency scores obtained with the translog cost function including financial capital as a fixed input 
are presented in the Appendix.
54 Berger and Mester (1997) include the ratio of non-performing to total loans to control for output 
quality. They report negligible differences in cost and profit efficiency measures obtained after adding 
this control variable. In addition, Berger and DeYoung (1997) point out that if loan quality is driven by 
bad management, controlling for non-performing loans in cost and profit functions will artificially 
increase measured efficiency. For these reasons, the ratio of non-performing loans is not included in the 
analysis.
89
differences with specification differences. The cost function and the alternative profit 
function not only have the same functional form but also have exactly the same right- 
hand side variables, the only difference being the dependent variable: total costs and 
total pre-tax profits, respectively. Following Berger and Mester (1997), the constant 
0=|7tmin|+l is added to every firm’s profits so that the natural logarithm is taken of a 
positive number, since the minimum profits are typically negative.55 56
To ensure symmetry and linear homogeneity in input prices, the following parameter 
restrictions on the cost function are imposed a priori: Zj Pj=l, Zj Sjk=0, 5jk=Skj for all j,k, 
Zj 5jm=0 and Zj ôJt=0.5A The homogeneity restriction does not have to be imposed on the 
alternative profit function, but following Berger and Mester (1997) it is imposed to 
keep the functional forms equivalent. In contrast, monotonicity with respect to output 
quantities and input prices arc not general properties of the translog functional forms 
and unlike symmetry, they cannot be conveniently summarised by linear restrictions on 
parameters of equation (4.8). Consequently, the consistency of the estimated equations 
with respect to these properties must be evaluated.57
Cost and profit efficiencies arc estimated using the parametric approaches SFA and 
DFA, allowing efficiency to vary across banks. The TFA is not applied since it does not 
provide estimates of efficiency at the firm level. Four different techniques arc used 
within the SFA to estimate bank efficiency; all use the same translog cost (profit)
55 The value of one plus the absolute value of the largest negative profit in the sample is included in ir . 
The dependent variable for firm i at time t is then: In 7t,i,-ln(itH+|)tm,n|+l), where n is measured profits 
and min indicates the sample minimum, which is negative. This modification is made for all observations 
and for the firm with the lowest value of n the dependent variable will be ln( 1 )-0.
56 In the empirical implementation, linear homogeneity in input prices is imposed by normalising the
dependent variable and all input price variables by one input price before taking logarithms.
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specification. Two panel estimation techniques are based on Schmidt and Sickles 
(1984): a fixed-effects model (FEM) and a random-effects model (REM). The other 
two are Maximum Likelihood (MLE) techniques, which are based on Battese and 
Coelli (1988).
In the FEM the inefficiency term Ui is treated as a firm-specific constant and the error 
term v„ is assumed to be iid (0,a2v) and uncorrelatcd with the regressors. The model is 
estimated by Ordinary Least Squares with Dummy Variables using the within-groups 
(WITHIN) transformation (since the number of firms is too large to accommodate with 
simple OLS). If a cost function is estimated, the firm with the lowest fixed effect is 
assumed to be the most efficient in the sample, and efficiency is measured by the 
distance between the fixed effect of each firm and that of the most efficient one:
(4.9) CEi = exp{-(A0, - A 7 ) ]
where aoi=a0+Ui are the fixed effects. The fixed-effects are intended to capture 
variation across firms in time-invariant efficiency. However, they also capture the 
effects o f all firm time-invariant events (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). The random- 
effects model that follows is intended to address this drawback.
In the REM the inefficiency term Uj is randomly distributed but is assumed to be 
uncorrelatcd with the regressors and with the v*,, which are assumed to have zero mean 
and constant variance. The model is estimated by the two-step Generalised Least 57
57 In the case of the alternative profit function, even when it is not possible to specify the properties 
satisfied by it, it is reasonable to assume that it is non-decreasing in output quantities and non-increasing 
in input prices (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000).
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Squares (GLS) method. In this model, the inefficiency term forms part of the random 
error, and efficiency is computed as follows:
(4.10) CE, = exp[-(ln £' -  In £'""" )]
where ln £ ' =(1/T, )-Z ln£„, ln£„ are the residuals and Tj is the number o f  observations 
for firm i.
The MLE techniques assume the random error Vjt is two-sided while the inefficiency 
term Uj is one-sided. The model is estimated by MLE and the inefficiency component is 
inferred from the composite error Eit= Uj+Vj,, where Vjt~iid N(0,a2v) and Uj and v*t are 
distributed independently of each other, and of the regressors. If the inefficiency term is 
assumed to follow a truncated normal distribution, ur-iid h f( |i,a2u), the efficiency 
estimate for firm i is given by (Battese and Coelli, 1988):
(4.11) CEj = E[exp(-u, )|e„ ] :
l-<l>[a' ~ (n ' / a ’)] 
l-<t>(-H,'/o')
where <t> is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution, 
pi*={(M02v+Ti o 2u £;)/[o2v+(a2uTi)]}, a i*={(a2uo2v)/[o2v+(a2uTi)]}'/2, t ‘ = (l/T i)I
ln£„ and Ti is the number of observations for firm i.58 If the inefficiency component is 
assumed to follow a half normal distribution, u riid  N+(0,o2u), the firm-specific time- 
invariant efficiency estimates can be produced simply by restricting p to equal 0 in
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(4.11) .* 59 Efficiency is measured relative to the estimated frontier rather than the best- 
practice bank (that with a zero value for In u), which may not be achieved by any bank 
in the sample. To make the efficiency measures comparable across techniques, the 
efficiency estimates are normalised to be deviations from the smallest observed 
expected value of In u, so the most efficient bank in the sample will have efficiency of 
one (Berger and Mester, 1997).
The other parametric technique used to analyse efficiency is the DFA. This approach 
makes no assumptions on the distribution of the inefficiency term u¡ and disentangles 
inefficiency u¡ from random error v¡t by assuming that the former is constant and that 
the latter tend to average out to zero over time. The cost and profit functions are 
estimated separately for each year over the sample period and the average residual for 
each bank is an estimate of In u¡. Despite the assumption that random errors average out 
to zero over time, the extreme values of these inefficiency estimates may reflect 
substantial random components. Hence, truncation is used to give less extreme values 
to banks with the most extreme values in each of different bank size classes.60 The 
time-invariant efficiency estimate for firm i is calculated as follows:
(4.12) CEi = exp[-(ln £' -  In £‘"” )]
51 The parameter y=o3„/o2 represents the share of inefficiency in the overall residual variance and ranges 
between 0 and I. A value of I suggests the existence of a deterministic frontier, whereas a value of 0 can 
be seen as evidence in favour of a standard OLS estimation (no inefficiency effects).
59 Berger and Humphrey (1997) point out that even when the half-normal assumption for the distribution 
of inefficiencies is relatively inflexible (and presupposes that most firms arc clustered near full 
efficiency), the use of other distributions such as the gamma or truncated normal distributions, which are 
more flexible, may make it difficult to separate inefficiency from random error.
“  Each bank at the top and bottom 5% of the distribution of the average residuals in a size category is 
assigned the value for the bank that is just at 5lh or 95Ul percentile, respectively. Truncation is performed 
within size class quartiles (by total assets) (DeYoung and Nolle, 1996).
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where In i ' = ( l /T )Z ln e „  and ln£„ are the residuals of the estimation o f  the model for 
each year.*1
The preceding analysis is based on the assumption that efficiency is time-invariant. 
Several techniques can be used to model time-varying efficiency, however, these 
methods are subject to several limitations, especially when technical change is 
considered in the analysis. Two different approaches can be used to model time-varying 
efficiency using fixed- or random-effects. One of these techniques assumes Ui,=UrPi, 
where the pt are time-effects represented by time dummies and the Ui can be either firm- 
specific fixed- or random-effects (Lee and Schmidt, 1993). This model is only suitable 
in cases where the number of firms is large and the number of time-series observations 
is relatively small (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). The main drawback of this method is 
that it assumes a common temporary pattern o f  variation on efficiency across firms. 
The other approach assumes u» to be Un^Qn+i^it+f^it2, where the Os are firm-specific 
parameters (Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles, 1990). Hence, this method allows temporal 
efficiency changes to differ across firms. However, if technical change is proxied by a 
time trend, it is impossible to separate the effects of technical change and of time- 
varying technical efficiency using this approach (Kumbhakar, Heshmati and 
Hjalmarsson, 1997).
A maximum likelihood approach can be used to solve this problem by positing a non­
linear specification on the time trend in the function identifying the temporal pattern of 41
41 Profit efficiency can be measured using (4.9), (4.10) and (4.12) with some sign changes and with 
respect to the firm with the highest fixed-effect or average residual and using (4.11) with some sign 
changes. However, since 0 is subtracted from n, these expressions can no longer be used. Instead profit 
efficiency needs to be computed as the ratio of predicted actual profits to predicted maximum profits for 
a best-practice bank as follows: | (exp [ln( ft+0)] exp[ln ( 0 ‘ )]}-0}/{ (exp [ln( ft +0)] exp[ln (0 “  )J)-0).
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inefficiency. This method assumes that Ui,=u,P(t), where P(t) is a parametric function 
of time and Uj is a nonnegative random variable (Kumbhakar, 1990; Battcse and Coelli, 
1992). In this case the time effects can be separated by using a non-linear specification 
for P(t). However, the main drawback of this approach is the assumption that efficiency 
change is the same for all banks and that the ranking of banks according to efficiency is 
the same at all time periods. This model does not account for situations in which some 
firms are relatively inefficient initially but become more efficient in later periods.
Another maximum likelihood approach allows for the temporary pattern of variation on 
efficiency to differ across firms (Battese and Coelli, 1995). The inefficiency term is 
assumed to follow a truncated distribution with different means for each individual. 
The distribution of the inefficiency effects is assumed to be a function o f observable 
variables. The u„ are non-negative random variables independently distributed, and 
obtained by truncation of the N^(pM,CT2u) distribution:
(4.13) Hi, = mj, ■ $
where m,, is a vector of observable explanatory variables and \  is a vector of unknown 
parameters. Consequently the inefficiency effects are defined as:
(4.14) Uj, = mu • 4 + wit
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where wit is defined by truncation of a normal distribution being mlt-^ the truncation 
point. These assumptions are consistent with Un being the non-negative truncation of 
the N+(mjt ^, a 2u) distribution.
The efficiency estimate for firm i at time t is given by (Battese and Coelli, 1995):
(4.15) CEit=E[exp(-ult)|eJ:
% > >  a - ] 
<j>(p ; / o ')
exp[p;, + - a
where nl,= (a2v ml,-^ +CT2U'e,I)/(o2u+CT2v) and a ’=[(a2ua 2v)/(a2v+a2u)]l/2. The goal o f  this 
technique is to analyse the determinants of inefficiencies among firms, however, it can 
also be used to measure time-varying efficiency. Even though the inclusion o f a time 
trend among the explanatory variables in the inefficiency function leads to the same 
identification problems mentioned above, the use of time-varying variables allows 
estimation of inefficiencies that vary across firms and time. This approach is used to 
analyse efficiency changes over time.62
The preceding analysis refers to the measurement of economic efficiency from the 
estimation of a cost or profit function. Several cost elasticities can be also computed 
from the parameters of the cost function (4.8). The elasticity of cost with respect to 
output, which represents the cost changes associated with scale y may be expressed as 
Ecy = Im(5c/<3ym)(ym/c)=Im(<91nc/dlny). In terms of the coefficients of (4.8), the elasticity 
of cost with respect to output can be written as:
62 Only few studies in the banking literature analyse time-varying efficiency or the determinants of 
inefficiencies using parametric approaches (Lang and Welzcl, 1999; Esho, 2001; Frame and Coelli, 2001; 
Cavallo and Rossi, 2002).
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Since scale economies can be measured as SCE=l/ecy values of ecy lower (higher) than 
one indicate the presence o f scale economies (diseconomies). The elasticity of cost with 
respect to time often interpreted as technological change, which measures the rate of 
downward shift of the cost function over time, can be estimated from the cost function 
as ect=(3c/3t)(l/c) =(31nc/3t), which from (4.8) can be written as follows:
(4.17) e„ =p, +8„t + £ 5 jl lnw, + £ 5n» lnym
j  m
where negative values indicate the contribution of technical change in reducing firm 
costs.
4.5 Data and Variables
The data used to estimate the cost and profit frontiers consist of annual information 
from the Report of Condition and Income Statement of each retail bank over the period 
1993-2000. Data for the 1993-1997 period were provided by the Banco Central de la 
República Argentina, while data for the 1998-2000 period were obtained from 
Información de Entidades Financieras, Banco Central de la República Argentina. 
Banks arc classified as stock, mutual, public- and forcign-owncd. The data set is an 
unbalanced panel of 715 observations: 124 refer to public banks, 346 to stock banks, 
115 to mutual banks and 130 to foreign banks. The unbalanced nature of the panel is 
due to: (i) privatisation of public banks; (ii) mergers among mutual financial
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institutions; (iii) mergers in the stock (domestic) sector and (iv) entry of foreign banks, 
which mainly occurred through acquisition of domestic banks. The following dummy 
variables DSIOCk. Dmul, Dpub and Dfor equal 1 for stock, mutual, public- and foreign- 
owned banks, respectively, and 0 otherwise.
The definition of outputs and inputs follows the intermediation approach. Thus, yi. is 
measured as the volume of loans and ys as total assets minus loans, property and 
equipment and other fixed assets. Since loans arc denominated in domestic (pesos) and 
foreign (dollars) currency, a quantity index is constructed by Divisia aggregation of 
loans in pesos and dollars as follows: lnyt-lny,.| = (l/2)S,(Si,+sl,i.|)- (lny^-lny^-i) where 
y, represents the ith type of loan, pi the interest rate, Si=pj-yj/Ijpj-yi its share in total 
revenues and t represents the time period.63
The input prices (labour, capital, materials and other funds) are computed as follows. 
The wage rate for each bank (wi) is proxied by the ratio of personnel expenses (wages 
and insurance payments) to the number of employees. The price of capital for each 
bank (wk) is constructed as sum of the depreciation rate and the opportunity cost of 
capital. The latter is approximated by the interest rate for loans less the expected rise in 
the value of the investment goods employed, which is proxied by the growth rate of the 
wholesale price index (Lang and Welzel, 1996). The price of materials (wm) is 
constructed as administrative expenses minus personnel and capital costs divided by the 
value of total assets. The price of other funds (W f) is given by the ratio of interest 
expenses on other purchased funds to other borrowed funds (including interbank funds 
purchased, commercial papers and other purchased funds). Total cost in each bank (c) 43
43 11 institutions were excluded due to negative or implausibly large prices.
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includes all operating expenses and interest payments on deposits and other purchased 
funds while total profit (7t) is given by net income before tax adjusted to exclude 
negative values. All nominal data were converted into 2000 prices using the wholesale 
price index.
Table 4.2 displays descriptive statistics by ownership type. The data indicate that banks 
differ in terms of assets. On average, stock banks held $610 million of assets, mutual 
banks had $258 million of assets and public-owned banks held assets for $2.2 billion. 
The average foreign-owned bank also had $2.2 billion o f assets. On the output side, 
forcign-owncd banks held fewer loans as proportion of total assets and charged lower 
interest rates than did domestic-owned banks. In the domestic-owned sector, stock 
banks held fewer loans than their mutual and public sector counterparts and mutual 
banks paid the highest interest rates on loans of the market.
On the inputs side, foreign-owned banks used fewer employees per million of assets 
than did domestic-owned banks, but paid them higher wages and benefits. This result 
suggests that foreign-owned banks used labour inputs rather efficiently and/or pursued 
a less labour-intensive strategy. In the domestic-owned sector, mutual banks relied 
more heavily on labour than public-owned and stock banks. Mutual banks, however, 
paid lower salaries. In terms of funds, forcign-owned banks had fewer deposits than 
domestic-owned banks financing a larger proportion o f their assets with purchased 
funds. This result may indicate that forcign-owned banks had difficulty competing for 
deposits from domestic customers and/or that they have access to foreign sources of 
funds. However, foreign-owned banks paid the lowest interest rate on deposits but 
similar rates on purchased funds. In the domestic-owned sector, mutual banks had more
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Table 4.2
Descriptive statistics
Stock, mutual, public- and foreign-owned retail banks, 1993-2000
Variable* All banks Domestic banks 
Stock Mutual Public
Foreign
banks
Output quantities (% of assets)
Loans Yl 57.6 55.0 65.2 60.8 54.8
(16.3) (16.8) (9.0) (18.5) (15.5)
Securities ys 31.2 33.1 20.4 31.6 35.4
(16.2) (17.1) (9.2) (14.8) (16.2)
Output prices (%)
Loans Pl 19.8 20.7 26.1 17.3 14.2
(9.9) (11.0) (6.7) (8.9) (5.7)
Securities Ps 6.5 6.7 6.7 6.2 6.1
(11.7) (11.2) (7.6) (19.4) (4.4)
Input quantities (% of assets)
Employees (per million $ of assets) X| 1.8 1.8 3.2 1.8 0.9
(1.3) (1.2) (1.3) (09) (0.5)
Capital Xk 6.9 6.6 8.8 6.4 6.6
(3.7) (3.9) (3.4) (3.1) (3.6)
Materials Xin 3.2 3.2 4.9 2.3 2.3
(1.9) (1.6) (2.4) (1.3) (1.6)
Deposits Xd 50.1 49.5 58.8 48.3 45.7
(20.1) (24.5) (119) (15.2) (14.1)
Other funds Xf 24.6 24.5 13.3 27.5 32.0
(14.9) (14.4) (9.4) (14.4) (14.7)
Input prices (*/•)
Labour (thousand S per employee) w, 31.8 30.2 24.5 31.2 43.2
(11.5) (10.4) (5.8) (8.9) (12.4)
Capital w k 23.5 24.7 28.8 19.7 19.1
(10.0) (10.7) (6.8) (9.6) (7.4)
Materials Wm 3.2 3.2 4.9 2.3 2.3
(19) (1.6) (2.4) (13) (1.6)
Deposits Wd 8.8 9.0 11.5 9.7 6.0
(7.5) (8.8) (6.9) (7.0) (1.8)
Other funds Wf 12.1 10.4 22.2 12.0 8.0
(17.6) (10.4) (30.1) (13.1) (18.9)
Other characteristics (%  of assets)
Costsb c 16.2 15.7 23.2 16.2 11.7
(7.8) (6.7) (7.3) (7.8) (4.8)
Profits 71 0.45 1.53 0.92 0.46 1.14
(7.3) (5.5) (2.6) (7.3) (3.2)
Assets (million S) 1,132.1 610.4 258.1 2,237.4 2,239.5
(2,615.4) (1,548.4) (407.4) (4,297.1) (3.142.2)
Number of banks* 123(62) 49 (31) 39(1) 22(10) 
in b, . v
13(20)
‘ Mean values and standard deviation in parenthesis. Constant pesos December 2000." Includes operating 
and financial costs. ‘ Number of banks in 1993 (2000) respectively.
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deposits than non-mutual banks and paid the highest rates for deposits and purchased 
funds.
4.6 Results
Results arc analysed in several sections. Cost frontiers are estimated using SFA and 
DFA techniques on pooled data for retail banks over the 1993-2000 period. Profit 
frontiers arc estimated for the pooled data of stock domestic- and foreign-owned banks. 
The first sections analyse time-invariant efficiency measures. Section 4.6.1 presents the 
average cost efficiency scores obtained for the pooled data. This section also examines 
the consistency across measurement techniques. Section 4.6.2 reports and discusses the 
differences in cost efficiency, economies of scale and the effects of technical progress 
across ownership types. Section 4.6.3 presents profit efficiency differences across stock 
domestic- and foreign-owned banks. The last section analyses time-varying efficiency 
indicators. Section 4.6.4 reports the changes in efficiency across ownership types over 
the subperiods 1993-1996 and 1997-2000.
4.6.1 Cost Efficiency Scores and Rankings across Techniques
Cost frontiers based on the pooled data arc estimated within the SFA using MLE and 
panel estimation techniques (GLS and WITHIN) and also using the DFA. MLE 
assumes the inefficiency error term follows a half normal and a truncated normal 
distribution. Table A1 in the Appendix presents the parameter estimates for the cost 
function using MLE, GLS and WITHIN techniques. The MLE for the normal and 
truncated normal models show that the estimates of y, the share of inefficiency in the 
overall residual variance, arc statistically significant at the 1% level. These estimates 
indicate that more than half of residual variation is due to the inefficiency effect. In
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addition, the one-sided Likelihood Ratio (LR) test of the standard cost function (OLS) 
versus the frontier model exceeds the 1% mixed chi-square critical value.64 This result 
implies that the restrictions imposed by OLS can be rejected for both the half-normal 
and the truncated-normal models. For the truncated normal model, the estimate of p is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The value of p suggests that the peak of the 
density function of inefficiency terms is 0.37. The LR test o f the half-normal versus the 
truncated normal model exceeds the 1% mixed chi-square critical value.65 This result 
suggests that the truncated-normal specification appear to be a more adequate 
representation of inefficiency effects. Table A2 in the Appendix reports LR statistics 
for structural tests of the cost function. In all cases, the restricted functional form is 
rejected at the 5% level, which suggests that the use of the translog flexible form 
appears to be appropriate to estimate the cost structure.
Table A1 also presents the GLS and WITHIN estimates, the Breush-Pagan Langrangian 
Multiplier (LM) test of the difference between the random-effects and the Pooled OLS 
estimators and the Hausman test of the difference between the GLS and WITHIN 
estimators. The LM test exceeds the chi-square critical value with 1 d.f. at 1% 
significance level suggesting that the random-effects model is a more adequate 
representation of the data when compared with the Pooled OLS model. The Hausman 
test statistics also exceeds the chi-square critical value at 1% significance level 
implying that the correlation between the individual effects and the explanatory 
variables is different from zero. This result suggests that GLS estimates are 
inconsistent. However, GLS generate similar efficiency scores than MLE while
M For the half normal (truncated normal) model, the null hypothesis in this test isy-0 (y-0, p-0 versus
the alternative y>0 (y>0, p*0). If H0 is true the LR statistic has asymptotic distribution (with one (two) 
degrees of freedom), which is a mixture of chi-square distributions (Coelli and Battcsc, 1996).
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WITHIN estimators produce significantly lower efficiency measures. Hence, GLS 
estimates arc still used in the analysis. Table A3 in the Appendix reports Sum of 
Squares statistics for structural tests of the cost function. In all cases, the restricted 
functional form is rejected at the 5% level, which suggests that the use of the translog 
flexible form appears to be appropriate to analyse the cost structure.
The cost function estimates are used to compute efficiency scores for each bank using 
(4.9), (4.10), (4.11) and (4.12). Table 4.3 reports a number of distributional 
characteristics of the cost efficiency scores that allow comparison across the different 
techniques (sec also figures A1 and A2 in the Appendix). The results based on the 
estimations performed using MLE techniques show that average cost efficiencies are 
lower (and dispersion higher) with the truncated normal model than with the half 
normal model, as average efficiencies are 0.696 and 0.820, respectively. These results 
also reveal that the panel estimation techniques and DFA method provide lower 
efficiency estimates than the MLE, as average efficiency scores are 0.563 and 0.309 for 
GLS and WITHIN techniques, respectively, and 0.661 for the DFA model.64 These 
figures are within the range found in the literature.6 *7 Overall, these results suggest that 
the choice of methodology has an important impact on the estimated average efficiency 
scores.
6S The null hypothesis in this test is p-0 versus the alternative p*0.
“  Burdisso et al. (1998) find average efficiency scores for a sample of (stock and public) Argentine 
banks over the 1991-1996 period ofO.486 and 0.717 using the WITHIN and DFA methods respectively.
67 Berger and Humphrey (1997) survey 122 frontier studies that apply efficiency analysis to depository 
institutions. They find that the distribution of average cost efficiency from parametric studies of U.S. 
(non U.S.) financial institutions has a mean of 0.84 (0.76) with standard deviation of 0.06 (0.12) and 
range of 0.61-0.95 (0.20-0.90).
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Table 4.3
Descriptive statistics of cost efficiency scores by technique
Method ’ Mean Median Standard
Deviation
Maximum Minimum
Stochastic frontier approach- SFA 
MLE Half Normal 0.820 0.829 0.096 1.000 0.409
MLE Truncated Normal 0.696 0.685 0.103 1.000 0.374
GLS Random-effects 0.563 0.556 0.105 1.000 0.362
WITHIN Fixed-effects 0.309 0.285 0.150 1.000 0.141
Distribution free approach -  DFA 0.661 0.662 0.076 1.000 0.390
‘ MLE Half Normal (Truncated Normal): maximum likelihood estimates under the assumption of half­
normal (truncated normal) distribution for the inefficiency error term; GLS Random effects: generalised 
least square estimates of random effects model; WITHIN Fixed effects: LS estimates of fixed effects 
model using within transformation.
Table 4.4 displays pairwise Spearman rank correlation coefficients of the efficiency 
scores obtained with the different methods. These correlation coefficients are useful to 
analyse the consistency of methods in ranking banks, as they show how close the 
rankings of banks (given by the different frontier techniques) are among each other. 
The MLE methods appear to be highly consistent in ranking banks according to cost 
efficiency, with a pairwise correlation coefficient of 97.8 (also see figures A3 to A6 in 
the Appendix). The rank correlation among the panel estimation techniques is lower -  
at 62.3 percent. The DFA method is highly correlated with MLE and GLS techniques, 
however, the correlation with the WITHIN estimators is low -  41.1 percent. In 
addition, the MLE methods and GLS model appear to be consistent in ranking banks 
according to cost efficiency with pairwise correlation coefficients of 94.5 and 95.1 
percent. However, the rank correlations are lower when comparing the MLE and 
WITHIN estimators, ranging from 49.5 to 58.7 percent. Despite the WITHIN-fixcd 
effects, the GLS-random effects and the DFA methods produce lower efficiency scores 
than the MLE techniques, these results suggest that the measurement techniques
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produce comparable efficiency rankings. These results are consistent with previous
studies.68
Table 4.4
Spearman rank-order correlations among efficiency scores
___________Stochastic Frontier Approach___________Distribution
Method MLE MLE GLS WITHIN Free
Half Truncated Random Fixed Approach
Normal Normal effects effects ______
Stochastic frontier approach- SFA 
MLE Half Normal 1.000
MLE Truncated Normal 
GLS Random-effects 
WITHIN Fixed-effects 
Distribution free approach -  DFA
0.978 “* 0.945 *" 0.495 “ * 0.827
1.000 0.951 *" 0.587 ™ 0.806
1.000 0.623 *** 0.795
1.000 0.411
1.000
***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Table 4.5 reports the proportions of banks that are identified by one technique as 
having efficiency scores in the top 10% that are also identified in the top decile by other 
technique. This information is useful to determine the degree to which different 
techniques identify the same banks as being in the highest and lowest efficiency groups. 
The results show that MLE methods arc reasonably consistent in identifying the most 
and least efficient firms, as 86.7 percent of banks identified as in the best and worst 
10% practice by the MLE Half normal technique arc also identified in the highest and 
lowest decile by the MLE Truncated normal technique. The results also reveal that the
“  Bauer et al. (1993) compare results obtained from MLE and panel data techniques (WITIHN and GLS) 
using U.S. banking data over 1977-1988. They report correlation of 89 percent between WITHIN and 
GLS efficiency estimates, but correlation between these two estimates and MLE estimates in the range 
38.0-50.0 percent. For the same sample of U.S. banks Bauer ct al. (1998) compare MLE, WITHIN, GLS, 
DFA, TFA and DEA estimates. They find that correlation between MLE and WITHIN and GLS 
estimates are 49.5 and 56.6 percent respectively, while the correlation between the later two is 93.6 
percent. They also report correlation of 96.4 between MLE and DFA estimates but correlation between 
the later and WITHIN and GLS estimates of 48.4 and 56.7 percent respectively. Furthermore, Berger and 
Mester (1997) compare results obtained from MLE and DFA approaches (assuming a half normal 
distribution for the inefficiency error term) using U.S. banking data. They report a rank-order correlation 
coefficient of 98.8 percent.
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correspondence of the best and worst practice 10% of banks between the WITHIN and 
GLS techniques are lower at 53.3 and 46.7 percent, respectively. In addition, the MLE 
methods and GLS technique are highly consistent in identifying the most and least 
efficient banks, though the correspondence with WITHIN and DFA techniques are 
lower. These results suggest that the different methods generate similar efficiency 
rankings, particularly at the top and bottom of the distribution.
Table 4.5
Correspondence of best practice and worst practice banks across techniques
Stochastic Frontier Approach__________ Distribution
Method MLE
Half
Normal
MLE
Truncated
Normal
GLS
Random
effects
WITHIN
Fixed
effects
Free
Approach
Stochastic frontier approach- SFA 
MLE Half Normal 0.867 0.800 0.533 0.467
MLE Truncated Normal 0.867 0.867 0.600 0.467
GLS Random-effects 0.800 0.733 0.533 0.533
WITHIN Fixed-effects 0.333 0.333 0.467 0.400
Distribution free approach -  DFA 0.600 0.533 0.600 0.333
Each number above (below) the diagonal represents the proportion of banks that are identified by one 
technique as having efficiency scores in the most (least) efficient decile of banks that are also identified 
in the most (least) efficient decile by the other technique.
4.6.2 Cost Efficiency, Scale Economies and Technical Change 
Differences across Ownership Types
Despite producing different efficiency scores, the analysis of the previous section 
indicates that the measurement techniques produce comparable efficiency rankings, 
particularly at the top and bottom of the distribution.69 The cost functions estimated 
above are used to analyse the differences across stock, mutual, public- and foreign- 
owned banks in terms of efficiency, scale economies and technical change over the 
1993-2000 period. The efficiency scores for each bank computed above are averaged
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out to obtain the average cost efficiency of each ownership type. Cost elasticities are 
computed for each bank using the cost function estimates and (4.16) and (4.17), and 
they are then averaged out for each ownership group. Table 4.6 presents the average 
cost efficiency, scale elasticities and technical change for each ownership type.69 70 The 
data show that all models generate similar results, except the fixed-effects model, 
which provides lower efficiency and scale economies measures.
The results for the domestic private-owned banks are presented in Panels A and B. The 
cost efficiency measures for stock banks reported in Panel A indicate that cost 
efficiency is 62.3 percent on average (range from 31.1 to 84.6 percent). This finding 
suggests that if all stock banks operate on the efficient frontier they could produce the 
same level of output with 62.3 percent of current inputs. Altunbas et al. (2001) and 
Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) report higher average cost efficiencies for stock banks in 
Germany and India (of about 80 and 76 percent, respectively).71 Burdisso et al. (1998) 
find that the average efficiency for stock banks in Argentina over the 1991-1996 period 
is 61.8 percent.72 The results also show that the average scale elasticity for stock banks 
is 0.873, which indicates that a 10% increase in output would raise costs by 8.73% 
holding other variables constant. This result suggests that stock banks operate under 
increasing returns to scale, and that an increase in the size of stock banks would lead to 
costs reductions. Finally, the findings indicate that technical change has reduced costs 
by less than 0.S percent per year.
69 However, the WITHIN method appears to be the least consistent with respect to the others.
70 Table A4 in the Appendix reports the average efficiency scores obtained using the Translog including 
financial capital as a fixed input. Table A5 also reports the average efficiency measures obtained from 
the Fourier flexible form. The efficiency differences and ranking of banks across specifications are very 
small.
71 The former uses SFA and DFA and the latter uses DEA.
72 They use WITHIN fixed-effects.
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Table 4.6
Cost efficiency, scale economies and technical change
Stock, mutual, public- and foreign-owned banks, 1993-2000
Type of bank MLE
Half normal
MLE
Truncated
normal
GLS
Random
effects
WITHIN 
Fixed effects
DFA Average
Panel A. Private (stock) banks
Cost efficiency 0.846 (0.09) 0.726 (0.10) 0.587 (0.10) 0.331 (0.14) 0.686 (0.08) 0.623
Scale elasticity 0.953 (0.07) 0.917 (0.07) 0.938 (0.07) 0.685 (0.09) 0.963 (0.05) 0.873
Technical change -0.010 (0.02) -0.010 (0.02) -0.008 (0.02) 0.020 (0.01) -0.002
Panel B. Private (mutual) banks
Cost efficiency 0.804 (0.06) 0.676 (0.08) 0.554 (0.09) 0.305 (0.15) 0.643 (0.06) 0.585
Scale elasticity 0.944 (0.06) 0.904 (0.07) 0.932 (0.07) 0.669 (0.09) 0.966 (0.03) 0.862
Technical change 0.011 (0.01) 0.020 (0.01) 0.013 (0.01) 0.037 (0.01) 0.020
Panel C. Public banks
Cost efficiency 0.723 (0.12) 0.610 (0.10) 0.491 (0.08) 0.222 (0.08) 0.609 (0.08) 0.511
Scale elasticity 0.977 (0.07) 0.956 (0.09) 0.967 (0.08) 0.722 (0.10) 0.986 (0.07) 0.906
Technical change 0.005 (0.02) 0.008 (0.02) 0.005 (0.01) 0.027 (0.01) 0.011
Panel D. Foreign banks
Cost efficiency 0.844 (0.09) 0.720 (0.11) 0.567 (0.13) 0.324 (0.21) 0.668 (0.05) 0.614
Scale elasticity 0.961 (0.07) 0.946 (0.09) 0.935 (0.08) 0.709 (0.09) 0.969 (0.05) 0.888
Technical change -0.015 (0.02) -0.016 (0.01) -0.015 (0.02) 0.016 (0.01) -0.008
Panel E. Overall average
Cost efficiency 0.820 (0.09) 0.696 (0.10) 0.563 (0.11) 0.309 (0.15) 0.661 (0.08) 0.597
Scale elasticity 0.955 (0.07) 0.923 (0.08) 0.940 (0.07) 0.688 (0.09) 0.968 (0.05) 0.876
Technical change -0.001 (0.02) -0.001 (0.02) -0.001 (0.02) 0.027 (0.01) 0.006
Mean and standard deviation in parenthesis.
The results for the mutual banking sector shown in Panel B reveal that these banks 
exhibit lower cost efficiencies and higher scale economies than stock banks. The 
average cost efficiency is 58.5 percent across the different techniques, however, it 
varies from 30.5 to 80.4 percent depending on the method. This result suggests that if 
all mutual banks operate on the efficient frontier they could produce the same level of 
output with 58.5 percent of current inputs. The findings reveal that mutual banks also
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operate under increasing returns to scale with an average scale elasticity of 0.862 
percent. Altunbas et al. (2002) report similar scale economies estimates but higher 
average cost efficiencies (about 85 percent) for mutual banks in Germany. In addition, 
technical change has not made a positive contribution to reducing costs, with costs 
having increased around 2 percent per year. This result may be due to cost increasing 
effects that have cancelled out technical innovations effects since technological change, 
defined as a trend, may capture not only production innovations but also the impact of 
other factors such as changes in organisational structure and processes on bank costs.
The cost efficiency measures for the public-owned banking sector shown in Panel C 
appear to be lower when compared with the private-owned -  stock and mutual - banks. 
Cost efficiency for public banks ranges from 22.2 to 72.3 percent, with an average of
51.1 percent. These figures suggest that, on average, about 50 percent of costs are 
wasted relative to a best-practice bank. Altunbas et al (2002) and Bhattacharyya et al 
(1997) report higher average cost efficiencies for public-owned banks of around 84 and 
87 percent, respectively. Burdisso et al. (1998) find that the average cost efficiency for 
public-owned banks in Argentina is 28.3 percent. The results also show that the average 
scale elasticity for stock banks is 0.906, which indicates that a 10% increase in output 
would raise costs by 9.06% holding other variables constant. This finding suggests that 
public-owned banks also operate under increasing returns to scale. As for mutual banks, 
technical progress docs not appear to have reduced costs in the public banking sector.
The results for forcign-owncd banks presented in Panel D reveal similar cost efficiency 
and scale economics, but higher technical progress than domestic-owned stock banks. 
The average cost efficiency is 61.4 percent, which ranges between 32.4 and 84.4
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percent depending on the technique used. Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) find similar cost 
efficiency for domestic private- and foreign-owned banks in India of around 75 percent. 
Berger et al. (2001) report that domestic-owned banks in France, Germany, Spain and 
the U.K. are more cost efficient than foreign-owned competitors while the opposite is 
true for banks in the U.S. The findings also show that foreign banks also operate under 
increasing returns to scale with scale elasticities averaging about 0.888. Finally, the 
results indicate that technical change has reduced costs by about 1 percent per year.
These results suggest that within the domestic-owned banking sector, stock banks seem 
to be more cost efficient than mutual and public-owned banks. The findings also imply 
that domestic-owned stock banks appear to be as efficient as foreign-owned banks. To 
further test whether these differences are statistically significant, the non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney rank test is used to infer whether different ownership types have 
identical or different populations.73 Table 4.7 presents the results of the tests 
undertaken. These results suggest that the efficiency differences between stock, mutual 
and public-owned banks are statistically significant at levels of 10% or less in most 
cases. The findings also imply that cost efficiency differences between stock domestic- 
and foreign-owned banks are not statistically significant but that differences between 
the latter and mutual and public-owned banks are statistically significant in most cases.
7J The Mann-Whitney statistic is obtained by pooling the groups that are to be compared, ranking in 
increasing order of magnitude according to efficiency and calculating the rank sum S of the first group. 
Then, the distribution of the rank sum statistic S is approximately normal with mean m(m + n + l)/2 and 
variance m n (m + n + 1)/I2 where m is the number of observations in the first group and n is the number 
of observations in the second group. By normalising S, the test statistic obtained is: Z— {(S- 
(n+m+l)/2]/[m n (m+m+l)/12]1'2, which has an approximated normal distribution ifn and m are large.
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Table 4.7
Mann-Whitney tests of cost efficiency differences across ownership types
Stock, mutual, public- and foreign-owned banks, 1993-2000
Differences between MLE MLE GLS WITHIN DFA
ownership types: Half normal Truncated normal Random effects Fixed effects
Difference within domestic-owned banks
Stock - Mutual banks -2.660 *" -3.010 “* -2.491 “ -0.912 -3.016***
Stock - Public banks -4.073 -3.901 *" -3.666 *** -3.834 “ * -3.316***
Mutual - Public banks -2.948 *“ -2.258 “ -2.450 ** -3.270 ” * -0.988
Differences between domestic- and foreign-owned banks
Stock - Foreign banks -0.100 -0.259 -0.909 -0.717 -1.422
Mutual - Foreign banks -1.640 * -1.884* -1.012 -2.590 ” * -1.169
Public - Foreign banks -3.109"* -2.895 *** -2.088 ** -2.595 "* -1.768*
***, •*, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
4.6.3 Profit Efficiency o f Stock Domestic- and Foreign-owned 
Banks
The analysis of the previous section suggests that cost efficiency differences between 
stock domestic- and foreign-owned banks are not statistically significant. However, 
since stock banks may seek to maximise profits, this section examines profit efficiency 
differences between stock domestic- and foreign-owned banks using SFA and DFA. 
Table A6 in the Appendix presents the parameter estimates for the profit function using 
MLE, GLS and WITHIN techniques. From these frontier estimates, the profit 
efficiency for each domestic- and foreign-owned bank is calculated as the ratio of 
predicted actual profits to predicted maximum profits. The average alternative profit 
efficiency for each ownership type is then obtained by averaging out the efficiency of 
individual banks belonging to each ownership group. Table 4.8 presents the average 
profit efficiency scores for domestic- and foreign-owned banks. These results show that 
all models generate similar results except for the fixed-effects model, which provides 
lower efficiency measures.
I l l
Table 4.8 
Profit efficiency
Stock domestic- and foreign-owned banks, 1993-2000
Type of bank * MLE
Half
normal
MLE 
T runcated 
normal
GLS
Random
effects
WITHIN
Fixed
effects
DFA Average
Overall average 0.300 (0.09) 0.261 (0.09) 0.272 (0.11) 0.161 (0.15) 0.326 (0.09) 0.264
Domestic banks 0.301 (0.10) 0.263 (0.10) 0.281 (0.12) 0.173 (0.14) 0.330 (0.11) 0.270
Foreign banks 0.295 (0.05) 0.255 (0.04) 0.236 (0.06) 0.105 (0.18) 0.322 (0.06) 0.243
Mann-Whitney h -0.445 (0.66) -0.455 (0.65) -1.183 (0.24) -0.848 (0.37) -0.446 (0.66)
1 Standard deviation in parenthesis.b p values in parenthesis.
The results show that the average estimated alternative profit efficiency for stock 
domestic- and foreign-owned banks is 26.4 percent (range from 16.1 to 32.6 percent). 
These values indicate that the average domestic/foreign-owned stock bank earns 26.4 
percent of the profits o f a best-practice bank producing the same output bundle. This 
overall profit efficiency estimate is consistent with the findings of previous studies. 
Berger and Mcster (1997) find average profit efficiencies of U.S. banks of 46.3 and
35.1 percent using DFA and MLE respectively. Berger et al. (2001) also use DFA to 
examine profit efficiency in various countries and report average alternative profit 
efficiency of 44.2 percent for banks in France, 52.2 percent in Germany and 67.1 and
66.1 percent in Spain and the U.K., respectively.
The findings for Argentina show that the average profit efficiency of domestic-owned 
stock banks ranges from 17.3 to 33.0 percent, depending on the technique used to 
compute the estimates. The results further reveal that the average alternative profit 
efficiency of foreign-owned banks varies from 10.5 to 31.1 percent. The Mann- 
Whitney statistics suggest that the efficiency differences between domestic- and
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foreign-owned banks are not statistically significant. This result differs from the 
findings of Berger et al. (2001), who report that domestic banks in France, Germany, 
Spain and the U.K.. are more profit efficient than foreign-owned competitors, although 
these profit efficiency differences are not statistically significant. However, they also 
find that foreign banks in the U.S. are less profit efficient than domestic-owned banks.
A further decomposition of foreign banks by country of origin provides mixed results. 
The MLE estimates suggest that Latin American banks are slightly more profit efficient 
than U.S. and European banks but the WITHIN, GLS and DFA estimates suggest that 
U.S. banks are slightly more efficient than other foreign-owned banks (Latin American 
and European). However, these profit efficiency differences across banks classified by 
country of origin are small. Berger et al. (2001) find that U.S. banks operating in 
France, Germany, Spain and the U.K., generally exceed the cost- and profit-efficiencies 
of domestic banks.
4.6.4 Cost Efficiency Differences Over Time
The preceding analysis is based on time-invariant efficiency measures. This section 
estimates time-varying efficiency scores using the MLE technique proposed by Battese 
and Coelli (1995) to analyse the changes in efficiency of each ownership type over the 
sample period. The cost function (4.8), based on the pooled data, is estimated along 
with the inefficiency function (4.14), which includes ownership dummy variables and 
size as explanatory variables. Table A7 in the Appendix presents the parameters 
estimates for the cost frontier. The results show that the estimate of y is significant at 
the 1% level. The one-sided LR test of the standard cost function versus the frontier 
model exceeds the 1% mixed chi-square critical value.
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Table A 7 also reports the parameter estimates for the inefficiency function. The results 
show that most of the parameter estimates of the inefficiency function are significant at 
the 1% level. The coefficient on Dpub is positive and highly significant, which 
confirms the previous results that public-owned banks are more inefficient than stock 
banks. The coefficient on Dfor is insignificant implying that the efficiency differences 
between stock foreign- and domestic-owned banks are insignificant. The estimate for 
Dmut is positive and statistically significant, which also confirms the previous findings 
that mutual banks are less efficient than stock banks. Finally, the coefficient on Size 
(measured as the logarithm of total assets) is negative and highly significant suggesting 
that cost inefficiencies decline as bank total assets grow.
The cost and inefficiency function estimates are used to compute efficiency scores for 
each bank in each year using (4.15). These efficiency indicators are then averaged out 
to obtain the average cost efficiency of each ownership type in each year over the 
sample period. Table 4.9 presents the average cost efficiency for each ownership group 
and for different subperiods. The results show that the efficiency of the banking system 
increased from 0.837 to 0.863 between the first and the second half of the sample 
period as a result of an increase in the average efficiency of all ownership types. The 
developments that occurred during this post-deregulation period might explain this 
finding. The privatisation of highly inefficient public banks, the failures and 
acquisitions of stock and mutual banks characterised by poor performance and the 
higher pressure from foreign banks may explain this improvement in efficiency over 
the post-deregulation period.
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The findings show that the efficiency of stock banks increased from 0.851 during 1993- 
1996 to 0.864 over 1997-2000 (and dispersion declined from 0.12 to 0.09). Mutual 
banks also show an improvement over the sample period from 0.833 to 0.858. The 
efficiency of public-owned banks increased (and dispersion declined) from 0.777 to 
0.810 over the subperiods analysed. Finally, foreign-owned banks became more 
efficient over the sample period since average efficiency increased from 0.884 to 0.891 
between 1993-1996 and 1997-2000.
The results also show that the ranking of ownership types is the same across time. 
Public-owned banks are the least efficient banks and stock and foreign-owned banks 
are the most efficient banks over the sample period, however, during 1999-2000 
mutuals appear to be more efficient than stock banks.74 The findings also show that the 
performance of mutuals and public-owned banks improved significantly over the 
sample period. The efficiency of public-owned banks increased notably over time, a 
result that could be explained by the effects of the privatisation of (potentially) high 
inefficient provincial banks and of the higher pressure resulting from the entry of 
foreign banks, as mentioned above. Additionally, the performance of mutual banks also 
improved notably over the sample period, a result that could be explained by the 
acquisition or failure of (highly) inefficient mutuals.
Zaim (1995) reports that public-owned banks in Turkey arc the most efficient while 
private domestic-owned banks the least efficient in both pre- and post liberalisation 
periods. They also find that all ownership types (private, public- and forcign-owned)
74 This result could be explained by the structural changes observed in the mutual banking sector. As a 
result of several M&A, failures and conversions to stock banks, only one mutual bank is left operating in 
the system at the end of the sample period.
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became more efficient after the liberalisation of the banking sector. In line with these 
findings, Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) report that public-owned banks in India are the 
most efficient over the early stages of the liberalisation period. They also find that 
foreign-owned banks are the least efficient at the beginning of the period, but that they 
are as efficient as public-owned banks by the end of the sample period (the efficiency 
of the latter decreased while the former became more efficient after the liberalisation of 
the sector).
Table 4.9
Efficiency differences across ownership types and over time
Stock, mutual, public- and foreign-owned banks, 1993-2000
Period Overall Stock Mutual Public Foreign
1993-1996
1997-2000
0.837 (0.12) 
0.863 (0.10)
0.851 (0.12) 
0.864 (0.09)
0.833 (0.07) 
0.858 (0.05)
0.777 (0.15) 
0.810 (0.11)
0.884 (0.07) 
0.891 (0.07)
1993-1994
1995-1996
1997-1998
1999-2000
0.852 (0.09) 
0.823 (0.15) 
0.874 (0.08) 
0.851 (0.11)
0.880 (0.08) 
0.821 (0.16) 
0.888 (0.07) 
0.841 (0.11)
0.840 (0.06) 
0.818 (0.07) 
0.821 (0.10) 
0.906 (0.00)
0.795 (0.11) 
0.759 (0.19) 
0.803 (0.12) 
0.817 (0.10)
0.874 (0.10) 
0.893 (0.04) 
0.904 (0.04) 
0.879 (0.10)
Mean and standard deviation in parenthesis.
To sum up, the cost efficiency measures presented in Section 4.6.2 suggest that stock 
banks are more cost efficient than mutual banks. This result may be explained by the 
higher proportion of employees and deposits used and also by the higher interest costs 
faced by mutuals. The findings also reveal that stock banks appear to out-perform 
public-owned banks in terms of cost efficiency. Overall, this evidence indicates agency 
problems for both mutual and public-owned banks in Argentina. The cost and profit 
efficiency measures presented in Section 4.6.2 and 4.6.3 indicate that efficiency 
differences between foreign- and domestic-owned banks are not significant. This result 
may be explained in part by the fact that foreign-owned banks use more purchased
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funds and pay significantly higher salaries than domestic-owned banks. These findings 
may be related to organisational diseconomies to operate and monitor an institution 
from a distance, which increases costs relative to domestic institutions. However, 
foreign-owned banks use fewer employees than domestic institutions, which may 
probably be indicative of the access by foreign-banks to best-practice procedures and 
policies. Finally, the findings from Section 4.6.4 suggest that the post-deregulation 
developments appear to have induced significant efficiency improvements since all 
ownership types, but especially public-owned and mutual banks, increased their cost 
efficiency over the post-deregulation period.
4.7 Conclusions
This chapter adds new evidence on the conflictive link between ownership and 
efficiency in the banking industry by examining efficiency differences between stock, 
mutual, public- and foreign-owned banks in Argentina over the 1993-2000 period. The 
cost and profit characteristics of these bank ownership types are compared by using a 
variety of techniques to evaluate differences in cost and profit efficiency, scale 
economics and the impact of technical progress across these ownership groups. Cost 
frontiers from pooled data of all banks are estimated using different parametric 
techniques to analyse the consistency across the different methods. From these cost 
frontiers, the differences between stock, mutual, public- and foreign-owned banks are 
examined by computing cost efficiency scores and cost elasticities measures. Profit 
frontiers from data of stock domestic- and foreign-owned banks are also estimated to 
explore profit efficiency differences between these profit maximising ownership types. 
Finally, the changes in cost efficiency over the post-deregulation period are analysed 
across ownership groups.
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The results suggest that the choice of methodology has an important impact on the 
estimated efficiency scores. However, the different methods generate similar efficiency 
rankings, particularly at the top and bottom of the distribution, where managerial 
interest is concentrated. Cost efficiency measures suggest that within the domestic- 
owned banking sector stock banks seem to be more cost efficient than mutual and 
public-owned banks, but that the differences between stock domestic- and foreign- 
owned banks do not appear to be significant. The findings also show that all banks 
appear to benefit from widespread economies of scale, though, only stock and foreign- 
banks seem to have benefited from the cost reduction effects of technical progress. 
Profit efficiency measures show that stock domestic- and foreign-owned banks do not 
differ in terms of profit efficiency. Finally, the results further reveal that the efficiency 
of the banking system increased over the sample period as a result of an improved 
performance of all ownership types, but especially that of mutual and public-owned 
banks.
A conclusion that arises from the empirical investigation seems to be that banks can 
gain by increasing their scale of operations and, especially, by identifying and tackling 
the sources o f inefficiencies. The evidence also shows that differences in efficiency 
between public and private-owned banks are much more relevant than differences 
within private banks. These findings are coherent with theoretical predictions that point 
towards agency problems in public-owned banks as responsible for lower efficiency 
levels. The empirical evidence also suggests that differences between domestic- and 
foreign-owned financial institutions are not significant A conclusion which can be 
drawn from these findings seems to be that foreign-banks appear to offset the costs of 
operating abroad by importing capabilities from their parent organisations. Finally, the
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finding that efficiency increased for all ownership types over the sample period 
suggests that post-deregulation developments: privatisation of (inefficient) public 
banks, mergers and acquisitions among stock and mutual banks and the (higher 
pressure from) the entry of foreign banks played a significant role in the banking 
industry.
The previous results have important policy implications. First, the results suggest that 
the use of multiple techniques could prove useful for regulatory analyses. If the 
methods provide similar efficiency scores and ranking of firms, especially at the top 
and bottom of the distributions, regulators could be more confident about the 
conclusions drawn. Second, the findings indicate that public-owned banks are more 
inefficient than private banks, however, the efficiency of the former notably increased 
over the post-deregulation period. This evidence suggests that privatisation policies 
may contribute to improve the performance of the banking sector. This finding could 
help policy makers by providing additional information on the beneficial effects of 
privatisation policies, given that the negative effects, such as credit availability to small 
and medium-sized customers, are not too high. Third, the results also suggest that the 
efficiency of the banking sector increased over a period characterised by strong foreign 
bank entry. This finding implies that foreign bank entry may contribute to improve the 
functioning of domestic banking markets. These results could provide policy makers in 
developing countries with information regarding the benefits o f liberalising entry into 
their banking sectors, provided any adverse effects of foreign bank entry are not too 
severe.
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A p p e n d i x
Table A1
Parameter estimates for cost function using M LE, GLS and WITHIN methods
Parameter
MLE
Half normal * 
Coef. t ratio
MLE
Truncated normal * 
Coef. t ratio
GLS
Random effects 
Coef t ratio
WITHIN
Fixed effects 
Coef. t ratio
a 0.991 0.906 0.809 0.844 -1.034 -0.829
Pl 0.123 0.756 0.037 0.191 0.894 *** 5.608 0.635 *“ 3.460
Ps 0.794 •" 5.619 0.659 “* 3.289 0.153 1.118 -0.096 -0.649
Pd 0.231 1.009 0.351 0.775 0.067 0.265 -0.165 -0.656
Pi 0.455 1.320 0.909 ” 2.562 0.788 ** 2.026 0.866 ** 1.994
Pk -0.029 -0.092 -0.550 -1.085 0.276 0.815 0.546 1.636
Pm 0.603 " 2.256 0.455 0.659 0.474 * 1.655 -0.090 -0.293
P, 0.067 1.155 0.131 “ 2.219 0.124 * 1.942 0.110 * 1.731
8ll 0.222 “ * 12.449 0.214 “ * 11.410 0.096 **• 13.886 0.074 *** 10.630
0.243 *** 14.413 0.224 *“ 12.397 0.183 "* 12.118 0.121 ” • 7.225
0.156 *" 3.469 0.176 “ * 3.573 0.175 *** 3.608 0.127 *** 2.907
5,i 0.047 0.763 -0.043 -0.698 0.036 0.535 0.031 0.432
8u 0.179 ** 2.521 0.128 1.613 0.316 *** 4.067 0.346 ” 4.777
0.185 •** 3.312 0.187 ” 2.355 0.230 *** 3.803 0.204 *** 3.397
s„ -0.003 -0.814 -0.001 -0.135 -0.003 -0.673 0.001 0.389
«Ld -0.021 -0.942 -0.035 -1.165 -0.027 -1.149 -0.012 -0.537
8li 0.036 1.464 0.031 1.165 0.001 0.029 -0.033 -1.202
8u -0.024 -1.063 -0.024 -1.033 -0.059 “ -2.491 -0.033 -1.523
8Lm 0.005 0.185 0.021 0.548 0.050 * 1.854 0.077 ” * 2.901
8sd 0.085 •" 3.805 0.092 “ * 3.938 0.107 *** 4.388 0.085 **• 3.751
8s, -0.108 *** -4.301 -0.094 *** -2.761 -0.090 *** -3.158 -0.040 -1.520
8» -0.025 -1.040 -0.018 -0.704 -0.011 -0.418 -0.032 -1.289
8Sm 0.056 “ 2.134 0.032 1.061 0.016 0.574 -0.001 -0.044
8di -0.109 *“ -2.888 -0.117 ” -1.976 -0.091 ** •2.188 -0.056 -1.458
8d, -0.109 ** -2.211 -0.125 “ -2.353 -0.156 *** -2.976 -0.093 ‘ -1.926
Sdm 0.043 1.072 0.029 0.681 0.055 1.273 0.015 0.348
8» 0.077 1.507 0.159 “ 2.284 0.042 0.751 -0.019 -0.365
6|m -0.089 * -1.888 -0.054 -0.652 -0.074 -1.478 -0.020 -0.390
5km -0.110 ** -2.366 -0.119 ” -2.460 -0.154 *•* -3.050 -0.168 *“ -3.462
8u 0.003 0.542 0.003 0.458 -0.012 * -1.895 -0.002 -0.292
0.002 0.348 0.000 -0.065 0.014 “ 1.967 0.001 0.125
5« 0.030 ** 2.446 0.031 ** 2.500 0.015 1.108 0.001 0.098
8, -0.016 -1.576 -0.021 ” -2.087 -0.014 -1.207 -0.009 -0.878
8u -0.030 " -2.271 -0.030 ** -2.248 -0.035 “ -2.375 -0.017 -1.267
8™ 0.002 0.223 0.003 0.290 0.009 0.830 0.007 0.802
8ls -0.207 *** -13.395 -0.188 *** -11.338 -0.114 •“ -12.293 -0.064 •" -5.578
y 0.655 *“ 11.980 0.515 ~ 9.802
M 0.370 “• 7.577
oJ 0.104 *** 7.333 0.066 *'• 7.600
Log likelihood 85.15 97.65
LR test
y - o 114.94 **• 139.94 *“
M-0 24.99 —
Adj RJ 0.981 0.990
LM test 158.43 ***
Hausman test 225.06 "•
I ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.* 
1 (rightward) skew in all cases. Number of observations: 715.
The cost residuals have the correct 
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Table A2
Structural tests of the cost function - MLE
Stock, mutual, public- and foreign-owned banks, 1993-2000
Hypothesis
Likelihood Ratio test statistic ‘ 
MLE MLE 
Half normal True normal
df Chi- 
square b
(i) Homotheticity 
8,n,=0, ö„„=0
55.1 58.4 10 18.3
(ii) Homogeneity
5jm=0, S M=0, 8mn=0
336.2 332.2 13 22.4
(iii) Unitary elasticity of substitution 
8jk=0
68.2 70.4 10 18.3
(iv) Cobb-Douglas:
8,m=0, 8„,=0, 5™,=0, 8|k=0
446.7 449.1 23 35.2
(vi) Technical change
8™=0, 8Jt=0, 8,=0,8„=0
25.5 16.8 8 15.5
‘ LR=-2[L(H0)-L(H|)], L(H0) and L(H,) are the values of the log-likelihood function under the null and 
alternative hypotheses, respectively. If the null hypothesis is true, LR has approximately a Chi-square 
distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions.b Critical value at 5% level.
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Table A3
Structural tests of the cost function -  GLS and WITHIN
Stock, mutual, public- and foreign-owned banks, 1993-2000
Statistic F test statistic '
GLS WITHIN 
Random-effects Fixed-effects
df ” F '
(i) Homotheticity 102.3 81.2 10 1.831
Sjm=0, 6ml=0 
(ii) Homogeneity 1,607.0 546.0 13 1.752
8jm=0, 8ml=0, 8lra,=0
(iii) Unitary elasticity of substitution 65.3 94.1 10 1.831
8jk=0
(iv) Cobb-Douglas: 1,511.0 627.9 23 1.517
8„“0, 5ml=0, 8m„=0, 8jk=0 
(vi) Technical change 30.6 39.1 8 1.938
ômt—0, 8ji—0, 5,-0, 6„—0
* F=[(URSS-RSSS)/nl ] / [ URSS/n2 ] where URSS and RSSS are the residual sum of squares of the 
unrestricted and restricted models, respectively, nl is the number of restrictions and n2 equals the sample 
size minus the parameters of the unrestricted model. Under the null hypothesis, the test has an F 
distribution with nl and n2 degrees of freedom. b Numerator d.f. Denominator d.f.: 532 (GLS) and 679 
(WITHIN).c Critical value at 5% level.
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Table A4
Cost efficiency using Translog cost function (including financial capital)
Stock, mutual, public- and foreign-owned banks, 1993-2000
Type of bank MLE
Half normal
MLE
Trunc normal
GLS
Random effects
WITHIN
Fixed effects
DFA
A. Excluding financial capital
Private (stock) banks 0.846 0.726 0.587 0.331 0.686
(0.090) (0.102) (0.104) (0.138) (0.079)
Private (mutual) banks 0.804 0.676 0.554 0.305 0.643
(0.060) (0.075) (0.092) (0.153) (0.059)
Public banks 0.723 0.610 0.491 0.222 0.609
(0.120) (0.098) (0.080) (0.079) (0.084)
Foreign banks 0.844 0.720 0.567 0.324 0.658
(0.086) (0.108) (0.130) (0.211) (0.049)
Overall average 0.820 0.696 0.563 0.309 0.661
(0.096) (0.103) (0.105) (0.150) (0.076)
B. Including financial capital
Private (stock) banks 0.825 0.682 0.673 0.429 0.698
(0.103) (0.115) (0.113) (0.158) (0.075)
Private (mutual) banks 0.782 0.630 0.620 0.393 0.657
(0.066) (0.082) (0.083) (0.127) (0.056)
Public banks 0.701 0.567 0.559 0.295 0.641
(0.107) (0.083) (0.076) (0.077) (0.049)
Foreign banks 0.817 0.675 0.667 0.415 0.670
(0.102) (0.126) (0.136) (0.226) (0.047)
Overall average 0.799 0.651 0.643 0.397 0.676
(0.102) (0.111) (0.111) (0.157) (0.068)
Mean and standard deviation in parenthesis.
Financial capital is added to the translog cost specification to capture default risk and 
the risk preferences o f  bank management. The translog cost function, including 
financial capital as a fixed input, is specified as follows:
lnc(y,w ,z)=  translog + p, lnr + - ô „  l n r l n r  + ^ ô m lnrlny„,
2 m
+ £ 8 ,, lnr-ln wj +8„ lnr-t +lnu‘ +lnvc
j
where r is financial capital measured as total equity. Berger and Mester (1997) report 
similar efficiency scores from including and excluding financial capital.
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Table A5
Cost efficiency using Fourier flexible cost function
Stock, mutual, public- and foreign-owned banks, 1993-2000
Type of bank MLE
Half normal
MLE
Trane normal
GLS
Random effects
WITHIN
Fixed effects
DFA
A. Translog
Private (stock) banks 0.846 0.726 0.587 0.331 0.686
(0.090) (0.102) (0.104) (0.138) (0.079)
Private (mutual) banks 0.804 0.676 0.554 0.305 0.643
(0.060) (0.075) (0.092) (0.153) (0.059)
Public banks 0.723 0.610 0.491 0.222 0.609
(0.120) (0.098) (0.080) (0.079) (0.084)
Foreign banks 0.844 0.720 0.567 0.324 0.658
(0.086) (0.108) (0.130) (0.211) (0.049)
Overall average 0.820 0.696 0.563 0.309 0.661
(0.096) (0.103) (0.105) (0.150) (0.076)
B. Fourier Flexible
Private (stock) banks 0.848 0.737 0.624 0.387 0.765
(0.091) (0.099) (0.100) (0.151) (0.077)
Private (mutual) banks 0.802 0.685 0.580 0.366 0.720
(0.061) (0.070) (0.062) (0.131) (0.059)
Public banks 0.725 0.626 0.524 0.268 0.698
(0.117) (0.096) (0.082) (0.085) (0.083)
Foreign banks 0.847 0.726 0.620 0.375 0.736
(0.086) (0.105) (0.127) (0.232) (0.055)
Overall average 0.821 0.707 0.598 0.361 0.740
(0.096) (0.100) (0.099) (0.155) (0.075)
Mean and standard deviation in parenthesis.
The Fourier flexible form is a global approximation that augments that translog by 
adding Fourier trigonometric terms. For the cost function is written as follows:
In c (y,w,z) = translog + £[<p„ cos(xn) + to„sin(x„)] +
n
+ I I K ,  cos(x„ +x , )  + ton,sin(x„ +x,)]  + lnuc+ln vc
n q
where x„ are re-scaled values of the In ym, such that each of the x„ is in the interval 
[0,2ti], and n refers to the number of radians. However, each end of the [0,2n] is cut
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10% to reduce approximation problems near the endpoints. The formula for x„ is 0.2ji- 
p a+p-ln y, where (a,b) is the range of variation of In y and p=(0.9-2jt - 0.1-2tt)/(b-a). 
Following Berger, Leusner and Mingo (1997), the Fourier terms are applied to the 
outputs leaving the input price effects to be defined by the translog terms. In addition, 
the linear homogeneity and symmetry restrictions are also applied to the translog 
portion o f the function.
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Parameter estimates for profit function using MLE, GLS and WITHIN methods
Table A6
Parameter
MLE
Half normal * 
Coef. t ratio
MLE
Truncated normal * 
Coef. t ratio
GLS
Random effects 
Coef t ratio
WITHIN 
Fixed effects 
Coef. t ratio
a 27.077 “ * 4.044 26.354 — 21.239 16.269“ * 3.547
Pl -1.667* -1.845 -1.630“ -2.445 -1.012 -1.595 -3.970 *** -4.667
Ps 0.981 1.276 1.036 1.414 0.441 0.811 1.310* 1.754
Pa -2.883 “ -2.194 -2.888 — -2.824 -1.993 ** -2.137 -0.293 -0.263
Pi -3.239 -1.583 -3.221 *" -3.713 -0.221 -0.157 -3.139 -1.570
Ps 2.775 1.542 2.747 *“ 2.909 1.542 1.214 2.214 1.439
Pm 0.674 0.455 0.619 0.612 0.326 0.315 0.967 0.711
P, 0.080 0.235 0.086 0.260 0.012 0.051 -0.058 -0.196
8u. 0.292 *** 2.793 0.291 *“ 2.809 0.260 *** 3.553 0.398 *** 4.366
-0.158 -1.616 -0.147 -1.528 -0.126* -1.799 -0.543 *** -4.994
8« -0.052 -0.191 -0.033 -0.127 -0.069 -0.357 0.006 0.030
8» 0.472 1.368 0.486 ” 2.159 0.096 0.402 0.437 1.327
5si 0.268 0.737 0.269 0.756 0.471 * 1.826 0.269 0.901
8 ^ 0.105 0.318 0.138 0.473 0.076 0.326 0.017 0.062
8n -0.010 -0.433 -0.010 -0.411 -0.009 -0.516 0.005 0.272
8u 0.339 *** 2.735 0.339 *" 2.905 0.261 “ * 2.991 -0.006 -0.058
8u -0.265 * -1.802 -0.258 * -1.894 -0.268 ** -2.572 -0.283 ** -2.297
8 ls 0.254 * 1.901 0.249 * 1.835 0.191 ** 2.013 0.105 0.976
8Lm -0.299 ** -2.096 -0.299 “ -2.143 -0.225 ** -2.220 0.134 1.102
-0.063 -0.462 -0.060 -0.439 -0.079 -0.817 0.170 1.520
0.386 ** 2.471 0.367 “ 2.388 0.365 *” 3.302 0.453 *** 3.518
8ss -0.119 -0.748 -0.113 -0.726 -0.073 -0.648 0.031 0.238
0.204 1.336 0.211 1.382 0.080 0.735 -0.257 ” -1.968
Sdt -0.281 -1.283 -0.286 -1.484 -0.191 -1.230 -0.360 ** -2.062
8ds 0.548 ** 1.981 0.546 ” 2.044 0.427 ** 2.200 0.268 1.195
-0.319 -1.277 -0.337 -1.451 -0.247 -1.391 -0.069 -0.344
8a -0.662 ** -2.291 -0.656 *** -2.938 -0.492 ** -2.418 -0.563 ** -2.330
8|m 0.118 0.440 0.125 0.548 0.308 1.637 0.092 0.409
8vm 0.092 0.385 0.075 0.315 -0.183 -1.079 0.145 0.713
8u 0.085 “ 2.282 0.083 “ 2.226 0.085 *** 3.213 0.067 ** 2.297
8s, -0.107 — -2.599 -0.106“ -2.575 -0.093 *** -3.173 -0.098 *** -3.017
8* 0.131 * 1.712 0.128* 1.694 0.149 *** 2.731 0.152 " 2.515
8 , 0.043 0.744 0.044 0.788 0.020 0.476 0.046 0.928
8s, -0.087 -1.119 -0.090 -1.192 -0.080 -1.448 -0.048 -0.790
8™ -0.048 -0.827 -0.048 -0.835 -0.032 -0.779 -0.082 * -1.884
8u -0.083 -0.930 -0.088 -0.987 -0.085 -1.339 0.140 1.587
r 0.285 — 3.354 0.536 *" 3.150
M -1.937 -1.278
oJ 1.139 “ * 9.030 1.751 *” 3.183
Log likelihood 
LR test
Y - 0
M-0
Adj RJ 
LM test 
Hausman test
-630.5
16.65 ‘
-629.7
18.10'
1.46
0.638 
12.79 ' 
93.53 '
0.690
** * indicates significance at the 1%. 5% and 10% level, respectively.'The profit residuals have the correct 
(leftward) skew in all cases. Number of observations: 476.
126
Table A7
Parameter estimates for cost function using time-varying MLE
Parameter Cost function 
Coef. t ratio
Parameter Inefficiency function 
Coef. t ratio
a 1.928 ” 2.158 5.362 *”  12.139
P l 0.185 1.221  ^Dpub 1.780*“  7.749
Ps 0.889 *“ 6.532 4 Dfor -0.053 -0.273
Pd 0.138 0.707 ^ Dmut 0.826 *“  2.254
p, -0.098 -0.358 -0.674“ * -15.468
Ps 0.106 0.356
Pm 1.071 *** 4.667
P, 0.026 0.495
5 a 0.226 *” 13.517
§ss 0.257 15.718
Sdd -0.012 -0.271
8» 0.022 0.428
5a 0.136“ 2.083
5mm 0.103 ” 2.151
8„ -0.004 -0.853
5 u 0.034 1.586
Su 0.074 *” 3.143
8a -0.027 -1.148
$Lm -0.089 *" -3.818
8sd -0.003 -0.113
8s, -0.080 “ * -3.292
5ss -0.023 -0.910
5sm 0.078 *“ 3.370
5d, -0.025 -0.675
8dk -0.086 -1.637
$dm 0.078 •“ 2.008
8a 0.047 0.942
5lm -0.037 -0.888
8vm -0.124 ““ -2.866
8u 0.000 0.053
8S, 0.009 1.390
8d, 0.026 ” 2.051
8. -0.018 * -1.907
8s, -0.014 -1.144
5m, 0.004 0.442
8 ls -0.242 *** -16.179
y 0.965 "* 17.624
<rJ 0.510 — 8.566
Log likelihood 138.9S
LR test
y - 0  222.54
***, •*, • indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.“ The cost residuals have the correct 
(rightward) skew. Number of observations: 715.
127
Co
st 
ef
fic
ien
cy
 
Co
si 
ef
fic
ien
cy
Figure Al
Half-normal, Truncated-normal and GLS cost efficiency scores
Half-normal GLS • Truncated-normal
Figure A2
WITHIN, GLS and DFA cost efficiency scores
DFA WITHIN • GLS
T 
ru
nc
at
ed
-n
or
m
al
Figure A3
Correlation Half-normal/Truncated-normal (p=0.978)
Half-normal
Figure A4
Correlation Half-normal/GLS (p=0.945)
129
d
fa
 
w
it
h
in
Correlation GLSAVITHIN (p=0.623)
Figure A5
GLS
Figure A6
Correlation Truncated-normal/DFA (p=0.806)
130
Chapter 5
Multimarket Contact and Market Entry Dynamics
5.1 Introduction
The reforms implemented in Argentina throughout the decade of the 1990s led to 
changes in the structure o f the banking sector towards greater consolidation. During the 
decade a number of mergers and acquisitions among domestic banks and also several 
other transactions involving foreign financial institutions led to a significant reduction 
in the number of banks operating in the system. As a result of this process, the industry 
became increasingly dominated by larger and more geographically diverse entities that 
encounter each other in multiple geographic markets. In fact, the average bank’s 
network of branches more than doubled while the number of geographic markets served 
increased by three-quarters over the 1990s.
The increasing geographic expansion of large banks with the consequent increase of 
multimarket contact raises concerns about the effects of contacts in multiple markets on 
interfirm relationships and competition. Theoretical studies of multimarket contact 
argue that firms facing each other in multiple markets are more likely to act collusively, 
as contact in multiple markets gives greater scope for firms to respond to their 
competitors’ actions. Firms recognise that aggressive behaviour in a particular market 
may be met with retaliation by a rival in other common markets. For the banking 
industry, however, previous empirical studies on the effects of multimarket contact on 
competition yield ambiguous results; some studies suggest that multimarket contact
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may reduce competition while others find the opposite effect or no effect at all of 
multimarket contact.
Several limitations o f  previous research may account for these ambiguous results. 
Firstly, most studies focus on outcomes of rivalry (using for example profitability, 
price-cost margins, prices or changes in market shares as proxies for competition), 
rather than on the rivalry process itself. Secondly, many works use either market- or 
firm-level indexes o f multimarket contact, while collusive agreements should not vary 
so much across firms or markets as from firm to firm in a given market(s). Thirdly, 
many studies use cross-section data assuming that observations are in long-run 
equilibrium. Fourthly, some works do not include adequate controls for industry, 
market and firm characteristics and also for moderators o f the relationship between 
multimarket contact and competition (Baum and Korn, 1999).
This chapter analyses the relationship between multimarket contact and competition in 
the Argentine banking industry over the 1994-2000 period.75 The focus of the analysis 
is on the effects of multimarket contact on banks’ entry into new markets taking into 
account the influences of firm- and market-level conditions on banks’ choices of entry 
and of other competitive and market factors affecting the relationship between 
multimarket contact and entry. The results suggest that banks with large asset bases and 
greater experience are more likely to expand into new markets when the level of 
demographic variables such as population density, demand or market growth are 
favourable. The findings imply that multimarket contact reduces the likelihood of entry 
into new markets and that other factors such as market dominance and market
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concentration also have a negative impact on entry. Finally, the results reveal that 
strategic similarity among multimarket competitors amplifies the negative effect of 
multimarket contact on the hazard of entry.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 reviews theoretical and 
empirical studies on the relationship between multimarket contact and competition. 
Section 5.3 discusses the link between multimarket contact and market entry, the 
factors that moderate this relationship and the firm and market characteristics that 
influence market entry. Section 5.4 presents the methodology. Section 5.5 describes the 
data sources and the definition of variables and provides a brief overview of the dataset. 
Section 5.6 reports and discusses the results. Finally, the last section summarises and 
presents the conclusions.
5.2 Literature Review
5.2.1 Theoretical Studies
Multimarket contact refers to a situation in which the same firms meet each other in 
multiple geographic-product markets. Although multimarkct contact increases the 
opportunity that rivals have to compete with each other, the theory of multimarket 
competition suggests that such contact in multiple geographic-product markets leads to 
mutual forbearance i.e. less vigorous competitive interaction in all markets in which 
they meet, and more stable and predictable behaviour over time (Edwards, 1955). 
Mutual forbearance among multimarket competitors is proposed to occur as a result of 
two different processes: deterrence (Bemheim and Whinston, 1990; Edwards, 1955; 75
75 The explanatory variables are measured at the start of the year, but data for 1993 are only available for 
the end of that year. For this reason the sample period spans from 1994 to 2000.
133
Porter, 1980, 1981) and familiarity (Williamson, 1965; Scott, 1993; Baum and Korn, 
1999).74 *6
Several authors argue that strategic deterrence may be responsible for mutual 
forbearance among multimarket competitors. Edwards (1955) and Porter (1980, 1981) 
suggest that deterrence strategics are more likely to emerge when firms face each other 
in multiple markets for at least two reasons. On the one hand, because retaliation 
involving simultaneous attacks in several markets where the firms meet could be more 
damaging than retaliation within a single market. On the other, because retaliation 
could take place in markets in which the retaliatory potential losses arc small or the 
aggressor’s potential losses are large, forcing the aggressor to bear a higher relative cost 
for its competitive attacks.
Bcmhcim and Whinston (1990) formalise these intuitions into a game theoretic 
framework in which they analyse the effect of multimarket contact on the degree of 
collusion.77 They show that when identical firms meet in identical markets and the 
technology exhibits constant returns to scale, multimarkct contact docs not facilitate 
cooperation, the so-called irrelevance result. However, they also demonstrate that 
under a variety of asymmetric conditions with respect to firms and markets, 
multimarkct contact can facilitate tacit collusion by relaxing the incentive constraints 
governing the implicit agreements between firms. They show that if demand growth 
rates differ across markets, multimarkct contact contributes to shift punishment power
74 Deterrence is the extent to which a firm is capable of preventing its rivals from initiating offensive
actions that may damage its interests in a particular market. Familiarity is the extent to which a firm's
knowledge of its rivals contributes to facilitate tacit cooperation (Jayachandran et al„ 1999).
77 A previous work by Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) investigate the effects of cost- and 
demand-based linkages across markets in the context of static oligopolistic models. However, their 
analysis docs not address the issue that multimarkct contact may facilitate tacit collusion among firms.
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from rapidly to slowly growing markets. They also demonstrate that when firm 
production costs differ across markets or when scale economies arc present, collusion 
can be sustained through the development of spheres of influence. Similarly if a single 
firm maintains a cost advantage over its rivals, or if the number of competitors varies 
across markets, firms can pool the incentive constraints across markets and transfer the 
ability to collude from markets in which cooperation is easy to sustain to those in which 
more rivalry exist.
Spagnolo (1999) further identifies an additional circumstance in which multimarket 
contact facilitates collusion, which is independent of asymmetries. He shows that when 
firms’ objective function is strictly concave in profits, multimarkct contact always 
facilitates tacit cooperation. He demonstrates that a strictly concave objective function 
has the effect of making the strategic interactions interdependent i.e. firms’ evaluation 
of profits in one market depends on profits accumulated in other markets. In this 
context, multimarkct contact has two effects that enhance firms’ abilities to collude. On 
the one hand, it makes the expected losses from simultaneous retaliations in more 
markets to be larger than the sum of those from retaliations in independent markets. On 
the other, the threat of simultaneous retaliation ensures that firms’ optimal deviation is 
simultaneous in all markets, which makes short-run gains from deviating less 
valuable.78 These two effects always facilitate collusion. In addition, when the 
asymmetric conditions identified by Bemheim and Whinston are also present, the effect 
of multimarkct contact as a facilitator o f collusion is strengthened. 71
71 Because the marginal utility of profits is decreasing.
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Other authors suggest that the increased familiarity among multimarket rivals may be 
responsible for mutual forbearance. Williamson (1965) argues that communication 
among firms is essential to coordinated responses. He suggests that the degree of 
coordination among firms increases as their level of communication raises. However, at 
high levels of familiarity, subsequent increases in communication produce successively 
smaller increases in the level of adherence to group goals. This can result from two 
possible effects. On the one hand, the early communications may be concerned with 
more essential matters for obtaining coordination among rivals than are the later. On 
the other, the susceptibility to influence is almost certainly going to reach a saturation 
point as long as the difference between individual and group goals exists.
Scott (1993, 2001) also points to increased familiarity as the reason for the effect of 
multimarket contact on firms’ behaviour. He argues that the irrelevance result of 
Bemheim and Whinston docs not show that multimarket contact has no effect on 
collusion. Scott (1982) argues that multimarket contact may facilitate collusion through 
the provision of the communication required to select a desirable Nash equilibrium 
from among the many equilibria that exist in multiperiod games. The repeated 
interactions in multiple markets could provide firms with enough experience to choose 
an equilibrium that is better from their private perspectives. This view about 
multimarket contact and increased experience helping firms solve the equilibrium 
selection problem applies even in the Bcmhcim and Whinston and Spagnolo 
frameworks.
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5.2.2 Empirical Studies
Several empirical studies analyse the relationship between multimarket contact and 
competition. Some of these works examine firms meeting in different manufacturing 
industries (Scott, 1982, 1991, 2001; Fcinbcrg, 1985; Hughes and Oughton, 1993). 
Other studies explore intra-industry multimarket contact across geographic markets for 
firms operating in airlines (Sandler, 1988; Singal, 1993; Evans and Kessides, 1994; 
Baum and Korn, 1996, 1999; Gimcno and Woo, 1996, 1999; Gimeno, 1999), 
telephone-equipment manufacturers (Barnett, 1993), cellular telephone service 
providers (Parker and Roller, 1997; Busse, 2000), cement manufacturers (Jans and 
Rosenbaum, 1997), hospitals (Boeckcr et al., 1997), hotels (Fernandez and Marin, 
1998) and computer software (Young et al., 2000),. These studies generally find a 
positive link between prices, profits or market share stability and multimarket contact 
among firms, the exceptions being Sandler (1988) and Baum and Korn (1999). Sandler 
(1988) finds that multimarket contact is negatively related to airlines’ market share 
stability while Baum and Kom (1999) find that multimarket contact has an inverted U 
relationship with rate of entry and exit in the airlines sector.
Empirical studies examining the relationship between multimarket contact and 
competition in the banking industry provide mixed results. These studies proxy 
competition with measures such as profitability, interest rates, service charges or 
changes in market shares. Contact is primarily measured with variables that capture 
cither the number of links among a specified set of banks (either all banks in a market 
or some subset of leading institutions) or the level of deposits held by those banks. 
Table 5.1 presents empirical studies of multimarket contact in the banking industry. 
Some works find a positive link between multimarket contact and forbearance
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(Heggested and Rhoades, 1978; Pilloff, 1999), others find a negative link (Whitehead, 
1978; Alexander, 1985; Mester, 1987) and some get mixed findings (Rhoades and 
Heggested, 1985).79
Table 5.1
Empirical studies of multimarket contact in the banking industry
Author Sample Findings * Support for 
forbearance
Profitability, prices, stability of market shares and multimarket contact
Heggested and 
Rhoades(1978)
Top 3 U.S. bank holding 
companies in 187 major 
markets, 1966-1972
Market share stability higher in 
markets with higher MMC
Positive
Whitehead (1978) U.S. bank holding 
companies in Florida, 1976
Market share stability and service 
charges on deposits lower (but loan 
rates and fees higher) in markets 
with high MMC
Negative
Alexander(1985) U.S. bank holding 
companies in 6 states, 
1975
Service charges on deposits higher 
in markets with high MMC. No 
effect of MMC on interest rates.
Negative
Rhoades and 
Heggested (1985)
1,074 U.S. banks in 154 
markets, 1970-1979
No effect of MMC on ROA, service 
charges, or interest rates and fees
None
Mester (1987) 171 U.S. savings and loans 
in 56 county markets in 
California, 1982
Deposits rates higher, and market 
share stability and ROA lower in 
markets with high MMC
Negative
Pilloff (1999) 6,233 U.S. banks, 1992- 
1995
ROA higher in markets with high 
MMC
Positive
Market entry and multimarket contact
Haveman and 
Nonnemaker (2000)
U.S. savings and loans in 
California, 1977-1991
Inverted U relationship between 
growth in current markets and entry 
to new markets and MMC
Positive for 
high levels 
of MMC
Fuentelsaz and 
Gomez (2002)
Spanish savings and loans, 
1986-1999
Inverted U relationship between 
entry to new markets and MMC
Positive for 
high levels
of MMC
* MMC: multimarket contact.
79 Gelfand and Spillcr (1987) analyse the effects of multimarket contact in product markets instead of 
geographic markets. They consider two product markets: loans in domestic and foreign currency, 
respectively. They find evidence of noncompetitive behaviour consistent with mutual forbearance, 
whereby firms avoid changing behaviour in one market fearing retaliation in another market.
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Several limitations of previous works may account for these ambiguous results. Firstly, 
most studies focus on rivalry outcomes (using profitability, prices or changes in market 
shares as proxies for competition) rather than on the rivalry process itself. Secondly, 
many works use either market- or firm-level indexes of multimarket contact, while 
collusive agreements should not vary so much across firms or markets as from 
‘relationship to relationship’ (Baum and Korn, 1999). Thirdly, many studies use cross- 
section data assuming that observations arc in long-run equilibrium. Fourthly, some 
works do not include adequate controls for industry, market and firm characteristics 
and also for moderators o f the relationship between multimarket contact and 
competition.
More recently, some studies in the banking industry analyse the impact of multimarket 
contact on rates of entry into new geographic markets, which may be considered a 
useful proxy for the intensity of rivalry among firms. Haveman and Nonnemaker 
(2000) analyse the impact of contact between saving banks in multiple markets in 
California focusing on two competitive behaviours i.e. growth in current markets and 
entry into new markets. They find that multimarket contact has an inverted-U-shaped 
effect on both growth into current markets and on entry into new markets for 
multimarket firms. Fucntelsaz and Gomez (2002a) examine the link between 
multimarkct contact and entry into new markets in the Spanish savings bank industry 
following deregulation. They find that the influence of multimarket contact on entry is 
of an inverted U form and that entry is affected by the inclusion of moderators such as 
market dominance or strategic similarity among competitors. These studies use firm- 
market level measures of multimarket contact and incorporate controls for market and
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firm characteristics and some moderators of the relationship between contact and 
competition.
5.2.3 Entry Decisions
Several studies analyse entry behaviour more generally. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), 
Berry (1992) and Scott-Morton (1999) use game theoretic models of discrete choice to 
develop econometric models of entry in oligopolistic markets. The predictions of these 
models are examined empirically in different markets using discrete choice techniques. 
Chevalier (1995) also uses discrete choice models to analyse de novo entry into the 
supermarket industry, but her model is not based on a game theoretic approach. 
Klepper and Simons (2000) use survival analysis techniques to analyse firm survival in 
the tire industry assuming that technical change drives entry and exit.
The game theoretic models of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), Berry (1992) and Scott- 
Morton (1999) have several similarities. These studies assume that the number of 
market participants is the equilibrium outcome of a game in which firms choose 
whether or not to enter the market. A reduced-form profit function describes the 
resulting payoffs in terms of market conditions (and also firm characteristics in some of 
these models) and the number o f  operating firms. These works enforce a Nash 
equilibrium solution, so no profitable deviations from the observed equilibrium 
outcome arc possible. All entrants earn positive profits while all non-entrants would not 
earned positive profits if they entered. Additional competitors reduce firms’ profits in 
the postentry stage of the game. A probability is assigned to each outcome (number of 
operating firms) based on the equilibrium concept. Finally, these studies use maximum
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likelihood to select parameters of the payoff function that maximise the probability of 
the observed outcome.
These works, however, present several differences. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) 
examine the effects of entry in five retail and professional markets. This study uses a 
profit function where the deterministic part of profits (composed of variable profits 
minus fixed costs) depends on market characteristics and the number o f firms in the 
market. This work allows for unobserved profits through the error term but all firms 
within a market are assumed to have the same unobserved profit. These authors use an 
ordered probit model to measure entry thresholds ratios to analyse the effects of entry 
on competitive conduct in retail (tire dealers) and professional (doctors, dentists, 
druggists and plumbers) markets in the U.S.
Berry (1992) examines entry decisions in the airline industry. This study allows fixed 
costs to depend on observed and unobserved firm characteristics while variable profits, 
which are common to all firms, are function of (observed and unobserved) market 
characteristics and the number of firms in the market. This heterogeneity across firms 
introduces a substantial computational problem.80 The author therefore uses simulation 
estimators that assume an order of entry (to solve this problem) to analyse airlines’ 
entry decisions into city pair markets in the U.S.81 Scott-Morton (1999) analyses entry 
into the generic pharmaceutical industry. This work also allows for firm heterogeneity 
in the profit function. Additionally, this study differentiates between existing firms in
110 The probability of a given event has a complicated region of integration.
"  He also uses probit and ordered probit models with and without unobserved heterogeneity.
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the market and de novo entrants.82 The author estimates a probit model to analyse entry 
decisions into the generic pharmaceutical industry.
Chevalier (1995) uses an econometric model, which is not based on a game-theoretic 
approach, to analyse de novo entry in the supermarket industry. This study analyses 
entry at the market level to explain the effects o f capital structure (through the share of 
supermarkets that participated in leverage buyouts) on market structure. The author 
estimates a probit model to examine de novo entry by large supermarket chains into 
local markets in the U.S.
Klepper and Simons (2000) examine the effects of technological change on market 
structure and firm survival patterns in the tire industry. The driving force in their 
theoretical model is R&D. This study assumes that in each period new potential 
entrants composed by start-ups and firms with experience in related technologies arise. 
These potential entrants are heterogeneous since only a fraction of them are innovators 
while the remaining are imitators. In each period new R&D opportunities arise to lower 
costs, however, all innovations are costlessly imitated after one period. In each period 
potential entrants and incumbents choose their R&D and level of output to maximise 
current profits. Potential entrants enter if profits are non-negative while incumbent 
firms remain in the industry if profits are positive. Firms expand in each period until the 
marginal cost of growth equals their price-cost margin. Therefore, earlier entrants are 
larger than later entrants because they have lower average costs. Similarly, innovators 
are larger than imitators that enter in the same period.
12 As Toivanen and Waterson (2000) suggest the papers by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and Berry (1992) 
can be viewed as “explaining market structure rather than entry” (pg. 988).
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This study also shows that the industry develops as follows. Initially, price is high 
enough to allow both innovators and imitators to enter profitably. Then price falls 
enough that only innovators can profitably enter. Eventually, price falls far enough that 
no firm can profitably enter and entry ceases. As price continues to fall, later entrants 
exit, contributing to a shakeout and evolution of an oligopolistic market structure. The 
authors use survival analysis techniques to examine the evolution of the U.S. tire 
industry concluding that technological change contributed to the changes in the 
structure of the industry as the theoretical model predicts.
These studies suggest that a potential entrant’s decision to enter a market is a complex 
function of expected profits where expected profits depend not only on incumbent firm 
market structure, but also on potential competition as measured by ease of entry. Ease 
of entry also depends on factors such as market growth, barriers to entry and entrant 
capabilities. Empirical studies analysing entry and multimarket contact control for the 
effects of (some of) these factors on entry by including several firm and market-level 
control variables.
However, most of these studies (on entry and multimarket contact) do not give 
adequate attention to several factors that moderate the relationship between 
multimarkct contact and competition (Jayachandran et al. 1999). Although some studies 
focus on some of these moderators (Baum and Korn, 1996, 1999; Haveman and 
Nonnemakcr, 2000), there has been no attempt to examine integratively the impact of 
these moderators on the relationship between multimarket contact and the intensity of 
competition (Jayachandran et al. 1999). Fuentelsaz and Gomez (2002a) attempt to 
analyse the influence of more than one of these moderators, however, they only 
consider the impact of these variables on market entry rather than on multimarket
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contact. The objective of this study is to analyse the relationship between multimarket 
contact and entry into new geographic markets in the Argentine banking industry, 
taking into account the influence of these moderators, which are discussed in the next 
section.
5.3 Multimarket Contact and Market Entry Dynamics
The theoretical arguments presented above suggest that contact in multiple markets 
reduces the intensity of rivalry as a result of strategic deterrence and increased 
familiarity among multimarket competitors. However, empirical studies of the 
relationship between multimarket contact and competition in the banking industry does 
not provide clear support to those arguments. As mentioned above, these studies focus 
on prices, profitability or instability of market shares as proxies for the intensity of 
rivalry. However, there is a wide range of competitive actions available to firms that 
could be used as such proxies. Firm’s market entry is key among strategic actions and 
represents an aggressive conduct that invite competitor reactions (Caves and Porter, 
1977; Tirole, 1988; Scherer and Ross, 1990; Miller and Chen, 1994; Baum and Korn, 
1996). Market entry provides then a useful proxy for the intensity of rivalry since the 
higher the entry rate, the more intense the rivalry (Porter, 1980, 1985; Caves, 1984).
Hence, if multimarkct contact reduces the intensity of rivalry, multimarket firms will be 
unlikely to enter markets where their level of contact with market incumbents is high. 
Therefore, as the level of multimarket contact between a potential entrant to a market 
and the incumbent firms increases, the focal firm’s likelihood of entry into that market
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will decline, ceteris paribus.83 However, two opposing processes may also operate. 
First, when multimarket contact is low, firms have incentives to strengthen existing 
footholds in competitors’ domains or establish new footholds to signal their ability to 
respond to an attack (Kamani and Wcmcrfelt, 1985). This expectation of strengthening 
or establishing a presence in competitors’ domains may make multimarket firms 
inclined to enter markets as the level of multimarkct contact with incumbents increases. 
Second, as the extent of multimarket contact increases, multimarkct firms have more 
opportunities to observe each other’s competitive behaviour increasing their abilities to 
interpret each other’s intentions and actions (Boecker et al, 1997). This reduced 
uncertainty about rival’s future behaviour may make multimarket firms inclined to 
enter markets as the number of contacts increases.
If all these processes associated with multimarkct competition operate simultaneously, 
the result will be an inverted U-shaped relationship between multimarkct contact and 
entry into new markets (Havcman and Nonncmakcr, 2000). When multimarkct contact 
between a potential entrant and the incumbents in the focal market is low, firms will be 
inclined to enter new markets to reinforce footholds in competitors’ domains and to use 
the information benefits of additional contacts. In such circumstances, market entry will 
increase with multimarkct contact. But when the level of multimarkct contact between 
a potential entrant and the firms already operating in the focal market is high, firms will 
recognise that the risk of destabilising the competitive relationship will be more 
important than the incremental deterrent and information benefits of additional 
contacts. In such circumstances, market entry will decline with multimarkct contact.
*' Focal market is the objective or target market for entry. The focal firm is the potential entrant in the 
focal market.
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Therefore, the relationship between multimarket contact and the rate o f  entry into new 
markets should have an inverted U-form.
5.3.1 Moderator Variables
The relationship between multimarket contact and market entry is also affected by 
several moderators, which are typically characteristics of the competitive or market 
environment. Jayachandran et al. (1999) suggest three competitive and one market 
factors: (i) spheres of influence, (ii) resource similarity, (iii) organisation structure and 
(iv) market concentration as potential moderators of rivalry among multimarket 
competitors. Few previous studies analyse the moderating effects of these variables 
separately. Baum and Korn (1996) and Gimeno (1999) analyse the effects of spheres of 
influence, Gimeno and Woo (1996) and Young et al. (2000) consider the role of 
strategic similarity and Gimeno and Woo (1999) study the influence of organisational 
structure on multimarket competition. Fuentelsaz and Gomez (2002a) consider the 
effect o f spheres of influence, resource similarity and market concentration on firm s' 
behaviour rather than the moderating effect on multimarket contact. These moderating 
factors and their relationship to market entry behaviour and the interactive influences 
with multimarket contact arc analysed below.
5.3.1.1 Spheres of Influence
Spheres of influence occur when firms engaged in multimarkct competition have 
dominant market positions in different markets among those in which they meet 
(Edwards, 1955). The presence o f  spheres of influence may facilitate coordination 
among firms in a market, regardless of multimarket contact. Firms arc more likely to 
retaliate in markets within their spheres of influence to protect important market
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positions (Haveman and Nonnemaker, 2000). Retaliation by dominant firms are likely 
to be harsher than retaliation by minor players because of their power to control prices 
or supply of material, financial and human resources. As a result, firms will be less 
likely to take aggressive actions in markets dominated by a large firm. This discussion 
suggests that firms ’ entry rates into a new market should be lower when those markets 
are dominated by a single firm.
Spheres of influence may also moderate the relationship between multimarket contact 
and the intensity of competition. Bemheim and Whinston (1990) suggest that the 
presence of spheres of influence leads to the reduction in the intensity of competition in 
a multimarket context rather than the simple aggregation o f contacts. While the 
aggregation of contacts among firms may lead to reduced rivalry because of increased 
familiarity and deterrence among multimarket competitors, spheres of influence may 
enhance deterrence due to firms’ interests in protecting important markets from rivals’ 
actions. Hence, when firms are multimarket competitors, firms will be less inclined to 
take aggressive actions in markets dominated by a single firm (Baum and Korn, 1996). 
These arguments imply that the impact o f  multimarket contact on the rate o f entry into 
new markets should be amplified when those markets are dominated by a single firm.
5.3.1.2 Strategic Similarity
Strategic similarity is the extent to which a firm’s strategics in terms of advertising, 
cost structure, R&D, etc., arc comparable to those o f  its competitors (Porter, 1979). 
Strategic similarity may influence the intensity of rivalry among firms in a market. 
Caves and Porter (1977) suggest that firms within a strategic group recognise their 
interdependence most closely while Newman (1978) argues that when firms have
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different strategies, such differences may lead to lack of consistency in their objectives, 
which may reduce their ability to tacitly collude. However, Porter (1976) points out that 
increased strategic similarity is often associated with increased product market 
interdependence, which could lead to more intense rivalry. In this context, Barney 
(1991) and Peteraf (1993) add that resource similarity among rival firms may increase 
rivalry. Consequently strategic similarity among firms in a market could be associated 
with more intense rivalry if the effect of lack of product differentiation or similar 
resource endowments outweighs the effect of increased coordination (Gimeno and 
Woo, 1996). These arguments imply that the average strategic similarity o f  a firm to 
competitors in a market could be either positively, negatively or not related to the rate 
o f entry into that market.
But strategic similarity may also have an interactive influence with multimarket contact 
on firms’ intensity of competition. Chen (1996) argues that firms’ rivalrous behaviour 
depends on the consideration of both market and strategic profiles. Multimarket contact 
provides firms with additional information about rivals’ behaviour across markets. For 
firms characterised by strategic similarity this additional information from multimarket 
contacts may increase the likelihood of coordination leading to tacit collusion. In 
addition, for firms characterised by strategic dissimilarities, this additional cross-market 
information provided by multimarkct contact may provide a common basis with which 
to tacitly coordinate behaviour. Therefore, the impact o f multimarket contact on the 
rate o f  entry into new markets should be amplified, the higher the degree o f  strategic 
similarity among firms.
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5.3.1.3 Organisational Structure
Differences in organisational structure may influence firms’ behaviour. Gimeno and 
Woo (1999) suggest that appropriate coordination among the different administrative 
units that manage operations in the different geographic markets is critical for the 
effectiveness of multimarket strategies. In the absence of such intrafirm coordination, 
competition converges to market-by-market competition, which may be less than 
optimal for overall firm performance (Jayachandran et al., 1999). An organisational 
unit within a firm, in its attempt to maximise performance within its geographic 
markets, may initiate actions that could lead to multimarket retaliation by better 
coordinated rivals. These actions may ultimately lead to losses in many markets. 
Therefore, firms with organisational units capable of coordinating actions across 
markets will be more likely to recognise the effects of interdependencies and respond to 
multimarket contact. Therefore, the impact o f multimarket contact on the rate o f entry 
into new markets should be amplified when firms have organisational structures 
characterised by a greater degree o f coordination o f  actions across the units that 
manage operations in the different markets than otherwise.
5.3.1.4 Market Structure
Market concentration, an indicator of actual rivalry, represents another factor that may 
affect firms’ actions."4 Different lines of argument suggest different effects of 
concentration on firm’s actions. On the one hand, oligopoly theory suggests that 
collusion is more likely to occur in concentrated markets because firms recognise their 
mutual interdependence (Scherer and Ross, 1990). On the other, the arguments offered
44 The literature has considered the effects of actual and potential rivalry when analysing entry decisions 
(Cotterill and Haller, 1992, for example). Following this literature, this section analyses the effects of 
actual rivalry on entry while the next section considers the influence of potential rivalry on rates of entry.
by the contestable markets theory suggest that under certain conditions, competitive 
outcomes can be observed even in concentrated markets (Baumol et. al., 1982).85 
Instead the theory of trigger price strategies suggests one means by which collusive 
behaviour may be sustained among arbitrarily many firms (Friedman, 1971). 
Consequently, the effect of market concentration on firms’ actions cannot be 
determined. These arguments suggest that firm s ' entry rates into a new market could be 
either positively, negatively or even unrelated to the degree o f concentration in that 
market.
Market concentration may also have an interactive influence with multimarket contact 
on firms’ competitive behaviour. Linked oligopoly theory suggests that in oligopolistic 
markets, the degree of linkage among markets or among firms in different markets, 
represents an important determinant of performance. This view assumes that 
multimarket firms coordinate their operations across markets and that this coordination 
affects the intensity of rivalry. Bemheim and Whinston (1990) argue that multimarket 
contact is more likely to ensure coordination in concentrated markets. They maintain 
that it is easier for oligopolists who are also multimarket rivals to collude, even easier 
than it is for multimarket competitors in less concentrated markets. These arguments 
suggest the impact o f multimarket contact on the rate o f  entry into new markets should 
be amplified when those markets are highly concentrated.
*’ However, these conditions are too extreme.
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5.3.2 Firm and Market Control Variables
Several characteristics of the firms, focal and non-focal markets and the economic 
environment may also influence a firm’s likelihood of entry into new markets. Previous 
studies include these factors in the analysis of market entry (Cotterill and Haller, 1992; 
Barnett, 1993; Baum and Korn, 1996; Haveman, 1993a,1993b, 2000; Fuentelsaz and 
Gomez, 2002a,b). These controls can be classified as: (i) firm-level characteristics 
including competence, size, experience and ownership structure; (iii) focal market 
controls such as market demand growth, demand intensity and potential rivalry; and (ii) 
non-focal market characteristics such as market concentration in markets where firms 
operate. These control variables and their potential influences on market entry are 
described below.
Several firm  characteristics may influence rates of market entry. First, firms’ 
competence may influence patterns of entry. More competent firms are characterised by 
superior management, costs control or strong market positions in established markets. 
These firms are more likely to enter new markets due to their ability to finance 
expansion either internally or externally (Cotterill and Haller, 1992). Second, firm’s 
size may influence rates of market entry. Larger firms generally posses more slack 
resources, which may help them satisfy capital requirements associated with entry 
(Cyert and March, 1963; Haveman, 1993b). Moreover, larger firms also benefit from 
the existence o f brand reputation or cost reductions associated with size that lower 
barriers to market entry (Caves and Porter, 1977; Haveman, 1993b). Third, firms with 
greater accumulated experience in managing operations across markets may exhibit 
higher rates o f entry (Wilson, 1980). However, previous experience may also reduce 
the likelihood o f  entry for a highly diversified firm due to higher coordination and
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monitoring costs. Fourth, banks’ ownership structure may also influence entry patterns. 
Banks with different ownership structure have different goals and authority structure, 
which affects their ability to monitor competitors or to devise adequate strategic 
responses.
Rates of market entry may also depend on the characteristics offocal markets. On the 
demand side, demand intensity and market growth may influence entry rates. A higher 
intensity of demand and/or market growth may lead to higher expected profits and a 
higher likelihood of entry.86 On the supply side, potential rivalry may affect entry rates 
(Mitchell, 1989). A higher potential competition in the focal market will lead 
incumbents to discipline new entrants, making entry less attractive. Rates of entry may 
also depend on non-focal market characteristics. If rivalry in non-focal markets is high, 
firms will have incentives to diversify in order to relax the intensity of competition.
The preceding analysis suggests that a firm’s likelihood of entry into a new (focal) 
market will be a function of: (i) the degree o f multimarket contact with focal market 
incumbents; (ii) the competitive moderating factors: market share of the largest firm in 
the market; the degree of strategic similarity with the firms operating in the focal 
market and the firm’s organisational structure; (iii) the level o f concentration in the 
focal market; (iv) other firm and market characteristics. Hence, the basic estimating 
equation is along the following lines:
(5.1) Eini = /  (Mmcjnt, Cmvinl, Mmv„i, Fcvit, Nfmcvmt, Fmcv„,)
86 A higher market growth rate can also reduce entry due to the larger queue of potential entrants 
(Cotterill and Haller, 1992). However, this effect is controlled for by including potential rivalry as a 
control variable.
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where Einl represents the hazard of firm i entering focal market n at time t, Mmcmt is the 
degree of multimarket contact between firm i and incumbent firms in market n (in 
markets different than n), Cmvi„, are the competitive moderating factors of firm i in 
market n, Mmvn, is the market moderating variable in focal market n; Fcvu, are firm 
control variables and Nfincvm, and Fmcv„, represent the market characteristics of non- 
focal market m and focal market n.
5.4 Methodology
Duration models are used to analyse the relationship between multimarket contact and 
entry into new geographic markets in the banking industry. Since the process of bank 
entry is intrinsically continuous but the observations are in discrete time (annual 
observations), the hazard that a bank enters a certain geographic market, given that, it 
does not already operate in that market is estimated using the Prentice and Gloeckler 
(1978) proportional hazards model for grouped data.87 The parametric explanatory 
element includes the variables in (5.1) while the baseline hazard function is given a 
non-parametric specification for two reasons.88 Firstly, because if a parametric baseline 
specification is incorrectly assumed the parameter estimates will be inconsistently 
estimated. Secondly, since even when the parametric baseline hazard specification is 
correct, a parametric approach will usually provide only a small increase in efficiency 
(Meyer, 1990).
Estimating market entry is subject to at least two problems. Firstly, the unit of analysis 
is the bank in a market in each year and the data on bank’s operations across multiple
17 Survival times arc grouped into discrete intervals of time.
"  However, a parametric baseline hazard is also estimated in the empirical part for comparison purposes.
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markets are pooled. As a result, the analysis o f market entry is subject to non- 
independence bias from pooling multiple observations on each firm across multiple 
markets at each point in time.89 To solve this problem, the model is estimated including 
random effects to account for the possible dependence between observations. Secondly, 
at each point in time, a bank is at risk of failure, by virtue of being alive, as well as of 
entering new markets. These risks are competing: if a bank fails it cannot 
simultaneously enter new markets, conversely if a bank enters new markets it cannot 
simultaneously fail. Therefore, in each year a bank can be treated as having 
simultaneous risks of entering new markets or failing. This can be modelled by means 
of an independent competing risk model where correlations between unobservable 
factors affecting each destination-specific hazard (entry or failure), are assumed away. 
Thus, single-destination models can be estimated separately, one for each destination. 
However, since the focus is on market entry dynamics the model of entry is the one 
estimated.
This section consists o f two subsections. Section 5.4.1 introduces the proportional 
hazards model and discusses the grouped data model of Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) 
for the analysis of discrete time data. Section 5.4.2 discusses the extension of the 
grouped data model to include random effects to account for non-independence of 
observations.
Firms coordinate activities across multiple markets. This means that entry behaviour of each firm 
should be correlated across market leading to nonindependence across observations.
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i5.4.1 Proportional Hazards Models for Discrete Time Data
Proportional hazards models often assume that failure times (entry times), are 
expressed on a continuous time scale. In these models, the continuous time hazard 
function X(t) and explanatory variables x are associated through the expression:
(5.2) k  (t;xit) = X0(t) • exp (xu’P)
where exp (xu’P) represents a term specific to the individuals (banks) with covariates xit 
(variables listed in (5.1)), p is a vector of regression coefficients and Xo(t) is the 
baseline hazard function corresponding to exp( )= l. The hazard rate represents the 
conditional probability of having a spell length exactly t (bank entry into a new market 
in period t), conditional upon survival up to time t. In this specification the effect of 
explanatory variables is to multiply the hazard ko by a factor exp(-) which does not 
depend on duration t. Since ôlnX(t,x)/dx = P the coefficients can be interpreted as the 
constant proportional effect o f x on the hazard rate. The associated continuous time 
survivor function is given by:
(5.3) S(t;Xji) = exp[-A0(t)exp(x /P )]
where A0(t)=|'X0(u)du is the integrated baseline hazard at t.
If ko( ) is completely arbitrary, expression (5.2) defines a semi-parametric regression 
model known as a Cox proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972). The Cox model is 
attractive since it permits the estimation of p without making any assumption about the
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form of ko(-). The procedure developed by Cox relies on the definition of a partial 
likelihood function, which is the part of the full likelihood function that docs not 
depend on Xo(-)- The partial likelihood can be obtained as the marginal likelihood of the 
ranks of failure times since it contains all the information about the order in which 
failure occurred (Ducrocq, 1999). However, the ranking of failure times is not possible 
with a discrete measure of failure times, which generates a large amount of ‘ties’.
When there are few ties between failure times (at least compared with the total number 
of observations), approximations of Cox’s partial likelihood have been proposed. Cox 
(1972) suggested the use o f logistic regression to approximate the true model. In 
addition, Breslow (1974) and Efron (1977) attempted to approximate the true partial 
likelihood when the information contained in the data does not allow an ideal 
construction. However, when there are many ties among failure times, these 
approximations arc no longer valid and a different analysis must be performed.
Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) suggested an approach for discrete time data. In this 
method, if the underlying continuous durations are only observed in disjoint time 
intervals: [0=to, t |) ,  [ti, i 2),...,[ik-i, xk),...], all failures occurring during the interval 
[Tk-I, tk) arc ‘grouped’ and the attached failure time is given by k. It is assumed that 
censoring only occurs at the end of each interval and that covariates arc constant within 
each time interval. The discrete time survivor function in the kth interval has the same 
form as (5.3), which can be rewritten as follows:
(5.4) S (t=Tk;xu) = exp [-exp (xit’P + 6k)] k=l,...,m
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iwhere 5k = log [Ao(t)].
Assuming all intervals are of unit length, the discrete time hazard function in the kth 
interval is given by:
(5.5) h (t=Tk;xit) = 1 - ^(T- ’X)- = 1 -  exp [ -exp(xj,’P + yk )]
S(Tk.,;x)
where yk = log J 'k X0(u)du . The log likelihood function can be written as follows:
(5.6) log L = L {c i log[S(tj.i;xil)-S(ti;xjl)]+(l-ci)- log[S(ti;xit)]}
where Ci is a censoring indicator. In contrast with the Cox model approach, the 
elements o f the baseline survivor curve (the y’s in (5.4)) are estimated jointly with p.
5.4.2 Random Effects Models
In the presence of unobservable variables or non-independence from pooling 
observations, the model presented above can be extended by including a random error 
term along with the vector of individual characteristics x. The most commonly used 
correction model is based on the gamma distribution or an inverse Gaussian distribution 
since they give a closed form expression for the likelihood, avoiding numerical 
integration. However, other distributions could in principle be used (see Meyer, 1990). 
By incorporating the random error, the instantaneous hazard rate (5.2) is specified as 
follows:
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(5.7) X (t;xit) = X0(t) • Ej • exp (xit’p) = X0(t) • exp [xu’P + log(Ej)]
where Ei is a random variable with a certain distribution. The discrete time hazard 
function is then given by:
(5.8) h (t=Tk;xit) = 1 -  exp{- exp [xit’P + yk + log(Ej)]}
This is the function used to analyse the effect of multimarket contact on market entry, 
where h( ) represents the hazard rate for bank i in the time interval k, x„ is the set of 
variables affecting market entry (multimarket contact, moderating and control 
variables) and yk is some functional form that represents the effect o f  duration of entry 
on the hazard rate, which is given a parametric specification by including the logarithm 
of time and also a non-parametric specification using dummy variables for each time 
interval (year). Finally, c is assumed to have two alternative distributions: Gamma and 
Normal.
5.5 Data and Variables
5.5.1 Data Description
The relationship between multimarkct contact and entry into new geographic markets is 
analysed using data of the retail-banking industry in Argentina over the period 1994- 
2000. The industry is composed of banks that operate in multiple provinces. The 
country is divided into 23 provinces and each province can be considered a geographic
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market, the exception being the Province of Buenos Aires.90 This province consists of 
three main and clearly separated areas: Capital Federal, Greater Buenos Aires and the 
rest of the province. These areas account for 10%, 25% and 14% of the total country 
population, respectively. Geographically, the province of Buenos Aires is also 
important. Consequently, banks in Capital Federal do not compete with banks in the 
rest o f the province or in the Greater Buenos Aires. Hence, Capital Federal, Greater 
Buenos Aires and the rest of the Province of Buenos Aires are treated as different 
geographic markets leading to a total of 25 markets.91
The sample period represents a critical window in the evolution of the Argentine 
banking sector. Over this period, a large number of mergers and acquisitions took 
place, which led to substantial changes in the size and geographic range of operations 
of most banks. Table 5.2 shows the evolution of the number of banks, the number of 
provinces served and the network size and geographic diversification of the average 
bank. The data reveal that in 1994 the average bank had 30 branches located in 4 
provinces while in 2000 the average bank operated a network of 72 branches in 7 
provinces. In addition, at the beginning of the sample period, 102 banks (out of 123) 
had branches in one to four provinces while the number of banks operating in less than 
five provinces fell to 36 (out of 62) by 2000.
w> Burdisso et al. (1998) analyses the validity of the SCP hypothesis in Argentina. They consider each 
province as a local market to estimate HHIs. They further suggest that banks’ localisation decisions are 
mainly taken at provincial levels.
”  The 23 provinces are subdivided into a total of 509 departments. The analysis is conducted at the 
provincial level due to data availability.
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Table 5.2
Number of banks and geographic diversification
Argentine retail banking sector, 1993-2000
Number Number of banks with operations in: Average bank
Year of Less than 5 6 to 10 11 to 20 More than 20 Number Number
banks Provinces provinces provinces Provinces of of
branches provinces
1994 123 102 10 7 4 30 4
1995 91 65 13 9 4 42 S
1996 87 61 11 11 4 45 5
1997 81 56 10 11 4 49 6
1998 72 45 12 9 6 61 7
1999 63 38 10 9 6 70 7
2000 62 36 10 10 6 72 7
The data were collected from different sources. The addresses of all branch offices 
from 1994 to 2000 were provided by the Banco Central de la República Argentina. 
Balance sheet data and information on mergers, acquisitions, conversion and failures 
were obtained from Información de Entidades Financieras, Banco Central de la 
República Argentina. Data on population density were gathered from the Instituto 
Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (INDEC) and information on total loans and deposits 
per province were obtained from the Boletín Estadístico, Banco Central de la República 
Argentina. The data have a longitudinal dimension, as information on the dependent 
and explanatory variables was obtained for every year over the period 1994-2000. The 
data take the form of one observation per bank per market (province) per year in which 
the bank is not present at the beginning o f the year.92 This provides a total of 12,397 
single bank-market-year observations from which 190 correspond to effective entries.
n  Each pair potential cntrant-focal market and their associated characteristics are followed year by year 
until either entry takes place or censoring occurs.
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Sampling was affected by the mergers and acquisitions that took place during the 
sample period, which reduced the number of retail banks from 123 in 1994 to 62 in 
2000. Three different cases were considered: (i) a bank was not involved in any merger 
or acquisition, (ii) a bank was acquired by another bank, and (iii) two banks were 
merged giving rise to a new entity. In the first case, the bank was followed throughout 
all the sample period. In the second case, the acquired institution was followed up until 
the year o f the acquisition while the acquirer was traced through all the sample period. 
In the third case, the merging banks were followed up until the year of the merger while 
the new entity was traced from that point up until the end of the sample period. In all 
cases, a bank was included in the analysis either up to the time at which entry took 
place, or censoring occurred. Censoring occurs when a bank legally disappears as a 
result of a merger, acquisition or failure, or when entry has not taken place at the end of 
the follow up.
5.5.2 Variables
5.5.2.1 Dependent Variable
Market entry is measured through an indicator variable (entry) which equals one if a 
bank entered a new market between the beginning and end o f the year and zero 
otherwise. Entry equals zero if the bank did not operate in the market in question in the 
focal year.,J The set o f markets (provinces) that a bank was at risk of entering each year
,J Given the characteristics of the Argentine banking industry, the analysis of entry could be extended in 
at least two different ways. First, several banks have opened more than one branch in the same province 
in the same year. Since the market is defined at the provincial level and given the definition of the entry 
variable for survival analysis, these entries are recorded as a single entry. In an extended study, however, 
an ordered probit model could be used to analyse the factors that explain the number of branches a bank 
opens in a particular province. The dependent variable in such a study would be defined as the number of 
branches opened by a single bank in a province in each year. Second, banks have entered new markets by 
means of opening new branches but also via mergers and acquisitions. The variable entry does not 
differentiate among the different types of entry. Again, in an extended study, separate models could be 
estimated using different definition of entry as dependent variable to analyse the effects of these different
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was the set of markets in which that firm did not have branches at the beginning of the 
year. It would be possible to limit the risk set to those provinces that are adjacent to the 
provinces in which a bank already operated, but more than half of the market entries 
observed occurred outside these adjacent provinces. The analysis included up to 22 
provinces for each bank each year and excluded the one or more provinces in which 
banks already operated. As a result, a total of 190 effective entries were recorded. 
These entries correspond to 45 banks opening branches in different number of 
provincial markets over the sample period.* 94
5.5.2.2 Independent Variables
The main independent variable included in the analysis to test for the effects of 
multimarket contact on entry into new geographic markets is a multimarket contact 
variable, which is measured as a simple index. In addition, to further analyse the effect 
of other moderators of the relationship between contact and entry, the following 
variables arc also considered in the analysis: (i) market dominance, (ii) strategic 
similarity and (iii) market concentration. The effects of organisational structure on 
market entry and multimarket contact are not analysed due to data limitations. 
However, the potential correlation due to omitted variables (other firm specific 
variables may also be omitted) is modelled through the random effect included in the 
hazard model. All variables arc time-varying and measured at the start of each year.
modes of entry on the hazard of entry93 Additionally, an ordered probit model could also be estimated to 
analyse the determinants of these different entry mechanisms where the dependent variable assumes 
different values for the different types of entry.
94 For example, 11 banks opened branches in I new market, 10 entities entered 2 new markets, 7 banks 
opened new branches in 3 markets, 3 entities entered S new provinces, 3 banks also entered 3 new 
markets while just 1 entity entered 11,1 3 ,15 and 17 new markets, respectively, over the sample period.
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Multimarket contact. The relationship between multimarket contact and market entry 
is evaluated using a count measure of multimarket contact. Count measures simply add 
up the number of markets in which firms in the focal market compete outside that 
market, and represent the most common measure used in the literature (Heggestad and 
Rhoades, 1978; Evans and Kessides, 1994; Baum and Korn, 1996; Gimeno and Woo, 
1996; Fuentelsaz and Gomez, 2002a). The average multimarket contact of that firm 
with each of its focal-market competitors is used when the potential entrant competes 
with multiple firms in the focal market. Hence, since a firm generally faces different 
competitors in different markets, the measures of multimarket contact differ across 
firms and markets.
Some researchers argue that count measures are too simplistic. This view considers that 
counts should be weighted by the strategic importance of the contacts, standardised by 
the number of markets in which the firm operates, or adjusted by the possibility of 
random contacts (Gimeno, 1999). Given the lack of consensus about which corrections 
to use, different studies use different measures making comparisons across works 
difficult to undertake. This study uses a simple count measure o f multimarket contact, 
which is similar to the indexes used in previous studies. This approach allows 
comparisons with previous works (Gimeno and Woo, 1996, 1999; Fuentclsaz and 
Gomez, 2002a).
Thus, for each bank i and each focal market n, the average intensity of multimarket 
contact between bank i and multimarket rivals j that operate in market n at time t 
(Mmci„i) is calculated as:
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(5.9) Mmc
ID.-Mp
where n represents the set of markets (the provinces plus Capital Federal, Greater 
Buenos Aires and rest of the Province of Buenos Aires) in which bank i does not have 
branch offices, m is a province from the set of markets in which bank i has branch 
offices, Djm is an indicator taking value 1 if bank j is established in market n and Mym= 
Dimi- Djml, thus XMjjm counts the number of markets in which banks i and j 
simultaneously participate outside the focal market at time t. This measure averages the 
number of contacts that bank i has with incumbents in focal market n in markets 
different from n. ranges between zero, when bank i does not have any contact
with incumbents in market n outside that market, and the number of markets in which 
bank i has branch offices. To allow a curvilinear effect, this variable is specified as a 
quadratic by including both linear and squared terms. Mmc is expected to have an 
inverted U shaped effect on the hazard o f  entry into new markets.
Table 5.3 presents a hypothetical example of multimarket contact, showing the contacts 
of three firms (ij=A, B, C) in three markets (n,m=I, II, III), where a square indicates 
the presence o f a firm in a given market. The multimarkct contacts of firm A (i) with 
the incumbents in market I (n) is calculated as follows. First, the contacts of firm A 
with firms operating in market I outside that market (Djni'Mjjm) is calculated as follows:
DB.rMA.un = 1(11) = 1, DBrMA.B.,n = 1 (1 0 ) = 0, Dc -Ma-cii = 1(11) = 1. and 
Dci'Maciii = 1(11)  = 1, where Dbi M a b ii=1 simply indicates that firm A meets 
incumbent firm B in market II while Dbi-Mab in = 0 indicates that even when firm A 
meets B in I, B docs not operates in III. Second, the contacts of firm A with incumbents
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in market I outside that market are averaged out by summing all the contacts outside 
the focal market and dividing by the number of firms in market I, that is, 
MmcA i=(D b i-Ma b ii+D b i-Ma b iii+D c i-Ma c  ii+D c i-Mac m )/2=(l+0+l+l)/2 =1.5. This 
measure suggests that firm A (i) has 1.5 contacts on average in non-focal markets II and 
III (m) with B and C (incumbents in focal market I) (n). Table 5.3 shows that potential 
entrant A in market I meets B in one market outside the focal market (II) and competes 
with C in two markets outside I, A has on average 1.5 contacts with incumbents in I.
Table 5.3
Multimarket contacts of imaginary firms A, B and C in markets I, II and III
Firm I
Market
II III
A ■ ■
B ■ ■
C ■ ■ ■
Market dominance. To evaluate the effects of spheres of influence on the likelihood of 
entry, market dominance (DShare„,) is measured as the total market share of the bank 
with the largest branch-office network in the focal market (Baum and Korn, 1996; 
Fuentelsaz and Gomez, 2002a; Haveman and Nonnemaker, 2000). The interaction of 
this variable with multimarket contact is also included as an explanatory variable to 
analyse the effect of spheres of influence on the relationship between multimarket 
contact and market entry. DShare and its interaction with Mmc are expected to have a 
negative effect on the hazard o f  entry into new markets.
Strategic similarity. The effect of strategic similarity among multimarket competitors 
on multimarket contact and entry is analysed by comparing some characteristics of 
firms’ strategies. Following Mehra (1996), a multi-dimensional approach distinguishing
between scope and resource commitments is used to select the variables describing 
banks’ strategic characteristics. The strategic scope variables are: (1) retail loans/total 
loans and (2) corporate loans/total loans, which are used to represent the degree of 
involvement of the bank in the retail and wholesale markets, respectively, and (3) non­
interest revenue/total revenues is employed to capture the product diversity in the 
banks’ strategy. The strategic resource variables are: (4) net purchased funds/total 
assets which is intended to reflect the degree to which the bank relies on purchasing 
funds rather than on deposits to fund its assets; (S) equity/total assets is used to capture 
the riskiness of the banks’ strategy; (6) provisions/total loans reflects the efficiency of a 
bank’s process in recognising problem loans, and making the adequate provisions and 
(7) total loans/total assets captures the production mix of a bank’s assets.
Following Gimeno and Woo (1996), these variables are used to measure strategic 
similarity for each pair of focal (i) and incumbent bank (j) as the Euclidean distances 
between the standardised points in the seven-dimensional space, normalised on the zero 
to one range:
where zv represent each of the strategic scope or resource variables. This measure takes 
the value of one (minimum similarity) when the Euclidean distance in the strategic 
space between two banks is the largest for all pairs in the sample, and it equals zero 
(maximum similarity) when the Euclidean distance is zero.
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Simy, measures the strategic similarity between banks i and j, however, the intensity of 
rivalry experienced by bank i in a given market n is affected by the rivalry with all 
relevant competitors in that market. Thus, the effect o f strategic similarity to those 
competitors is aggregated by calculating the average strategic similarity to all 
competitors j in focal market n. The bank-market measure of strategic similarity is then 
obtained by summing and dividing SimtJ, by the number of incumbents j in every focal 
market n:
Z D,» Sim„ 
(5.11) SSimilinl = —
2Ld*J  jn t
The interaction of this variable with Mmc is also included as an independent variable to 
analyse the moderating effect of strategic similarity on the relationship between 
multimarkct contact and entry. SSimil could have a positive, negative or no effect on the 
hazard o f  entry, while its interaction with multimarket contact is expected to have a 
negative effect on the hazard o f entry into new markets.
Market concentration. To analyse the influence of market structure, as an indicator of 
actual rivalry, on the relationship between multimarket contact and entry, market 
concentration (FM ConcM) for each focal market n is defined using the Herfindahl- 
Hirschman index at the start of each year:
(5.12) FM Concn, = £ S j .
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where Sjni is the market share of firm j in market n at time t defined in terms of number 
of branches. The interaction of this variable with multimarket contact is also included 
as explanatory variable to analyse the influence of market structure on the relationship 
multimarket contact-entry. FM Cone could have a positive, negative or no effect on the 
hazard o f  entry, while its interaction with multimarket contact is expected to have a 
negative effect on the hazard o f entry into new markets.
5.5.2.3 Control Variables
The control variables are classified as firm-level and market-level controls. These 
variables are time-varying and measured at the start o f each year.
Firm-level control variables. The effect of banks’ competence on the likelihood of 
entry is proxied by the bank’s profitability (Prof,), which is measured using the return 
on assets calculated as profits before taxes to total assets. Size is also included as a 
control variable (Size„), which is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets of bank 
i (in constant pesos).”  The effects of a bank’s previous experience in managing 
operations across markets on its current pattern of entry is controlled by including the 
variable Exp«, which counts the number of provinces in which the bank was operating 
at the end of the previous year. To permit a curvilinear effect, this variable is specified 
as a quadratic by including both linear an quadratic terms. Banks’ ownership structure 
is also included as a control variable. Banks arc divided into three types: (i) public- 
owned banks, which are under the control of the national or provincial government; (ii) 
mutual banks, which are owned by all depositors, and (iii) stock banks owned by
”  Size could be measured using the volume of loans instead of total asset* however, most studies in the 
banking industry measure size using total assets.
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shareholders. This last category is further broken down in terms of domestic or foreign 
ownership. Binary dummy variables taking value one when the bank is public, mutual, 
stock or foreign (DPub, DMut, DStock and DFor), are used to distinguish among these 
different banks.
Market-level control variables. Several focal market characteristics are included as 
control variables. Two variables are used to measure intensity of demand in the 
objective market: (i) population density (MPop„,) in the focal market n at the start of the 
year, which is a variable frequently used in the literature on bank branching to proxy 
for population concentration (Lilien and Yoon, 1990; Fuentelsaz and Gomez, 2002) and 
(ii) volume of loans per inhabitant (Mdemnl). These two “intensity” variables are added 
to compare their ability to predict duration before entry.9* Market growth (MGrowth„,) 
is given by the average growth rate of total loans in province n in the three years 
previous to the focal year t.
Potential rivalry (MRivaln,) is measured by counting the number of banks operating in 
the markets adjacent to every potential focal market. The degree of concentration in 
markets in which banks operate is also controlled by including the variable NFM 
Concu, which is measured through a Herfmdahl-Hirschman index weighted by the 
relative importance of each market for firm i (Fucntclsaz and Gomez, 2002a). A 
provincial HH1 is calculated using the number of branches as a proxy for market share 
and then weighted by multiplying each provincial HHI by the relative importance of the
** In (i) intensity of demand arises from both market size (population) and geographic area. Population 
density is included to reflect the fact that the more densely populated the area the greater the likelihood 
of entry. Population density is used (instead of population and area separately) with the aim to compare 
its predicting ability with the other intensity of demand variable (ii). In an extended study, however, two 
different specifications could be estimated: one including population and area and another including 
population density and deposits per inhabitant.
province for bank i (the number of branches is used to measure the importance of the 
province for bank i).
Another control variable included in studies of entry is proximity to the objective 
market. These studies suggest that firms first enter closer locations, acquiring 
knowledge about local markets, and then enter further markets. Physical proximity 
arises then as a potential determinant of firms’ entry. However, in this study more than 
half of the entries occurred outside the markets adjacent to that in which the bank 
already operates. For this reason, this variable is not included in the analysis. In 
addition, some studies limit the set of markets at risk to those adjacent markets. In this 
study, however, since this is not the case, all markets where the bank does not operate 
at the beginning of the year are considered at risk (not just adjacent markets).
5.5.3 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 5.1 shows the number of entries per year over the period 1994-2000. This figure 
reveals that the number of entries increased up until 1995, when entry started to decline 
possibly due to the effects of the Mexican crisis of 1994. But in 1996 the entry process 
started to escalate again with a peak in 1998 when around 50 new entries occurred, 
probably associated to the expansion process initiated by foreign- and large domestic- 
owned banks. However, from 1998 the number of entries fell until the end of the 
sample period. In 2000 the number of entries into new markets was as low as 10. This 
figure suggests that the entry process appear to have an (accentuated) S form
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Number of entry events
Figure 5.1
Table 5.4 presents the descriptive statistics for the independent variables. The mean 
value of multimarket contact is 2.63, which suggests that the average bank have 
contacts with market incumbents in 2.63 markets outside the focal market. The measure 
of skewness suggests the distribution of multimarket contact is skewed right with few 
banks greatly exposed to contact in outside markets. Figures in Table 5.4 also reveal 
that the average degree of strategic similarity among multimarkct competitors is 0.20, 
ranging from 0.03 to 0.98. The mean dominant market share is 0.43, which suggests 
that a single bank with 43 percent of the market dominates the average market. The 
figures further suggest that the distribution of dominant shares is symmetric with many 
markets dominated by a single bank while many others shared among several banks 
with relatively small market shares. The data also show that the degree of concentration 
in the average market is 0.27, which varies from 0.04 to 0.62.
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Descriptive statistics
Table 5.4
Argentine retail banking industry, 1993-2000
Variable Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis
Multimarket contact
Mme (number of markets) 2.635 1.778 2.468 0.079 17.800 2.511 10.300
Moderating variables
SSimil 0.200 0.122 0.155 0.029 0.984 1.147 4.472
DShare (%) 43.40 43.86 15.03 8.33 77.36 -0.016 2.411
FM Cone 0.268 0.258 0.124 0.036 0.617 0.579 2.880
Firm control variables
Size (million S) 627.9 219.7 1,460.5 5.78 15,200 6.118 48.456
Prof (%) 0.546 0.766 3.399 -14.32 12.99 -1.088 6.448
Exp (number of markets) 3.361 2.0 3.453 0.00 24.00 2.954 13.645
Market control variables
NFM Cone 0.144 0.123 0.091 0.036 0.554 1.609 5.970
FM Pop (inhabitants per km2) 217.10 7.158 1,449.3 0.700 15,217 9.516 97.243
FM Dem (thousand S per 1.528 0.615 2.623 0.086 16.158 2.902 10.725
inhabitant)
FM Growth (%) 9.090 16.300 13.433 0.000 74.826 68.900 294.300
FM Rivalry (number of banks) 70.453 61.0 44.379 9.000 181.00 0.510 2.374
“Number of observations: 12,397
Table 5.4 also reports descriptive statistics for the firm- and market-level control 
variables. These figures reveal that the average bank has $628 million of assets, return 
on assets o f 0.55 percent and operative branches in 3.36 markets. The data also show 
that the average degree of concentration in the markets where multimarket competitors 
operate is 0.14. The information further indicate that the average focal market has a 
population density of 217 inhabitants per square kilometre, that demand for loans is 
$1.5 thousand per inhabitant, that market growth is 9 percent per year and that the 
average number of competitors in adjacent markets is 70.4.
5.6 Results
The hazard function (5.3) was estimated using the Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) 
estimator. To correct for cross-dependence across observations, the hazard rate (5.7) 
was also estimated assuming a normal distribution for the random effects.97 The null 
hypothesis that the variance o f the random effects is zero was strongly rejected in all 
cases, hence, the results presented correspond to the model that includes random 
effects. Different models were estimated in order to analyse the relationship between 
multimarket contact and market entry into new markets using a parametric and a non- 
parametric baseline specification. Table 5.5 shows the results for the hazard rate 
estimates for these alternative models. Columns (l)-(3) report maximum likelihood 
estimates of the hazard of bank entry into new markets using a parametric baseline 
specification while columns (4)-(6) show the estimates obtained with a non-parametric 
baseline specification. All models provide similar estimates across specifications. 
However, the non-parametric baseline specification clearly dominates over the 
parametric specification from log-likelihood values.
Model 1 shows a baseline model, which contains only the firm- and market-level 
control variables. The coefficient on Size is positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level in all cases. This suggests that banks with large asset bases are more likely to 
expand into new markets. The coefficients on Exp and Exp2 present the wrong signs 
suggesting that as experience increases market entry decreases but it escalates for high 
levels of experience. However, after adding multimarket contact the linear term 
becomes insignificant while the quadratic term continues being positive and significant,
’7 Even though the Gamma and inverse Gaussian distributions are the most commonly used to capture 
unobserved heterogeneity, Meyer (1990) suggests that other distributions can also be used. In this study
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which implies that entry increases at an increasing rate with experience. The coefficient 
on DPub is negative and highly significant suggesting that public-owned banks are less 
likely to enter new markets than private-owned banks. The coefficients on FM Pop, FM 
Dem and FM  Growth (for the non-parametric specification) are positive and significant 
at the 1% confidence level, which suggests that banks tend to enter new markets when 
the level o f demographic variables are favourable i.e. high population density, demand 
intensity and growth. None of the other control variables have any significant effect on 
the rates o f  entry.
Model 2 incorporates multimarket contact to analyse whether the relationship between 
multimarket contact and market entry is linear. Model 2 represents a significant 
improvement over Model 1. The Likelihood Ratio (LR) test of model 1 versus model 2 
exceeds the chi-square critical value with 1 d.f. at the 1% level. The coefficient on 
Mmc is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that banks are 
more likely to enter markets where their level of contact with multimarket incumbents 
is low. Model 3 incorporates the quadratic term on multimarket contact to analyse 
whether the relationship is o f an inverted U-form. The LR test of model 2 versus model 
3 does not exceed the chi-square critical value with 1 d.f. at the 1% level and the 
quadratic term of multimarket contact is not statistically significant. These results 
suggest that the relationship between multimarket contact and market entry seems to be 
linear.98
the Gamma distribution was used in a first instance, however, convergence problems for the estimation 
of most o f the models led to the use of the normal distribution to represent heterogeneity.
”  Another specification included a cubic term, which resulted negative (but insignificant). This result 
discards the U shape as an alternative.
Table 5.5
Hazard rate estimates using parametric and non-parametric baseline specifications
Variable1 Parametric baseline hazard
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Non-parametric baseline hazard
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Control variables
Size 0.645 — 0.989 *“ 1.451 ~ 0.676 *** 1.006 •" 0.654 ***
(5.99) (7.85) (10.07) (5.71) (8.09) (5.6)
Prof -0.018 -0.012 -0.009 -0.002 -0.011 -0.009
(-0.85) (-0.54) (-0.35) (-0.1) (-0.5) (-0.45)
Exp -0.207 *** -0.118 * 0.034 -0.187 *** -0.092 0.125
(-3.07) (-1.66) (0.35) (-2.58) (-1.18) (1.18)
Exp2 0.009 *“ 0.008 — 0.001 0.007 " 0.007 “ 0.001
(3.45) (3.06) (0.26) (2.54) (2.46) (012)
NFM Cone 0.827 1.613 3.879 *** 3.217 ** 1.569 3.229 **
(0.56) (1.07) (2.63) (2.07) (1.1) (2.01)
FM Pop 0.135 *** 0.133 *” 0.108 *** 0.135 *** 0.130 *" 0.105 “ *
(4.18) (3.95) (3.18) (4.07) (3.87) (3.07)
FM Dem 0.139 *“ 0.119 *** 0.109 — 0.136 *** 0.118 “* 0.105 ***
(5.32) (4.55) (4.07) (5.23) (4.5) (3.99)
FM Growth 0.681 0.902 0.472 2.068 * 1.881 • 1.814 *
(0.71) (0.93) (0.46) (191) (175) (166)
FM Rivalry 0.003 0.003 * 0.003 * 0.003 0.003 0.003
(1.56) (1.86) (1.89) (1.54) (1.63) (161)
DPub -2.140 *" -2.511 **• -3.635 *** -2.315 *** -2.361 “* -2.548 *“
(-4.11) (-4.31) (-6.39) (-3.75) (-4.22) (-3.9)
DFor -0.076 -0.008 -0.057 0.495 * 0.056 -0.428
(-0.31) (-0.03) (-0.19) (174) (0.21) (-135)
DMut 0.268 -0.581 “ -0.269 -0.489 -0.998 *** -0.368
(0.90) (-1.98) (-0.89) (-159) (3.15) (-1.21)
Multimarket contact variable
Mme
Mme2
-0.289
(-4.22)
-0.631 *“  
(-415) 
0.018 
(152)
-0.296 “* 
(-4.17)
-0.568 *“  
(-3.52) 
0.018 
(1-25)
Time variables
Log time 0.274
(137)
0.735 “ * 
(3.36)
0.758 *** 
(2.87)
Duration dummies”
Constant -14.332 *“ -18.696 — -23.223 -15.375 — -19.660 — -14.986 ***
(-10.19) (-11.04) (-12.85) (-10.02) (-11-5) (-10.02)
Log likelihood -775.57 -766.08 -764.83 -759.63 -750.06 -747.62
Likelihood Ratio test
Versus Model 1 
Versus Model 2 
No random effects 156.51 ***
19.00 "* 
127.46 “*
21.48 **• 
2.49
124.33 *** 101.81 *“
19.14 “ * 
110.95 “*
24.03 *“  
1.53 “  
113.04*“
(P-0)
” , • indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. * Dependent variable is entry 
into new geographical (provincial) markets, the number of entries is 190 and the number of observations 
is 12,397. b The coefficients of the dummy variables D1-D5 (D6-D7) are non-monotonically increasing 
(decreasing) from a larger (smaller) negative to a smaller (larger) negative number.
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These results are similar to Baum and Korn’s (1996) for the Californian airlines’ 
industry. However, these findings differ from previous studies of multimarket contact 
and market entry in the banking industry. Haveman and Nonnemaker (2000) and 
Fuentelsaz and Gomez (2002a) find an inverted U-shaped relationship between contact 
and entry. Fuentelsaz and Gomez (2002a) analyse the period following elimination of 
branching restrictions in the Spanish banking industry. They find that the likelihood of 
entry increases for values of multimarket contact lower than 10.9 while it decreases for 
higher values of contact. They also recognise that while multimarket contact ranges 
between 0 and 24, the average level of contact in the Spanish savings industry is of 1.62 
in 1999 (end of the sample period). In contrast, in the Argentine banking industry 
multimarket contact ranges between 0 and 17.8 and the average level of contact at the 
end of the sample period is 4.3. This may suggest that as a result of a higher degree of 
multimarket contact, the Argentine banking industry is on the decreasing portion of the 
inverted U-shaped curve. This may explain the linear relationship between contact and 
market entry encountered in this study.
Other variables may affect the relationship between multimarket contact and market 
entry, as discussed in section 5.3. Table 5.6 shows the results of estimating a set of 
models that consider the influence of market dominance, strategic similarity and market 
concentration on the relationship between multimarket contact and bank entry. These 
models incorporate the variables and their interactions with multimarket contact to 
analyse the effects of these moderators on the likelihood of entry and on the link 
between multimarket contact and entry. The results reported correspond to the 
estimation o f proportional hazards models with non-parametric baseline specification. 
As mentioned above, the non-parametric specification imposes fewer restrictions on the
shape of the baseline hazard avoiding any potential bias on the parameter estimates and 
provides a better representation of the data. The results show that the coefficients are 
similar across specifications and that all of models (but one) represent a significant 
improvement over Model 2.
Models 4 and 5 add the effect of dominant market share (DShare) to the analysis of 
multimarket contact and bank entry. Model 4 represents a significant improvement 
over Model 2, the LR test exceeds the chi-square critical value at the 1% level. The 
coefficient on market dominance is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
This result suggests that banks are less likely to enter markets dominated by a large 
bank, since retaliation by a dominant bank is likely to be more damaging. In line with 
this finding, Baum and Korn (1996) also find that in the Californian airline industry 
DShare has a negative and significant influence on airlines’ entry rates. Similarly, 
Haveman and Nonnemaker (2000) report that, in the S&Ls industry in California, 
market dominance reduces the likelihood of entry into new markets.
Model 5, which adds the interaction term, do not represent a significant improvement 
over Model 2 or Model 4. The estimate for the multimarket by dominant share 
interaction is statistically insignificant, suggesting that market dominance does not 
moderate the relationship between multipoint contact and market entry. Baum and Kom 
(1996) report that the interaction term between DShare and Mmc is negative and 
significant, however, the main effects of Mmc becomes insignificant in the analysis 
after adding this interaction. They suggest that the effects of multimarket contact 
become mediated by the share of the dominant airline on a route, however, they also 
mention multicollinearity as an alternative explanation. In contrast, Haveman and
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Table 5.6
Hazard rate estimates of market entry including moderating variables
Explanatory
Variables3
Market
Dominance
Model 4 Model 5
Strategic
Similarity
Model 6 Model 7
Market concentration
Model 8 Model 9
Control variables6
Size 0.813 *** 0.691 *" 0.796 *** 1.069 '** 1.134 — 1.040 ***
(6.79) (5.64) (6.67) (8.3) (7.56) (7.93)
Prof -0.003 -0.016 0.000 0.005 0.003 -0.004
(-0.12) (-0.77) (-0.02) (0.21) (01) (-0.16)
Exp -0.100 -0.100 -0.093 -0.017 -0.116 -0.115
(-1.24) (-1-16) (-1-1) (-0.21) (-1-37) (-141)
Exp2 0.010 “ * 0.010 *** 0.011 0.003 0.006 ** 0.008 ***
(3.47) (3.26) (3.67) (1.08) (2.06) (2.77)
NFM Cone 1.854 1.598 2.754 3.457 ** 3.918 ** 2.377
(1.28) (103) (159) (2.27) (2.17) (1.61)
FM Pop 0.115 *“ 0.096 *" 0.124 *** 0.122 *** 0.122 *** 0.104 "*
(341) (2.66) (3.66) (3.64) (3.5) (2-93)
FM Dcm 0.084 *** 0.074 *** 0.118 *** 0.117 **• 0.063 “ 0.050 *
(2.99) (2.58) (4.52) (4.47) (2.2) (174)
FM Growth 1.397 1.237 1.844 * 1.799 1.320 1.056
(1.28) (1.13) (1.69) (1.63) (12) (0.94)
FM Rivalry 0.006 — 0.005 ** 0.003 * 0.003 * 0.007 •** 0.007 ***
(2.72) (2.38) (1.75) (1.83) (3 38) (3.2)
DPub -2.229 *“ -2.250 *** -2.577 “ • -2.834 “ * -2.827 *** -2.629 ***
(-3.87) (-4 09) (-3.43) (-4.7) (-3.88) (-4.38)
DFor 0.265 0.405 0.472 0.256 0.327 0.168
(0.98) (141) (1.64) (0.94) (1.08) (0.62)
DMut 0.619 ** 0.611 * -0.601 * -0.077 0.194 -0.205
Moderator variables
(1.96) (1.88) (-1-87) (-0.24) (0.57) (-0.66)
Mmc -0.200 *** -0.307 *** -0.257 *** -0.468 *“ -0.200 *” -0.297 *“
DShare
SSimil
FMConc
Mmc-DShare
MmcSSimil
MmcFMConc
(-2.66)
-1.813
(-3.01)
(-2.92) 
-3.319 *** 
(-3.35)
0.233
(152)
(-3.52)
1.251
(0.84)
(-5.05)
-0.924
(-0.54)
-0.707 *** 
(-3.37)
(-2.64)
-3.654 — 
(-455)
(-3.05)
-5.463 *" 
(-4.1)
0.259
(16)
Constant -16.446 -14.506 *** -16.852 "* -20.066 “ • -20.268 *" -18.397 •”
(-9.87) (-8.6) (-10.49) (-1114) (-9.82) (-10.29)
Log likelihood -745.37 -744.16 -749.70 -744.07 -739.75 -738.51
Likelihood Ratio test
Vs Model 2 
Vs Model 4, 6, 8 or 10
9.40 *** 11.82 *** 
2.43
0.73 11.99 •** 
11.26 ~
20.62 *” 23.12 “ • 
2.50
No random effects
___________
114.52 *** 116.09 •** 120.84 •" 122.44 **• 108.51 *** 110.43 •**
***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. * Dependent variable is 
entry into new geographical (provincial) markets, the number of entries is 190 and the number of 
observations is 12,397.
JTable 5.7
Hazard rate estimates of market entry including all variables
Explanatory All Excluding DShare Excluding FMConc
Variables* Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15
Control variables “
Size 0.934 *** 0.960 *** 0.807 *** 0.548 *** 0.674 *” 0.741 ***
(7.24) (7.58) (6.79) (4.20) (5.82) (5.96)
Prof 0.005 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.013 -0.001
(0.24) (0.07) (-0.03) (-0.12) (-0.65) (-0.02)
Exp 0.012 0.073 -0.108 0.007 -0.114 -0.043
(0.14) (0.85) (-1.32) (0.08) (-138) (-047)
Exp2 0.007 ** 0.006 ** 0.010 *** 0.006 ” 0.010 "* 0.009 ***
(2.37) (2.07) (3.40) (2.18) (3.52) (2.77)
NFM Cone 1.742 1.614 1.920 2.189 2.073 2.474
(116) ( i n ) (1 28) (134) (1.15) (155)
FM Pop 0.182 *** 0.145 *** 0.119 “ 0.091 *** 0.115 "* 0.081 **
(488) (3.51) (3.50) (2.60) (3.40) (226)
FM Dem 0.056 * 0.045 0.064 ** 0.046 0.085 *” 0.071 **
(195) (1.56) (2.26) (159) (2.99) (2.47)
FM Growth 1.067 0.570 1.159 0.849 1.494 1.125
(0.97) (0.5) (1.06) (0.75) (1.38) (1.01)
FM Rivalry 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.007 *“ 0.006 *” 0.005 ” * 0.005 **
(3.02) (2.73) (3.23) (2.99) (2.61) (2.42)
DPub -2.584 *** -2.659 *** -2.234 *** -2.320 *" -2.306 *“ -2.444 ***
(-415) (-4.3) (-3.85) (-3.920 (-3.95) (-3.88)
DFor 0.758 *“ 0.688 ## 0.273 -0.465 0.429 0.421
(2 73) (2.57) (1.00) (-1.44) (147) (1.51)
DMut -0.173 -0.186 0.636 ** -0.475 0.631 * -0.629 **
(-0.57) (-0.62) (1.98) (-1.48) (190) (-2.00)
Moderator variables
Mmc -0.135 * -0.437 *** -0.164 ** -0.396 *** -0.174 ” -0.466 ***
(-174) (-3.25) (-2.18) (-3.31) (-2.34) (-3.71)
DSharc 8.651 *** 6.092 -1.859 ” * -3.460 ***
(3.98) <1 63) (-3.08) (-3.52)
SSimil 1.658 0.214 0.662 -0.324 1.209 -0.199
(114) (013) (0.43) (-0.17) (0.77) (-0.12)
FMConc -14.176 *** -12.994 — -3.632 '** -5.414 “
(-512) (-2.73) (-4.53) (-4.07)
Mmc DShare 0.423 0.284
(0.94) (1.25)
MmcSSimil -0.434 ** -0.462 ” -0.412 **
(-216) (-2.24) (-1 98)
MmcFMConc -0.170 0.284
(-0.30) (1 49)
Constant -18.647 *” -17.710 *•' -16.312*” -11.963 *” -15.145 ” * -14.345 ***
(-10.52) (-9.95) (-9.91) (-6.88) (-9.43) (-8.46)
Log likelihood -738.76 -734.64 -738.85 -734.07 -744.99 -740.71
Likelihood Ratio test 
Vs Model 2 22.61 ~ 30.85 *" 22.44 *" 32.00 ~* 10.16*“ 18.71 ”*
Vs Model 4, 6, 8 or 10 8.25 ” 9.56 " 8.56 **
No random effects
___________
90.85 *** 90.94 — 109.64 •** 112.93 *” 114.64 *** 113.46 —
••• , •*, • indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. * Dependent variable is 
entry into new geographical (provincial) markets, the number of entries is 190 and the number of 
observations is 12,397.
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Nonnemaker (2000) report that market dominance has a moderating effect on 
multimarket contact.
Models 6 and 7 incorporate the effects o f strategic similarity (SSimil) into the analysis 
of multimarket contact in Model 2. Model 6 does not improve over Model 2. The LR 
test does not exceed the chi-square critical value with 1 d.f. at usual levels of 
confidence and the coefficient on SSimil is statistically insignificant. This finding 
implies that the effects of increased coordination among similar firms, related to their 
recognition of mutual dependence, appears to compensate the effect of lack o f  product 
differentiation on the intensity of inter-firm rivalry. The final outcome is that strategic 
similarity has no significant influence on market entry. Gimeno and Woo (1996) report 
that high strategic similarity increases rivalry, as reflected by low average prices while 
Fuentelsaz and Gomez (2002a) find that more similar firms are inclined to have less 
aggressive behaviour towards rivals, as reflected by lower entry rates into new markets.
Model 7, which adds the interaction term with multimarket contact, represents a 
significant improvement over Model 6. The LR test of model 7 versus model 6 exceeds 
the chi-square critical value with 1 d.f. at the 1% level. The estimate for the 
multimarket contact by strategic similarity coefficient is negative and significant 
suggesting that higher similarity amplifies the negative effects of multimarket contact 
on market entry. This finding suggests that the deterrent and information benefits of 
multimarket contact outweigh the effects o f  lack product differentiation and reinforces 
firms’ recognition of interdependence leading to higher coordination. In line with this 
result, Baum and Korn (1999) find that in the Californian airline industry size
asymmetries across firms, an indicator of resource dissimilarity, interact with 
multimarkct contact in reducing market entry rates.
Models 8 and 9 add the effect of market concentration to the relationship between 
contact and entry into new markets. Model 8 represents an improvement over Model 2. 
The coefficient on FM Cone is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, 
suggesting that banks are less likely to enter highly concentrated markets. This results 
provides support to the predictions of oligopoly theory that collusion is more likely to 
occur in concentrated markets. Previous studies provide mixed results regarding the 
effect of market concentration. On the one hand, Fuentelsaz and Gomez (2002a) report 
that the degree of concentration has no significant effect on the rates of market entry. 
On the other, Baum and Korn (1996) find that market concentration has a positive 
effect on entry rates and argue that it creates opportunities for new specialised entrants.
Model 9, which adds the interaction term, does not provide any improvement over 
Model 8. The coefficient on the interaction term between FM Cone and Mmc is 
statistically insignificant. These results imply that market concentration does not appear 
to moderate the effect of multimarket contact on bank entry. Baum and Korn (1996) 
also find that market concentration has an insignificant effect when interacting with 
multimarket contact, but the effect of multimarkct contact on entry also becomes 
insignificant. They suggest that this finding could be related to multicollincarity 
problems.
Model 10 and 11 incorporates all these moderating factors. The coefficient on Mmc is 
negative and statistically significant. Market dominance has now a positive effect on
market entry, while its interaction with Mmc is insignificant. This result may be related 
to possible multicollinearity with market concentration. For this reason, Models 12 and 
13 incorporate DShare and SSimil only while Models 14 and 15 include SSimil and FM 
Cone. These results show that market dominance has a negative and significant effect 
on market entry, while its interaction with Mmc is insignificant. Strategic similarity has 
no significant impact on the likelihood of entry, however, interacting with Mmc leads to 
lower entry rates. Finally, market concentration has a negative and statistically 
significant effect on the timing of entry into new markets while the interaction term 
with Mmc is insignificant.
The analysis of entry in the banking industry in Argentina could be further extended by 
analysing the factors that explain the number of branches banks open in a particular 
province or by estimating the determinants of the different types o f entry i.e. de novo or 
via mergers and acquisitions. Additionally, alternative definition of control variables 
could also contribute to analyse the robustness of the results such as different 
definitions of size, inclusion of population and area instead of population density and 
deposits per inhabitant or inclusion of a proximity variable. However, this is left for an 
extended study.
5.7 Conclusions
This chapter adds new evidence to the debate regarding the link between multimarket 
contact and competition by examining the relationship between contact and market 
entry dynamics in the Argentine banking industry over the 1994-2000 period. Market 
entry is used as an indicator of firm’s behaviour and multimarket contact is analysed at 
the firm-market level. The effects of firm- and market-level characteristics on banks’
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choices of entry and of other competitive and market factors such as spheres of 
influence, strategic similarity and market concentration on the relationship between 
multimarket contact and market entry are considered in the analysis. Survival analysis 
techniques are used to estimate the relationship between contact and bank entry into 
new geographic markets using a longitudinal dataset.
The results tentatively suggest that firms with large asset bases and greater experience 
are more likely to expand into new markets when the level of demographic variables 
such as population density, intensity of demand or market growth are favourable. The 
results further show that multimarket contact seems to reduce the likelihood of entry 
into new markets. This finding provides some support to the mutual forbearance 
hypothesis, which predicts that when firms meet in multiple markets they hesitate to 
contest a given market vigorously. Contact in multiple markets allow firms to observe 
each other’s behaviour increasing firms’ abilities to interpret each other’s intentions 
and actions. It also provides greater scope for firms to respond to their competitors’ 
actions. As a result, multimarket competitors avoid aggressive behaviour that could 
destabilise their competitive relationship.
The findings tentatively suggest that firms arc less likely to enter markets dominated by 
a single firm, that is, these markets are not attractive for firms searching for new 
opportunities. However, the effects of multimarket contact on firms’ rates of entry are 
not affected by the level of market dominance. The results also seem to suggest that 
strategic similarity among firms has no effect on rates of entry into new markets, which 
implies that the possibility o f  tacit coordination among strategically similar rivals is 
outweighed by the potential for disruption when rivals seek similar market positions,
use similar resources or develop similar organisational capabilities. However, when 
similar firms are multimarket rivals, the additional information provided by the 
multiple contacts increases the likelihood of coordination, which thus reduces the rates 
of entry into new markets. The findings further imply tentatively that firms are less 
likely to enter highly concentrated markets, because they recognise their mutual 
interdependence, avoiding aggressive behaviour. The effects of multimarket contact on 
firms’ entry rates are, however, not affected by market concentration.
The results have implications for the analysis of multimarket competition. First, it 
provides new evidence on the link between multimarket contact and competition in the 
banking industry, which is consistent with theoretical predictions and empirical 
findings for other industries. Second, the inclusion of moderating variables of the 
relationship between multimarket contact and competition contributes to a better 
understanding of the effects of market and firm-level characteristics. Third, the use of 
longitudinal data adds considerable value to the study of the dynamics o f rivalry, going 
beyond traditional cross-sectional studies that examine interfirm interaction at a given 
point in time. Fourth, the introduction of random effects to control for the potential 
correlation across observations as well as for omitted variables represents a significant 
improvement over previous works.
The results lead to some tentative policy implications . The findings can be used by 
regulators to analyse the effects of deregulation in markets such as telephone 
communications, for example. Deregulation will have the effect o f bringing into 
competition firms with different positioning and capabilities that have not experienced 
multimarket contact before due to local market regulations. The results o f this study
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could be used to predict firms’ competitive interactions given the effects of strategic 
similarity and multimarket contact, helping managers develop appropriate strategies. 
The findings of this chapter could also be used in antitrust policies when analysing the 
effects o f horizontal mergers. Antitrust authorities in general ignore multimarket 
reactions, focusing only on horizontal dominance of markets. The results discussed in 
this study could be used to consider the effects of horizontal mergers on both market 
concentration and multimarket linkages.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.1 Summary of Findings
The banking industry has experienced extraordinary changes over the last decades. 
Banking markets have been deregulated and opened up to foreign competition in a 
number o f  countries around the world with the aim of achieving more efficiency. As 
banking markets were seen as partly characterised by collusive behaviour, liberalisation 
policies have been targeted at fostering innovation and efficiency, by making markets 
more competitive and reducing oligopoly rents. As a result, post-deregulation 
developments including mergers and consolidation, privatisation of public-owned 
banks and entry of foreign banks have led to deep changes in the structure of domestic 
banking markets.
This thesis has provided new evidence on post-deregulation developments in financial 
services industries by examining the banking industry in Argentina after its 
deregulation in the early 1990s. The analysis of the Argentine banking sector is relevant 
for other developing countries, as the banking reforms implemented throughout the 
1990s made the country among the first developing economies transforming the 
ownership, structure and regulation of the industry. This thesis extends existing 
research by providing new evidence on the effects of consolidation on market power, 
cost economics and consumers’ welfare; on the relative efficiency of different 
ownership types; and on the influence of banks’ geographic expansion on multimarket 
contact and local market competition.
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The construction of a rich and detailed dataset for the Argentine banking industry has 
allowed a fuller and richer understanding o f the industry’s cost structure, the effects of 
banks’ ownership structure on efficiency and a more comprehensive assessment of the 
determinants o f banks’ expansion decisions. These issues have been examined using 
post-deregulation data over the 1993-2000 period. Such a period covers a decade of 
institutional order and economic stability. These conditions were, however, interrupted 
in December 2001 with the resignation of the Nation’s President, the freezing of bank 
deposits and an asymmetric ‘pesification’ o f banks’ loans and deposits. The findings of 
this thesis are not only unaffected but, in practice, they also could assist policy makers 
in the development of future policies.
Chapter 2 provided the contextual industry framework that led to the questions 
addressed in the rest of the thesis. This chapter offered an institutional background to 
the empirical chapters, as it described the characteristics of the consolidation process in 
the banking industry, its effects on the structure o f the sector and on the geographic 
range of banks’ operations. It also examined the industry’s privatisation process, the 
entry of foreign banks and discussed the changes in the ownership structure of the 
sector as a result of these developments. The three chapters that follow presented the 
empirical results.
Chapter 3 used a cost-function based model incorporating output- and input-market 
pricing equations to examine the market and cost structure o f the banking industry in 
order to provide some useful insights on the effects of consolidation on market power, 
cost economies and economic welfare. This chapter makes two contributions to the 
banking literature. First, it is the first to examine market power both in the markets for
loans (output) and deposits (inputs) using bank-level data and allowing for a flexible 
cost structure. Second, it is also novel in that it analyses the market power and cost 
economics effects of consolidation on economic welfare.
The findings provided evidence of market power exploitation in the market for loans 
but not in the market for deposits. On the contrary, in the latter banks appear to have 
been paying a margin above the marginal value for increases in deposits. The results 
also suggested differences across banks size classes since larger banks appear to have 
been exercising a higher degree of market power pricing in the market for loans and 
seem to have been paying a lower margin over the marginal value of deposits. The 
findings further suggested that banks operate under increasing returns to scale, which 
decrease with bank size, and that larger banks benefited to a larger extent from 
technical progress.
The evidence also indicated that market power and scale economies increased over the 
post-deregulation. However, the effects of cost economies appear to have outweighed 
the negative influence of market power on prices and service availability, as consumers 
and banks have benefited in terms of economic welfare. These findings could serve 
policy makers because they suggest that policies directed towards downsizing in 
industries characterised by high concentration levels could be misdirected if  
consolidation and resulting concentration arc motivated by cost economies. Such an 
action could limit the potential to lower costs in the industry, and thus reduce the price 
for consumers.
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Chapter 4 explored the relative efficiency of stock, mutual, public- and foreign-owned 
banks using a variety of techniques to allow for comparisons across measurement 
methods. This chapter makes two contributions to the empirical banking literature, as it 
is the first to consider efficiency differences across four different ownership types and 
since it analyses the relationship between ownership and efficiency in the context of a 
developing economy. The banking industry in Argentina presented an interesting 
setting to analyse the ownership-efficiency relationship as the sector is characterised by 
the coexistence of four ownership types: mutual, stock, public- and foreign-owned 
banks. Previous studies have mainly analysed differences between stock and mutual or 
domestic- and foreign-owned banks, most of them in the U.S. where the public 
ownership form is not present. Few studies have analysed efficiency differences in a 
developing economy and the results from these works have been mixed.
The findings suggested that the choice of methodology have an important impact on the 
estimated efficiency scores. However, the different methods provided similar efficiency 
rankings, especially at the top and bottom of the distribution, where managerial interest 
is concentrated. The evidence further indicated that among domestic-owned banks, 
stock banks have higher cost efficiency scores than mutual and public-owned banks. 
However, the differences between public-owned and private banks are much more 
relevant than differences within private banks, which point towards agency problems in 
public-owned banks as responsible for the lower efficiency levels.
The results also showed that stock domestic- and foreign-owned banks have similar 
cost and profit efficiency levels, suggesting that foreign-owned banks compensated the 
costs of operating abroad by importing capabilities from their parent organisations. The
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findings also provided evidence of widespread economies of scale across all ownership 
types but technical progress benefited only stock domestic- and foreign-owned banks. 
The empirical evidence further indicated that the efficiency of the banking industry 
increased over the post-deregulation period as a result of an improved performance of 
all ownership types, but especially that o f  mutual and public banks. This result 
suggested that the post-deregulation developments i.e. consolidation, privatisation and 
foreign entry, appear to have played a significant role in the banking industry in 
Argentina. These findings could serve regulators when performing regulatory analysis 
by suggesting that the use of multiple techniques could prove useful. Additionally, this 
evidence could also provide policy makers in developing countries with information 
regarding the benefits of privatising public banks or liberalising entry into their banking 
sectors, provided any adverse effects of such policies, are not too severe.
Chapter 5 examined the impact of multimarket contact on banks’ entry rates into new 
geographic markets using survival analysis techniques and considering the effect of 
bank- and market-level characteristics on banks’ choices of entry. The main 
contribution of this chapter to the multimarket contact literature lies in the analysis of 
the moderating effects o f several variables, which were not considered, at least 
simultaneously, in previous studies. The results showed that, regardless of multimarket 
contact, banks with large assets bases and greater experience are more likely to expand 
into new markets when the level of demographic variables is favourable, such as high 
market population, intensity of demand and market growth.
The findings tentatively suggested that multimarkct competitors are less likely to enter 
new markets when their level of contact with market incumbents is high, providing
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support for the mutual forbearance hypothesis. The results also showed that contact in 
multiple markets provide banks with greater information about competitors to predict 
future intentions and actions and also provide greater scope for banks to respond to 
their competitors’ actions. However, the evidence further indicated that strategic 
similarity possibly moderate the relationship between multimarket contact and market 
entry. The results showed that when multimarket competitors are similar in terms of 
strategies, the likelihood o f entry into new markets is reduced even more. These 
findings could serve regulators to analyse the effects of deregulation in markets 
characterised by barriers to geographic expansion or in antitrust policies to the analysis 
of horizontal mergers.
6.2 Further Research Avenues
This thesis has made several contributions to the banking literature. These contributions 
are in part a direct result o f the utilisation of a particularly rich dataset for the banking 
industry in a developing country -  given the industry standards -  that contains bank 
level data for the period following deregulation in the 1990s. The findings presented in 
the thesis contributed to the literature by demonstrating how post-deregulation 
developments in the banking industry can be very important economic events with 
multiple implications. This thesis, furthermore, could also serve as the starting point for 
future research.
This thesis has analysed post-deregulation developments in the banking industry in 
Argentina, where deregulation policies were undertaken in the early 1990s with the aim 
of achieving more efficiency by making the industry more competitive. The evidence 
presented in the empirical chapters, however, has suggested that deregulation has not
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contributed to enhance competition during the decade. These chapters have analysed 
the behaviour of banks, though, other developments that have also emerged during this 
post-deregulation period have affected consumers behaviour. The unbundling of the 
pricing of services and electronic technology have contributed to increase consumers’ 
switching costs in retail banking. These costs refer to “the information and transaction 
costs incurred by retail customers in switching from one supplier to another” (Rhoades, 
2000, pg. 363). Switching costs could help explaining the effects of deregulation on 
market competition.
The unbundling in the pricing of retail banking services involved the implementation of 
explicit fees and charges to cover costs for specific services used by customers. This 
new pricing scheme replaced the previous one based on the implicit incorporation of 
fees and charges in the interest paid on deposits or charged on loans to customers. As a 
result of this new scheme, the pricing of banking services became more complex with 
the consequent difficulty for customers to compare the prices of products across banks. 
The increased use of electronic technology, such as direct deposit of paycheques or 
direct debit for payments of mortgages or bills, has also contributed to increase 
switching costs. To switch from one bank to another, customers need to make formal 
arrangements with each organisation making direct deposits or debits and also with the 
original and new banks.
As Rhoades (2000) mentions, the presence of switching costs constitutes a significant 
impediment to competition. In addition, Waterson (2003) notes that “resulting from the 
behaviour o f  customers in some important types of industry, traditional competition 
policy will not suffice to render the industry competitive and that, in such cases, quite
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different policy measures may well be more effective in enhancing competition” (pg.
130). Rhoades (2000) also argues that “the issue has received almost no attention from 
researchers or antitrust authorities” (pg. 364). As well as continuing with the line of 
research of this thesis, the analysis of post-deregulation developments in the banking 
industry could also be extended towards the study of switching costs and consumers’ 
behaviour.
6.3 Concluding Remarks
This thesis has made several contributions to the banking literature in the following 
areas. Firstly, it has analysed market power in both the markets for loans (output) and 
deposits (input) using a structural model. In addition, this study has also examined the 
welfare consequences of market power and cost economies as a result of increased 
concentration, using a partial equilibrium model. Secondly, this thesis has explored the 
efficiency differences across public- and private-owned banks and, within the latter, it 
has further measured the relative efficiency of stock and mutual banks. Furthermore, it 
has compared domestic- and foreign-owned banks in terms o f  both cost and profit 
efficiency using a variety of techniques. Additionally, this study has analysed the 
evolution of the banking sector’s efficiency after deregulation. Thirdly, this thesis has 
explored the effects of increased multimarket contact on market entry dynamics, 
considering the influence of firms’ strategies or the structure o f the markets on this 
relationship.
The findings of this thesis could be used by policy makers in developing countries 
when deciding about several issues. Firstly, the evidence presented could provide 
regulators with additional information to decide about the policies to adopt in highly
concentrated industries, when consolidation is possibly driven by cost economies. 
Secondly, the findings could also provide policy makers with useful information 
regarding the benefits of privatisation or liberalising policies. Finally, the evidence 
could also serve regulators to analyse the effects o f deregulation in markets 
characterised by barriers to geographic expansion or in antitrust policies to the analysis 
of horizontal mergers.
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